Military crisis management in the next decade (2020-2030) : inducing consent or relying on compliance? by Laakkonen, Mikko
NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEXT DECADE (2020-2030) – 
INDUCING CONSENT OR RELYING ON COMPLIANCE? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
    Diploma thesis 
 
    Lieutenant Senior Grade (Navy) 
    Mikko Laakkonen 
        
    General Staff Officer Course 55 
    Naval Warfare Branch 30 
     
    August 2011 
 
 NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY 
Course 
General Staff Officer Course 55 
Branch 
Naval Warfare Branch 30 
Author 
Lieutenant Senior Grade (Navy) Mikko Laakkonen 
Title 
MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEXT DECADE (2020-2030) – 
INDUCING CONSENT OR RELYING ON COMPLIANCE? 
Area of study 
Strategic and Defence Studies 
In custody of 
National Defence University Student Library 
Date  
August 2011 
Text pages                      Appendices, pages  
118                               99 
ABSTRACT 
 
The most outstanding conceptual challenge of modern crisis management is the principle of 
consent. It is not a problem only at the operational level - it challenges the entire decision-
making structures of crisis management operations. In post-cold war times and especially in 
the 21st century, there has been a transition from peacekeeping with limited size and scope 
towards large and complex peace operations. This shift has presented peace operations with a 
dilemma. How to balance between maintaining consent for peace operations, whilst being 
able to use military force to coerce those attempting to wreck peace processes? 
 
To address such a dilemma, this research aims to promote understanding, on what can be 
achieved by military crisis management operations (peace support operations) in the next 
decade. The research concentrates on the focal research question: Should military 
components induce consent or rely on the compliance of conflicting parties in crisis 
management operations of the next decade (2020 – 2030)? The focus is on military – political 
strategic level considerations, and especially on the time before political decisions to commit 
to a crisis management operation. This study does not focus on which actor or organisation 
should intervene. 
 
The framework of this thesis derives from the so called ‘peacebuilding space’, the scope of 
peace operations and spoiler theory. Feasibility of both peace enforcement and peacekeeping 
in countering future risk conditions are analysed in this framework. This future-orientated 
qualitative research uses the Delphi-method with a panel of national and international 
experts. Citation analysis supports identification of relevant reference material, which 
consists of contemporary literature, the Delphi-questionnaires and interviews. The research 
process followed three main stages. In the first stage, plausible future scenarios and risk 
conditions were identified with the Delphi-panel. In the second stage, operating environments 
for peace support operations were described and consequent hypotheses formulated. In the 
third stage, these hypotheses were tested on the Delphi-panel. The Delphi-panel is 
sufficiently wide and diverse to produce plausible yet different insights. The research design 
utilised specifically military crisis management and peace operations theories. This produced 
various and relevant normative considerations. Therefore, one may argue that this research; 
which is based on accepted contemporary theory, hypotheses derived thereof and utilising an 
expert panel, contributes to the realm of peace support operations. 
 
This research finds that some degree of peace enforcement will be feasible and necessary in 
at least the following risk conditions: failed governance; potential spillover of ethnic, 
religious, ideological conflict; vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in 
ungoverned spaces; as well as in territorial and extra-territorial border disputes. In addition, 
some form of peace enforcement is probably necessary in risk conditions pertaining to: 
extremism of marginalised groups; potential disputes over previously uninhabited and 
 resource-rich territories; and interstate rivalry. Furthermore, this research finds that 
peacekeeping measures will be feasible and necessary in at least risk conditions pertaining to: 
potential spillover of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict; uncontrolled migration; 
consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes; territorial and extra-territorial 
border disputes; and potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich 
territories. These findings are all subject to both generic and case specific preconditions that 
must exist for a peace support operation. 
 
Some deductions could be derived from the research findings. Although some risk conditions 
may appear illogical, understanding the underlying logic of a conflict is fundamental to 
understanding transition in crisis management. Practitioners of crisis management should 
possess cognizance of such transition. They must understand how transition should occur 
from threat to safety, from conflict to stability – and so forth. Understanding transition is 
imperative for managing the dynamic evolution of preconditions, which begins at the outset 
of a peace support operation. Furthermore, it is pertinent that spoilers are defined from a 
peace process point of view. If spoilers are defined otherwise, it changes the nature of an 
operation towards war, where the logic is breaking the will of an enemy - and surrender. In 
peace support operations, the logic is different: actions towards spoilers are intended to cause 
transition towards consent - not defeat. Notwithstanding future developments, history 
continues to provide strategic education. However, the distinction is that the risk conditions 
occur in novel futures. Hence, lessons learned from the past should be fitted to the case at 
hand. 
 
This research shows compelling evidence that swaying between intervention optimism and 
pessimism is not substantiated. Both peace enforcement and peacekeeping are sine qua non 
for successful military crisis management in the next decade. 
 
KEYWORDS 
military crisis management, peace operations, peace support operations, peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement, spoilers, spoiler theory, Delphi method 
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MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEXT DECADE (2020-
2030) – INDUCING CONSENT OR RELYING ON COMPLIANCE? 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Challenges of  Military Crisis Management 
 
“The operation has encapsulated virtually all the obstacles to effective peacekeeping. It is 
deployed in a vast space, lacks sufficient forces to handle that space, is overshadowed by 
international differences over its role, has no credible peace process to maintain – and does 
not enjoy the genuine consent of either the host state and many non-state actors. The 
consequence is that the organisation has found itself in a strategic muddle, operating neither 
in an enforcement mode nor with a political basis for consent-based peacekeeping. Even with 
weak consent from the state the mission was able to mitigate the humanitarian crisis – but the 
limitations on even that mode of operation have been highlighted by the fact that it has not 
stopped the host nation expelling many NGOs from the area.”1 To avoid such strategic 
muddles in the future - the intent of this thesis is to provide insight on when to induce consent 
and when to rely on compliance. 
 
The greatest single conceptual challenge for peacekeeping today, may be defining how the 
principle of consent applies to modern operations. Host-nation consent and exit strategies will 
continue to challenge peacekeeping in the future.2 The problem is how far the United Nations 
or any organisation can operate contrary to the will of a host government. This is not merely 
an operational problem, but a political one that goes to the heart of peacekeeping. It highlights 
                                            
1
 Jones, Bruce et al.: Building on Brahimi – Peacekeeping in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty, New York 
University, Center on International Cooperation, New York, 2009, p.10. Original quote edited by author 
of this thesis as not to reveal operation or organisation directly. Acronym NGO stands for non-
governmental organisation. 
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divisions between states that emphasize the importance of sovereignty, and those that give 
humanitarian concerns and human rights precedence in some cases.3  
 
Research of crisis management is both timely and relevant from a national interest as well as 
international relations point of view. Firstly, the Finnish Defence Forces’ role pertaining to 
crisis management was clarified in recent legislation4. Secondly, developments within the 
overall international system have been significant. Transformation of military forces; evolving 
roles of UN, NATO and EU; as well as their experiences from both the Middle East and 
Africa, have all had an impact on military crisis management5. Military crisis management 
and related developments have remained high on the agenda of political, military and 
scientific discourse.  
 
Contemporary military crisis management is rather new for military forces. In warfare, one is 
usually confronted by an identifiable enemy. In most cases of contemporary military crisis 
management, identifying an enemy is not plausible. Furthermore, waging war has been 
founded on a possibility to differentiate the battlefield and the existing societies from each 
other6. Existing reality is different – war occurs among the people7. Throughout history, wars 
have had a direct or indirect effect on societies. Responding to these challenges has been 
attempted by developing the ways and means by which crisis management is conducted. The 
UN has developed integrated mission approach8. The EU and member states are involved in 
developing comprehensive approaches to crisis management9. Crisis management continues 
to experience a significant evolution10. Peace enforcement and other various ways of using 
military capabilities have appeared alongside what was once called ‘traditional peacekeeping’. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
2
 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon: Remarks to General Assembly thematic debate: "UN 
Peacekeeping - Looking into the Future", 22 June 2010, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=864, (18.1.2011). 
3
 Jones et al. (2009), p. 10.  
4
 Act on the Defence Forces, 11.5.2007/551, with effect from 1st of January 2008. Act on Military Crisis 
Management, 31.3.2006/221, with effect from 1st of April 2006.  
5
 Raitasalo, Jyri and Sipilä, Joonas: Sodan määrittelystä - Käsitykset sodasta sodankäynnin taustalla, 
Edita Prima, Helsinki, 2004, p. 2.  
6
 Raitasalo et al., p. 2. 
7
 Nurmela, Teemu: The Social Battlespace of Stabilization Operations – Action Amongst the People, 
Edita Prima Oy, Helsinki, 2010, pp. 18–21, 126–128. 
8
 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO): United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations --, New York, 2008, http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf, 
(6.2.2009). 
9
 Rintakoski, Kristina and Autti, Mikko: Comprehensive Approach --, Edita Prima, Helsinki, 2008, s.11. 
10
 Bellamy, Alex J.; Williams, Paul; Griffin, Stuart: Understanding Peacekeeping, 2nd edition, Polity 
Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 71, 93, 121. Bellamy, Williams and Griffin depict examples of peace 
operations as early as in the 19th century. In post-cold war time, peacekeeping has experienced 
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Protection of global peace and security; managing the challenges posed by ’rogue’ and ’failed’ 
states on the periphery of the state system; and the protection of citizens from an expanding 
array of threats, are all examples of the fundamental challenges that the international 
community faces.11 Crisis management has an important role in countering these challenges. 
Thus, conducting research on crisis management is pertinent from multitude points of view. 
Awareness of requirements imposed by future military crisis management has an impact on 
the development of military forces, as well as on considerations related to the employment of 
military capabilities. Awareness guides education and training of military forces, which 
develops essential knowledge to perform successfully in military crisis management12. This 
enhanced knowledge should especially reflect on advice provided by military experts for 
political decision-making13. 
 
1.2 Why this Research: Dilemma of Consent Divide and Avoiding 
Intervention Pendulum 
 
Humanitarian interventions have two general aims: provide emergency assistance and protect 
fundamental human rights. Such interventions can and often do take non-military forms of 
activity: emergency aid, diplomacy and sanctions – and so forth. However, forcible military 
interventions in humanitarian crises have proven to be necessary in ongoing conflicts. Such 
conflicts threaten aid and development operations, and at times encompass states that violate 
human rights. To these ends, humanitarian interventions are peace operations aimed at 
creating safe and secure environments by suppressing conflict. Such humanitarian 
interventions are post-cold war activity. There are several reasons for this. Cold war itself 
dominated international politics, and intervention in developing states was not plausible. Cold 
war politics prevented international collaboration in suppressing conflicts in developing states. 
This was mainly achieved by paralyzing the UN Security Council by vetoes. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                        
quantitative, normative and qualitative transformation. Furthermore, at the turn of the 21st century there 
has been an increased demand for peace operations. 
11
 Jackson, Robert et al.: Introduction to International Politics: Theories and Approaches, 3rd ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp.94.  
12
 Krogars, Marco and Parikka, Eevastiina: Sotilaana globalisoituvassa maailmassa, Hakapaino, 
Helsinki, 1999, p. 52. Krogars and Parikka describe a definition hiearchy of data, information and 
knowledge. 
13
 Välimäki, Pasi: Tiedustelu rauhaatukevissa operaatioissa, Hakapaino, Helsinki, 1999, p.1. Lieutenant 
General Sir Michael Rose, Commander UNPROFOR: ” -- it is our job to make sure that propaganda 
does not provide the basis upon which policy is based. We have to ensure that the international 
community, in particular, understands the reality, not the rhetoric.”  
 4  
 
there was insufficient public pressure on great powers to ameliorate conflicts in developing 
states.14 
 
Now two decades into post-cold war times, there is a well-known but relevant theoretical and 
practical shift pertaining to peace operations. Where humanitarian interventions were rare and 
considered illegitimate during the Cold War, large-scale complex peace operations have been 
and are being conducted in post-cold war times. There has been a transition from 
peacekeeping with limited size and scope towards large and complex peace operations. This 
shift has presented the whole context of peace operations with a dilemma. How to balance 
between maintaining consent for peace operations, whilst being able to use military force to 
coerce those attempting to wreck peace processes and oppose humanitarian mission? This 
dilemma pertains to the idea of ‘consent divide’. It is argued that should consent be withdrawn 
at the tactical level, where one or more hostile groups obstruct peacekeepers in the field; small 
amounts of force may be used to keep a mission on track. However, it is cautioned that 
excessive use of force could result in a collapse of consent for a mission as a whole – that is at 
the operational level. This implies that, a mission would have crossed the ‘consent divide’, 
undermining its credibility as an impartial peacekeeping force and prejudicing mission 
legitimacy in the eyes of the belligerents.15 
 
Despite the above dilemma, during the past decades the number and scale of military 
interventions is at unprecedented levels compared to cold war times. This development is 
coined as new interventionism.16 However, this interventionism appears to sway as a 
pendulum between intervention optimism and intervention pessimism. To elaborate, “--, 
intervention pessimism is the belief that little can be done about humanitarian disasters 
without the consent and cooperation of the major parties concerned; all is lost if the 
peacekeeping force crosses the consent divide. Intervention optimism is the belief that the 
international community can forcibly rebuild failed states and reform murderous ones; 
operational success depends on the ability to induce consent if required.”17 Two failures in 
                                            
14
 Baylis, John; Gray, Colin S.: Strategy in the Contemporary World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2010, pp. 308-310. See Theo Farrell’s elaboration on reasons for non-intervention.  
15
 Baylis et al. (2010), pp. 311-313. See also Mason, David T. and Meernik, James D.: Conflict 
Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies, Routledge, London, 2006, pp.1-11. As an 
example pertaining to this dilemma, the UN failed to stop Serb spoilers in Bosnia, which was eventually 
admitted by the Secretary-General. See United Nations Press Release: Situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: Report of Secretary-General on Fall of Srebrenica, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19991215.ga9687.doc.html (19.4.2011). 
16
 Baylis et al. (2010), pp. 309-310. 
17
 Baylis et at. (2010), p. 314. Bellamy et al, (2010), pp. 119-121, 151-152. 
 5  
 
post-cold war peace operations: in Somalia from 1992 to 1995 and in Rwanda from 1993 to 
1994, are examples of such optimism and pessimism. 
 
Operations in Somalia are described as a ‘Vietnam’ of peacekeeping, and display intervention 
optimism. Despite huge financial effort (i.e. US$ 1.6 billion), deploying material and 
personnel into Somalia, the UN failed to establish a sustainable safe and secure environment, 
and rebuild the state. After unsuccessful efforts of UNOSOM I mission, the UN Security 
Council authorized first UNITAF and then UNOSOM II18. The key idea was induce consent if 
required. Though UNITAF had modest achievements, apparent misunderstanding of military 
capabilities for the tasks on hand caused the overall failure of these operations. The UN failed 
by trying to do too much.19 Matching ends to means had failed. 
 
Operation UNAMIR had been deployed to Rwanda with a limited mandate to monitor a 
ceasefire and assist in relief operations20. The key idea was do not cross the consent divide. 
Unauthorized to prevent war crimes and under-resourced, UNAMIR was overwhelmed by the 
genocide that unfolded around it. Lack of political commitment resulted to UN failing in 
Rwanda by not doing nearly enough.21 Intervention optimism and eventual failure in Somalia 
had led the intervention pendulum to sway towards intervention pessimism. Such pessimism 
failed the people of Rwanda. 
 
Thereafter the intervention pendulum has continued swaying. NATO’s successful air 
campaign in Bosnia (1995) and in Kosovo (1999)22 gave traction for intervention optimism. 
After such optimism, the contemporary post-conflict stabilization operations in Afghanistan 
have proven to be a struggle23. A pertinent question on future prospects is: will there be 
sufficient political will to utilise the hard learnt lessons of Afghanistan in peace support 
operations of the next decade?24 
 
                                            
18
 United Nations Operation Somalia (UNOSOM); Unified Task Force (Somalia) (UNITAF). 
19
 Baylis et al. (2010), pp. 314-317. Bellamy et al, (2010), pp. 106-107. 
20
 United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). 
21
 Baylis et al. (2010), pp. 314-317. Bellamy et al, (2010), pp. 108-110, 113-117. Bellamy et al. provide 
a useful summary of failings, which led to the UN peacekeepers stand aside in both Srebrenica and 
Rwanda. 
22
 Baylis et al. (2010), pp. 324-325. 
23
 i.e. Operation International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which is a NATO led operation; and 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which is a United States led operation. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oef_orbat.htm (22.6.2011) and http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi 
(22.6.2011). 
24
 Here the author is grateful for useful discussion with diplomatic editor Kari Huhta, 12.8.2010. 
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Strategy is both a discipline and a way that has an interest to connect military capabilities to 
political objectives. In contemporary times of fiscal austerity within some developed states 
and transformations of military forces, it is evermore important to match ends to means in 
crisis management and peace support operations. This matching will be conducted in an 
international environment where there is a continuous evolution in balance of power25. In 
parallel, there is an evolution of crisis management and peace operations concepts, as well as 
uncertainties in resourcing peace support operations. Some research has attempted to match 
future operating environment requirements with the dilemma of consent divide26. 
Nonetheless, it is evident that continuous research on this issue is a prerequisite for sound 
future policies and practice27. 
 
“Consent is a requisite for legitimacy and long-run sustainability, yet coercion will be 
required to deal with factions resisting or defecting from a peace process28.” The research 
interest is, if this statement is valid in the future. If so, under what specific circumstances is it 
applicable in the future? Answers to these questions may have numerous ramifications, 
including requirements set for military capabilities. As military engagement is about using or 
preparing to use military force, thus one focal question is the quantum of force required and 
expected29. As the examples of peace support operations from recent history show, 
misjudgement has led to either inefficient use of resources or unnecessary huge loss of life. 
Instead of accepting an ‘intervention pendulum’ approach, future peace operations call for 
comprehensive and honest appreciations of conflicts on hand. Simply, strategy must fit the 
case. 
 
                                            
25
 For example see: ”China abroad - Welcome, bienvenue, willkommen - America needs to worry about 
the contrast between its attitude to China and Europe’s”, The Economist, 30.6.2011. See also Ministry 
of Defence (Finland): Predictions Regarding International Actors up to the Year 2030, Helsinki, 2007, 
http://www.defmin.fi/files/1154/Abstracts_in_English.pdf (22.6.2011). 
26
 Regan, PM: Choosing to intervene: Outside interventions in internal conflicts, Journal of Politics, 60 
(3): 754-779 AUG 1998. See also Doyle, Michael W. and Sambanis, Nicholas: Making War and 
Building Peace, Princeton University Press, New Jersey (2006), pp. 13-18. 
27
 This need is underscored by the contradictions of contemporary research – see: Fortna, VP: Does 
peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war, 
International Studies Quarterly, vol. 48, no.2, pp. 269-292 June 2004. Fortna identified three 
contradictory arguments as a starting point for her study. See also Peceny, Mark and Pickering, 
Jeffrey: “Can liberal intervention build liberal democracy?” in Mason, TD and Mernik, JD (ed.): Conflict 
Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Studies, Routledge, London, 2006, pp. 130-132. Peceny 
and Pickering call for focus on strategic dilemmas between stabilization and democratization. 
28
 Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 303-304. 
29
 See appendix 1 for illustration on spectrum of military effort in peace operations and conflict. 
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1.3 The Structure of  this Thesis  
 
Theoretical framework and research process is described in chapter 2. Chapter 3 moves on to 
describe plausible future scenarios in which crisis management is likely to be conducted in the 
next decade. Probable risk conditions that merit crisis management efforts are also identified 
in chapter 3. Feasibility of inducing consent or relying on compliance in future peace support 
operations is evaluated and described in chapter 4. Deductions derived from research findings, 
recommendations on the subject matter for Finnish Defence Forces, evaluation of validity and 
reliability are depicted in chapter 5. In addition, propositions on areas for further research are 
included in the concluding chapter 5. 
 
 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Key Definitions 
 
This chapter describes how the United Nations and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization 
define key terms pertaining to this research. The chapter concludes by describing how peace 
operations, military crisis management and peace support operations are understood in this 
research. 
 
NATO understands crisis management to include military and non-military responses to 
threats, be it in a national or an international situation30. NATO’s role in crisis management 
goes beyond military operations to include issues such as the protection of populations against 
natural, technological or humanitarian disaster operations. NATO states that its definition of 
crisis management entails wider tasks than peacekeeping. The NATO Strategic Concept 2010 
broadens NATO thinking on crisis management, envisaging NATO’s involvement at all 
stages of a crisis.31  These views are similar to UN’s views in the sense that crisis 
management (i.e. peace operations) involves military and non-military measures at a national 
                                            
30
 NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm?, (10.1.2011). It is worthwhile to note 
that the UN understands crisis management as a field level activity. See UN: A New Partnership 
Agenda (2009), p.5: “Crisis management: When put to the test, peacekeeping missions must be 
prepared to respond. Timely, accurate and detailed security risk assessments can provide early 
warning of an emerging threat and help ensure the safety and security of missions and personnel. 
Scenario planning in the field is critical. In moments of crisis, reliable reserve capacities remain a vital 
and as of yet unfulfilled requirement for UN peacekeeping.” 
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or international level. The UN approach is making, keeping and building peace. UN 
understands that peace operations are rarely limited to one type of activity, whether United 
Nations-led or conducted by non-United Nations actors32. The way of dealing with a crisis 
depends on its nature, scale and seriousness. In some cases, crises can be prevented through 
diplomacy or other measures while others require more robust measures such as military 
action. Depending on the nature of the crisis, different types of crisis management operations 
may be required.33 
 
The NATO definition of crisis management includes collective defence crises and crisis 
response operations. Collective defence refers to what the alliance defines ‘article 5 
operations’, and which are not within the scope of this research. Crisis response operations 
cover all military operations conducted by NATO in a non-Article 5 situation. They support 
the peace process in a conflict area and are also called peace support operations34. NATO also 
distinguishes natural, technological or humanitarian disaster operations as a separate entity of 
crisis response operations.35  
 
NATO understands peace support operations to be multi-functional operations conducted 
impartially in support of a United Nations mandate; or a mandate of Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe; or at the invitation of a sovereign government. Peace support 
operations involve military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies and are designed 
to achieve long-term political settlement or other conditions specified in the mandate. NATO 
has delineated several functions that peace support operations may encompass: peacekeeping, 
peace enforcement, conflict prevention, preventive deployment, peacemaking, peace building 
and humanitarian operations.36   
 
                                                                                                                                        
31
 NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm?, (10.1.2011). NATO Strategic Concept 
2010: “NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage 
crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.” 
32
 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO): United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations - Principles and Guidelines (2008), pp. 17-20. 
33
 NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm?, (10.1.2011). For definitions of various 
peace operations, see also Bellamy et al. (2010) pp. 7-9; and Doyle, Michael W. and Sambanis, 
Nicholas: Making War and Building Peace, Princeton University Press, New Jersey (2006), pp. 10-11.  
34
 NATO's involvement in the Balkans and Afghanistan and its efforts in countering piracy off the Horn 
of Africa are illustrations of this. (e.g. operations: IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, ISAF, Operation Ocean Shield). 
35
 NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm?, (10.1.2011). 
36
 NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm?, (10.1.2011). See also United 
Kingdom Ministry of Defence: The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations, JWP 3-50, 2nd 
Edition, Swindon, June 2004, pp. 15 (1-2). This manual endorses that these activities pertain to peace 
support operations same, but does not include preventive deployment. 
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The United Nations has portrayed peace operations to include similar activities: conflict 
prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace building and 
preventing relapse into conflict.37 These activities are discharged as an integral part of a 
political process. Picture 1 illustrates linkages between the activities. 
 
Picture 1: The scope of peace operations.38 
 
These peace operations, which intrude upon domestic sovereignty of states, are established in 
two alternative ways. In the first way, under the Chapter VI of the UN Charter, operations are 
achieved through negotiated consent of the parties to a conflict. Thereafter the legal terms for 
the presence of foreign forces are specified in the status of forces agreements. Alternatively, in 
the second way, operations are established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which 
permits overriding domestic jurisdiction without the consent of the local parties.39 
 
NATO defines peacekeeping operations to be generally undertaken under Chapter VI of the 
UN Charter, and they are conducted with the consent of all parties to a conflict to monitor and 
facilitate implementation of a peace agreement.40 For UN peacekeeping is a technique 
designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist 
in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has 
evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces 
                                            
37
 UNDPKO (2008), pp. 18-19. 
38
 UNDPKO (2008), pp. 17-20. 
39
 Doyle et al. (2006), p. 320. 
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after interstate wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and 
civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.41 It is important 
to note that the UN does not explicitly define consent of all parties as a necessity to conduct 
peacekeeping. Furthermore, it is understood that peacekeeping has military and non-military 
dimensions. 
 
NATO appreciates that peace enforcement operations are undertaken under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. They are coercive in nature and are conducted when the consent of all parties to a 
conflict has not been achieved or might be uncertain. They are designed to maintain or re-
establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate.42 For UN peace enforcement 
involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive 
measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore 
international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the 
existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security 
Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement 
action under its authority.43 Pertaining to the coercive dimensions of peace operations both 
organizations, NATO and UN, recognize the authority of the UN Charter. 
 
The term peace operation is the overarching definition that entails the activities portrayed in 
picture 1.  In this research, military crisis management is understood as a peace operation that 
has a military dimension – which means that military capabilities are planned for and 
utilised44. Furthermore, in this research peace support operation is understood as a part of 
military crisis management and encompasses both peace enforcement as well as peacekeeping. 
These are feasible definitions as military measures have a meaningful role alongside non-
military measures in peace operations.  
 
2.2 Identifying Reference Material 
 
To identify relevant sources of information pertaining to the research interest several methods 
were utilised. Firstly, related material was identified using search engines. Subsequently, 
through citation and content analysis key authors of relevant research were determined. 
                                                                                                                                        
40
 NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm?, (10.1.2011). 
41
 UNDPKO (2008). 
42
 NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm?, (10.1.2011). 
43
 UNDPKO (2008).  
44
 The definition ‘military crisis management’ (i.e sotilaallinen kriisihallinta) is consistent with national 
legislation of Finland. Therefore, it is utilised in this thesis. 
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Secondly, founded on initial discussions45 people with expertise were identified as members 
for Delphi-panel. Utilising the Delphi-panel will be explained in chapter 3. Thirdly, based on 
content analysis academic researches and books were identified utilising the National Defence 
University and University of Helsinki search engines. 
 
To identify key authors of relevant research searches were conducted using the Web of 
Science (ISI) search engine46 in October 2010 and January 2011. Six keywords were used: (1) 
peacekeeping; (2) peace enforcement; (3) peace operations; (4) peace support operations; (5) 
humanitarian intervention: and (6) military intervention. Subject areas were set as 
international relations and political science. Document types searched were article or 
proceedings paper with time span from 1995 to 2011. Thereafter, the ten most cited articles 
pertaining to each keyword were analysed for substantial relevance for this thesis.  Citation 
amounts of relevant articles were examined to determine how well they are represented in 
total and annual citations. These searches provided the following results (i.e authors of 
relevant articles and proceedings): 
- Peacekeeping: Doyle and Sambanis; and Fortna47 
- Peace enforcement: Doyle and Sambanis; Werner and Yuen; Jakobsen; Chopra; and 
Dandeker48 
- Peace operations: Doyle and Sambanis; Luttwak; Neack; and Jakobsen49 
- Peace support operations: Neack; Jakobsen; Chopra; Dandeker; Bellamy and 
Williams50 
                                            
45
 The researcher is thankful for helpful discussions with colonel Norman Atkins, colonel Pekka 
Holopainen and diplomatic editor Kari Huhta, August and September 2010. 
46
 The search was directed to the following databases: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-
expanded), Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Arts and Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI), 
Conference Proceedings Citation Index (CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH). 
47
 Doyle, MW; Sambanis, N:  International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis, 
American Political Science Review, 94 (4): 779-801 DEC 2000. Fortna, VP: Does peacekeeping keep 
peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war, International Studies 
Quarterly, 48 (2): 269-292 JUN 2004 (Fortna 2004a). Fortna, VP: Scraps of paper? Agreements and 
the durability of peace,  International Organization, 57 (2): 337-372 SPR 2003 
48
 Werner, S: The precarious nature of peace: Resolving the issues, enforcing the settlement, and 
renegotiating the terms, American Journal of Political Science, 43 (3): 912-934 JUL 1999. Werner, S; 
Yuen, A: Making and keeping peace, International Organization, 59 (2): 261-292 SPR 2005. Jakobsen, 
PV: National interest, humanitarianism or CNN: What triggers UN peace enforcement ater the cold 
war? , Journal of Peace Research, 33 (2): 205-215 MAY 1996. Chopra, J: The space of peace-
maintenance, Political Geography, 15 (3-4): 335-357 MAR-APR 1996. Dandeker, C; Gow, J: The future 
of peace support operations: Strategic peacekeeping and success, Armed Forces & Society, 23 (3): 
327-& SPR 1997. 
49
 Luttwak, EN: Give war a chance, Foreign Affairs, 78 (4), Jul. - Aug., 1999, pp. 36-44. Neack, L: ÚN 
Peacekeeping – In the interest of community or self, Journal of Peace Research, May 1995 vol. 32 no. 
2 181-196. 
50
 Bellamy, AJ; Williams, PD: Who's keeping the peace? Regionalization and contemporary peace 
operations, International Security, 29 (4): 157-195 SPR 2005. 
 12  
 
- Humanitarian intervention:Thomas and Tow; Evans and Sahnoun; Regan; and 
Jakobsen51 
- Military intervention: Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom; Regan; Hermann and 
Kegley52 
Doyle and Sambanis, Werner and Yuen, and Jakobsen have the largest percentage shares of 
total citations during 1995-2011. However, Doyle and Sambanis receive overwhelming shares 
of total citations, and consequently provide core reference material for this thesis53.  Detailed 
results are in appendix 2.  Furthermore, books and research papers produced by the identified 
authors were utilised as references. Evidently, these books and research papers provided 
further reference material. The reference material provided by the identified authors (i.e. 
above) is utilised throughout the thesis, but especially in the discussion of the findings in 
chapter 4.  
 
Research on military crisis management in Finland (i.e. within the military community) has 
focused on the European Union’s role in military crisis management, defining comprehensive 
approach as well as capabilities development. These researches were not used as reference 
material directly, but some of them were utilised as useful background information on 
research interests and research designs. For instance, Koljonen has a future oriented research 
design founded on scenario building method and Nurmela’s research interest is the social 
battle space.54 The existing research does not cover matching of contemporary approaches to 
future scenarios. Consequently, provided recommendations are derived mainly from past 
                                            
51
 Thomas, N; Tow, WT: The utility of human security: Sovereignty and humanitarian intervention, 
Security Dialogue, 33 (2): 177-192 JUN 2002. Evans, G; Sahnoun, M: The responsibility to protect, 
Foreign Affairs, 81 (6): 99- NOV-DEC 2002. Regan, PM: Choosing to intervene: Outside interventions 
in internal conflicts, Journal of Politics, 60 (3): 754-779 AUG 1998. 
52
 Collier, P; Hoeffler, A; Soderbom, M: On the duration of civil war, Journal of Peace Research 41 (3): 
253-273 MAY 2004. Hermann, MG; Kegley, CW: Ballots, a barrier against the use of bullets and 
bombs - Democratization and military intervention, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40 (3): 436-459 SEP 
1996. 
53
 Doyle, Michael W. and Sambanis, Nicholas: Making War and Building Peace, Princeton University 
Press, New Jersey (2006). This book draws upon the study (Doyle et al., 2000). 
54
 Kemppilä, Veli-Matti: Kokonaisvaltaisen kriisinhallinnan käsite, Senior Staff Officer Course (SSOC) 
thesis, National Defence University (NDU), Helsinki, 2010. Koljonen, Vesa: Euroopan unionin 
sotilaallinen kriisinhallinta vuonna 2030, Master of Military Science thesis, NDU, Helsinki, 2009. 
Laakkonen, Mikko: Sodankäynnin periaatteiden vaikutus kriisinhallinnassa, SSOC, NDU, 2009. 
Lehtonen, Janne: Kokonaisvaltainen kriisinhallinta ja sen koulutustarpeet, SSOC, NDU, 2009. 
Myllymäki, Juha: Euroopan unionin turvallisuusrakenteiden kehittyminen vuoteen 2010 mennessä 
kriisinhallinnan näkökulmasta, SSOC, NDU, 2003. Mäkinen, Mikko: Euroopan unionin ja Yhdysvaltojen 
suhteiden kehittyminen: erityistarkastelussa unionin kriisinhallinta ja NATO, Master of Military Science 
thesis, NDU, Helsinki, 2006. Nurmela, Teemu: The Social Battlespace of Stabilization Operations – 
Action Amongst the People, General Staff Officer Course Diploma thesis, NDU, Edita Prima, Helsinki, 
2010. Pirkkalainen Jarkko: Ilmavoimien kansainvälisen valmiusyksikön tehtävät ja suorituskyvyt 
kriisinhallintaoperaatiossa vuonna 2020, Restricted, SSOC, NDU, 2010. Seppänen, Marko: Analyysi 
Euroopan unionin kriisinhallintakyvystä kriisiskenaarioiden valossa, Master of Military Science thesis, 
NDU, Helsinki, 2003. Wikström, Kaarle: Euroopan unionin merellisen toimintakyvyn kehittyminen ja 
sen näkymät, General Staff Officer Course Diploma thesis, NDU, Helsinki, 2007.  
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experiences. Pertaining to strategic studies of crisis management, analysing the operating 
environment and related changes is at least recommended by Mika Kerttunen55. This thesis 
attempts to follow that recommendation. In this thesis, publications issued by NATO, The 
Millennium Project and United Kingdom Ministry of Defence were utilised to depict future 
scenarios, reasons for conflict and operating environments of military crisis management56. 
Subsequently, the Delphi-panel provided insights on the plausibility of the futures depicted. 
 
Relevant research material was not constrained to the above only. A wider preunderstanding 
provided by existing literature is described in the next chapter, in which many of the above 
authors are represented. 
 
2.3 Preunderstanding and Consequent Propositions 
 
After indentifying relevant reference material, it was possible to start forming a 
preunderstanding on the subject. This chapter describes what contemporary literature provides 
for understanding conflict and peace operations, and consequent propositions. Literature and 
research related to peace operations, peace support operations, peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement, military or humanitarian intervention focus on five main themes. These are: 
reasons for conflict; reasons for sustainable peace; implementation of interventions; 
legitimacy of interventions; and organisational issues (e.g doctrines, development, burden 
sharing) of intervening organisations. 
 
2.3.1 Reasons for Conflict  
 
Levels of economic development and integration; friction related to power and influence; as 
well as the asymmetry of wealth and power, are the fundamental potential causes of conflict57. 
These underlying problems may materialize as regional disputes, interstate rivalry and 
extremism. Interstate rivalry may exacerbate as well as be influenced by intrastate conflicts58. 
A European perspective is the key threats that the EU may face. These threats include 
                                            
55
 Kerttunen, Mika: Kuinka sota voitetaan. Sotilasstrategiasta ja sen tutkimisesta, National Defence 
University, Edita Prima, Helsinki, 2010, p.10. 
56
 NATO: Multiple Futures Project – Navigating Towards 2030, Final report, April 2009.  
The Millennium Project: 2010 State of the Future, Washington, 2009. 
United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (UK MoD): Future Character of Conflict, 2010.  
United Kingdom Ministry of Defence: Global Strategic Trends - Out to 2040, Strategic Trends 
Programme, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), 4th edition, 2010. 
57
 NATO: Multiple Futures Project – Navigating Towards 2030, Final report, April 2009. 
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terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and 
organised crime59. Though they are not categorized as reasons for interstate conflict – they do 
have an impact on the international peace and security. Furthermore, by traversing across state 
boundaries these threats have an interstate dimension – although it is not explicitly stated. The 
reasons for disruptions in international peace and security are examined in more depth in 
chapter 3 of this research. 
 
Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis focus on the reasons for outbreak of civil war60. By 
conducting a comparative case study of 30 civil wars over the period of 1960-1999, they 
analyze the impact of opportunity and grievance factors. They find that the opportunity factors 
explain well the reasons for outbreak, whilst grievance factors have little explanatory power. 
Unsurprisingly the availability of finance and the costs influence the opportunities for civil 
war. Reliance on primary commodity exports substantially increases conflict risk. Male 
secondary education enrolment, per capita income and economic growth rate are significant 
factors and reduce risk of conflict. Grievance factors such as inequality, political rights, ethnic 
polarization and religious fractionalization where insignificant. Of the grievance factors, only 
ethnic dominance had adverse effects. Collier and Sambanis suggest that diversity makes 
rebellion harder because it makes rebel cohesion more costly. Their study also shows that time 
since a previous conflict has substantial effects: time ‘heals’. However, large population 
diasporas slow the ‘healing’ effect.61  Collier and Sambanis’ findings raise two propositions. 
Firstly, one may theorise that by acknowledging the causes of war, one is able to address those 
causes and eventually remove them. This would support a state of no war. Especially 
addressing opportunity factors appears to be prudent.  Secondly, it is important to understand 
time as a factor. The longer a peace operation can help sustain even an uneasy peace, the 
lower the risk for reoccurrence should be. However, large diasporas should be prevented. 
Patience appears to be a virtue for peace operations. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
58
 UN:  A More Secure World – Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change, UN Department of Public Information, New York, 2004, pp. 31 – 32. 
59
 EU: A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 2003, pp. 3 – 5. 
60
 Collier, Paul and Sambanis, Nicholas (ed.): Understanding Civil War, volume 1: Africa and volume 2: 
Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions, The World Bank, Washington, 2005.  
61
 Collier et al. (2005), pp. 1 – 19, 303 – 329. 
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2.3.2 Reasons for Sustainable Peace 
 
Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis have conducted a renowned quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of international peacebuilding.62  Supported by statistical analysis of all 
the civil wars from 1945 until 1999 they provide the robust theoretical framework of a so 
called ‘peacebuilding triangle’. Their relevant and valid argument is that the levels of hostility, 
local capacity and international capacity are dimensions that interact; and consequently, these 
dimensions define the space for peacebuilding.63   
 
Relevant to this thesis Doyle and Sambanis have identified several critical determinants of 
successful peacebuilding. Most importantly, they find that strategically designed 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement do make a difference. This applies to interstate conflict 
as well64. International capabilities can advance peace by substituting for limited local 
capacities and decrease factors that feed deep hostility. Such intervention improves the 
prospects for peace, but only if the peace operation is appropriately designed. Enforcement 
operations can end violence, but alone they cannot promote durable, democratic peace. 
Consent-based peacekeeping with civilian functions, which do not have a mandate to end the 
violence if parties do not cooperate, usually are not successful in ending violence. However, 
with a peace treaty and the cooperation of the parties, peace operations can assist with 
required institutional and political reform that helps secure long-term peace.65  
 
Democratic peacebuilding (i.e higher order peacebuilding) is more successful after non-
identity wars; after long and not very costly wars; in countries with relatively high 
development levels; and when UN peace operations and substantial financial assistance are 
available. An end to the violence (i.e. lower order peacebuilding) is more dependent on robust 
third-party intervention and on low hostility levels; rather than on the breadth of local 
capacities. Furthermore, peacemaking aimed at facilitating a peace treaty is potentially life 
                                            
62
 Doyle, Michael W. and Sambanis, Nicholas: International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and 
Quantitative Analysis, American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Dec 2000), pp. 779 – 801. At 
the time of writing, Michael Doyle was a professor at Princeton University. Currently he is a professor 
of international affairs at Columbia University. He has served as assistant secretary-general and 
special adviser to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 2001-2003. At the time of writing, Nicholas 
Sambanis was an economist at the World Bank. Currently he is a professor of political science at Yale 
University. 
63
 Doyle et al. (2000), pp. 779 – 801. See also Regan, PM: Choosing to Intervene - Outside 
Interventions in Internal Conflicts, Journal of Politics, vol. 60, issue 3, (Aug 1998), pp. 754 – 777. 
Regan makes the similar point of international considerations influencing decisions to intervene. 
64
 Fortna, VP: Interstate Peacekeeping - Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects, World Politics, 56 
(4), July 2004, (Fortna 2004b), pp. 511 – 519. 
65
 Doyle et al. (2000), pp. 779 – 801. See also Werner et al. (2005) pp.261-263, 287-289.  
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saving, since treaties are highly correlated with an end to the violence.66 Pertaining to 
applicability of peace enforcement and peacekeeping, these findings suggest two evident 
propositions. Firstly, if a cessation of hostilities is the main objective and hostility levels are 
relatively low - then peace enforcement should be feasible. Secondly, if a sustainable peace is 
desired and suitable preconditions exist, then peacekeeping and a more comprehensive 
approach is appropriate. 
 
2.3.3 Implementation of Peace Operations 
 
Page Fortna’s survey of peacekeeping pertaining to interstate conflict suggests that 
peacekeepers are able to disrupt the processes that might otherwise lead back to war in several 
ways. To some degree, they may make deliberate aggression physically more difficult, and 
make surprise attack less likely. Peacekeepers have the potential to raise the international 
costs of aggression, bringing tangible losses in terms of military support, as well as, less 
tangible losses in reputation and political support. In the overall setting of an operating 
environment,67 peacekeeping actions of mediation, monitoring and verification serve as 
credible signals of intentions among belligerents, who otherwise have difficulty making their 
aims known. On a smaller scale, peacekeepers can help prevent accidents and small 
skirmishes from leading back to war. This is to say that on-the-spot mediation can restore 
calm, while formal investigations would present belligerents with difficult choices. Either the 
belligerents do nothing and appear weak in the face of perceived provocations, or they 
respond and escalate the situations. Most importantly, peacekeeping helps to disrupt spirals of 
misunderstanding and uncertainty, which could lead to unwanted war. Alongside the initial 
will to stop the fighting, a determinant of long-term success will depend on the perception that 
resolve of the peacekeepers will last68. Peacekeeping fulfils this role by monitoring 
compliance and serving as an impartial referee for the inevitable charges of cease-fire 
violations.69 An evident proposition is that measures related to peacekeeping (e.g. observing, 
monitoring, verifying etc.) are justified in military crisis management. Furthermore, Fortna’s 
study suggests another proposition. Simply the presence of a peacekeeping force acts at least 
as a deterrent. However, such forces must display a will to persevere even in the long-term. 
                                            
66
 Doyle et al. (2000), pp. 779 – 801.  
67
 For a definition of operating environment, as understood by the military see United Kingdom Ministry 
of Defence: British Defence Doctrine, Swindon, 2008, pp. 2-10 – 2-11. See also Nurmela (2009), pp. 
54-73. 
68
 Werner, S; Yuen, A: Making and keeping peace, International Organisation, 59 (2): pp. 273-276, 
Spring 2005.  
69
 Fortna (2004b), pp. 481-519. Page Fortna is associate professor of political science at Columbia 
University. 
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Mats Berdal focuses on the lessons learned and not learned from the use of force in peace 
operations70. The specific focus is on the role and utility of military force. The obvious point 
he makes is that there is firm link between the employment of military force and the long-term 
political objective, which the use of force is intended to support. That is matching means to 
ends. Parallel to Doyle and Sambanis, the key point Berdal advocates is that peacekeeping is 
not appropriate in a number of cases. In contrast, hard decisions regarding the use of force will 
have to be made. Furthermore, Berdal sees that peace enforcement follows the logic of war 
and war fighting71. He does not see peace enforcement distinct from war fighting. However, in 
this thesis such logic is not fully accepted, which will be summarised in chapter 5. For the 
benefit of this research, Berdal argues that consent is not an absolute quality72. Based on 
Berdal’s argumentation there are two consequent propositions. Firstly and evidently, in certain 
circumstances peace enforcement measures within crisis management are necessary. 
Secondly, consent is malleable, which supports the feasibility of peace enforcement in the first 
place. However, Berdal does differentiate between spoilers73 of a peace process and an enemy 
encountered in war. One may consider the lack of this differentiation, as a shortcoming in 
Berdal’s argumentation. 
 
Pertaining to the discourse on whose interests are appreciated in peace operations, Alex 
Bellamy and Paul Williams claim that there is a lack of research between the relationship 
between peace operations and international theory. They explore the epistemological and 
ontological issues related to peace operations. Pertaining to epistemological issues, they 
present critical theory as a new approach to gaining knowledge on peace operations. They 
claim the dominant problem solving theories are limited in their perspective and as identifying 
and dealing with problems in a particular manner. Problem solving theories take the world as 
they find it. These theories define some actions relevant, identify particular lines of causality 
and render certain practices legitimate at the expense of others. In contrast, critical theories 
aim to reflect upon the characteristics of the prevailing world order querying how that order 
came to existence. On the ontological issue, they raise concern that the ontology of theories of 
                                            
70
 Adebajo, Adekeye and Sriram, Chandra Lekha (ed.): Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century, 
Frank Cass, London, 2001. Article by Berdal, Mats: Lessons Not Learned: The Use of Force in ‘Peace 
Operations’ in the 1990s, pp. 55-71. 
71
 Adebajo et al. (2001), p. 71. Berdal quotes an anonymous highly experienced officer as saying: “… 
in war, however limited the objective or the resources allocated to achieve it, the need to break the will 
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 Adebajo et al. (2001), pp. 61-63. Berdal uses the Australian forces in Somalia as an example, where 
the margin of existing consent was enlarged and built upon by an enterprising outside force. 
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 The spoiler theory is explained in chapter 4 of this study. See Stedman, Stephen John: Spoiler 
Problems in Peace Processes, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2, Autumn 1997, pp. 5-7. 
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peace operations is rarely discussed. They raise three interrelated questions. What is the 
relationship between the intervening force and the recipient of intervention? What is the 
abstract and material context in which peace operations function? In addition, what counts as 
an issue in the study and practice of peace operations? For the benefit of this thesis, Bellamy 
and Williams explore the ever-important question of point of view in peace operations: 
Whose interests are served by the prevailing definitions of ‘common sense’ in peace operation 
matters? They claim that it is usually the interests, values and priorities of the intervening 
forces that shape contemporary peace operations.74 For the benefit of this thesis and as 
relevant propositions, Bellamy and Williams’ argumentation suggest that peace operations 
and peace processes they support should be inclusive and comprehensive. This actually 
supports argumentation against forceful intervention, and simultaneously advocates local 
ownership of peace processes. The question related to point of view is relevant for this thesis 
– it has ramifications on defining both spoilers as wells as posture of a peace operation (i.e. 
either peace enforcement or peacekeeping). Despite their criticism on problem solving 
theories, Bellamy and Williams do not provide robust alternatives75. 
 
Bellamy and Williams have identified various types of peace operations in order to overcome 
the above problems. They base their distinction on what each type of operation is supposed to 
achieve. This implies that the primary distinction lies in the intended ends they aim to achieve 
rather than the means that are employed to achieve them. The seven types of peace operations 
they distinguish are: (1) preventive deployments, (2) traditional peacekeeping, (3) wider 
peacekeeping, (4) peace enforcement, (5) assisting transitions, (6) transitional administrations 
and (7) peace support operations. It is important to point out that these types of operations 
have not been developed in chronological order. Nor are they mutually exclusive, but rather 
that a single operation may move back and forth between various aims or may involve more 
than one of these roles simultaneously.76 
 
2.3.4 Legitimacy of Interventions 
 
The discourse on humanitarian intervention is supported by the writings edited by J.L. 
Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane. Their focus pertains to the conditions under which 
                                            
74
 Bellamy, Alex J. and William, Paul (ed.): Peace Operations and Global Order, Routledge, New York 
(2005), pp. 3, 6-9, 17. See also article by Michael Pugh, p. 39 – 55.  
75
 Bellamy et al. (2005), pp. 103-183. The insights provided do not relate particularly well to applicability 
of military means in crisis management. However, Bellamy and Williams provide views on how to 
provide adequate resources for peace operations, pp. 183-213. 
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unauthorized humanitarian intervention is justified ethically, legally and politically. These 
viewpoints are integrated to form an interdisciplinary approach to the issue. They define 
humanitarian intervention as follows: “The threat or use of force across state borders by a state 
(or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the 
fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of 
the state within whose territory force is applied.”77 From the definition, one identifies the 
requirement for military force (i.e. means) with a specific aim of preventing or ending 
violations (i.e. ends) in a non-consensual context (i.e. ways: coercion). Thus, these writings 
have relevance for this research.  
 
Deriving from just war theory and liberal political philosophy, Fernando Tesón argues that it 
is acceptable for interventions to cause deaths of innocent people - if by intervening greater 
harm is prevented, and the damage caused is unintended. He makes the claim that non-
intervention is doctrine of the past. Allen Buchanan argues that moral authority justifies 
actions taken without necessarily obtaining state consent. In contrast, Michael Byers and 
Simon Chesterman strongly defend the principle of non-intervention, generally, in 
international law. They argue that to denigrate this principle would be to assume an unsound 
change in the international legal system. Jane Stromseth argues usefully that codification of 
principles of humanitarian intervention is a mistake. According to Stromseth, as it is not 
codified it provides “… fertile ground for the gradual emergence of normative consensus, over 
time, based on practice and case-by-case decision-making.”78 From the viewpoint and the 
execution of strategy, this is a useful view.  
 
Robert Keohane advocates for differentiation of domestic and external sovereignty. Domestic 
sovereignty should be sustained where and when possible. In contrast, the concept of external 
sovereignty (n.b. involving the exclusion of external authority) should be abandoned for many 
troubled societies where interventions are contemplated. Thus, Keohane’s standpoint makes 
an argument for peace enforcement. The idea of forceful liberalism is advocated in the book, 
but the important counterpoint made is that application should be incremental and developed 
from discourse and practice. The writings are from an immediate ‘post 9/11 – era’ and reflect 
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an intellectual need to analyze humanitarian interventions in the international system. Though 
the ideas presented are relevant for this research, one must note that the viewpoint in 
Holzgrefe and Keohane’s book is on unauthorized intervention. That is intervention not 
authorized by the UN Security Council under the Charter of the UN. NATO intervention in 
Kosovo is a prominent example79. Furthermore, Michael Doyle provides useful standards for 
preventive interventions as well as related case examples. These four standards are lethality of 
threat, likelihood of threat, legitimacy of responses and legality of actions. In addition, Doyle 
advocates an incremental approach to build up standards that promote rule of law on what 
constitutes a legitimate use of force.  To achieve this, he argues that the UN Security Council 
should decide on legitimacy of all non-defensive or preventive uses of force.80  
 
2.3.5 Organisational Issues  
 
Rather obviously all relevant multilateral international organisations issue themselves, and are 
the focus of continuous research. Broadly speaking the organisations aim to define the 
respective organisation’s strategic vision and objectives for the future; specific objectives for 
developing necessary capabilities; processes and structures to implement capabilities 
development; and guidelines on how to operate with these capabilities.  
 
The EU focuses on an active, capable and coherent approach to managing security matters, 
whilst being focused on partnership through international cooperation.81 UN peacekeeping 
calls for clear political direction and cohesive mission implementation. Furthermore, UN 
focuses on faster deployment of missions and their meaningful ability to respond to 
contingencies. With a capability-driven approach, the UN concentrates on projecting future 
needs for post-conflict crisis management (i.e. peacekeeping).82 NATO focuses on reaffirming 
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its collectiveness as an effective alliance, and is prepared to prevent, manage and stabilize 
conflicts83. All organisations focus on strategic partnerships and burden sharing with other 
organisations and individual states84. All organisations appreciate that future threats are 
diverse and intertwined creating a blur in any operating environment. 
 
Furthermore, within the Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE5) contemporary challenges 
pertaining to organisational issues have been identified. As the ultimate aim of every 
operation is to promote and secure human security. A more ‘human’ aspect is required in all 
phases when developing comprehensive approach (CA). Human aspect calls for appropriate 
attitude, mindset and flexibility at national, international, inter-agency and individual levels. 
Implementing CA implies a need to create integrated mechanisms for early coordination - at 
the decision making phase. It is too late to begin coordination at execution phase. Three 
specific challenges are stressed. First, different understanding of mandates hinders co-
operation amongst all actors. This challenge is exacerbated by information sharing policies 
and cultures, which are not supportive for CA. Alongside this, the same challenge reflects on 
understanding and verifying the impact of operations. Second, communication and 
cooperation with local counterparts is inadequate to create understanding and to manage 
expectations. Consequently, this hinders ability to plan actions according to the local 
absorption capacity. Third, stovepipes in national and international budgeting systems prevent 
pragmatic and flexible use of resources. This strains any planning processes, which are supply 
driven in the first place.85 
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2.4 Theoretical Approaches 
 
The future research interests of neoclassical realism (Morgenthau) include the challenges 
posed by rogue and failed states, security crisis created by terrorism and the contemporary 
version of the Concert system of great powers, which safeguards international peace and 
security. The permanent members of the UN Security Council and led by the United States 
would be the foundation of such a system.86 The prospect of rogue and failed states seems 
valid in the coming decade, but the idea of one unrivalled power does not seem plausible. 
Furthermore, the expansion of security threats to include an array of threats (e.g. international 
crime, climate change, unequal development, refugees, and struggle for resources) alongside 
international terrorism calls for another approach.87 
 
Neorealism is not sufficient to explain why intrastate political divisions (e.g. ethnic, religious, 
class-based) occur or why they might be important causes of conflict. This is because 
neorealism understands states as unitary actors and explains state behaviour deriving from 
structural changes in the international system. The issue of anarchy seems relevant, but the 
anarchy of civil war emerges because of domestic political competition – and is not a constant 
structural condition.88   
 
On the other hand, neoliberalism has focus on domestic political institutions. It considers non-
state actors (e.g. ethnic networks, crime syndicates, multinational corporations) and 
appreciates their influence on risk of conflict. However, neoliberalism is neither able to 
explain alliances and conflicts among insurgent groups, nor is it able to explain domestic 
institutional change or use of force in ethnic hostility. To some degree, international relations 
theory is supported by empirical evidence; that living near countries with internal war or 
authoritarian polities may increase a country’s chance of experiencing an ethnic war.89 
Relevant for this research thesis is that international relations theory and empirical findings 
support the point that spillover effects from one country to another are conceivable. 
Furthermore, neoliberalism appreciates non-state actors having a role in conflicts. Such 
appreciation supports applicability of spoiler theory in crisis management. 
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Doyle and Sambanis point out an important gap in existing research. There is a lack of 
analysis on the link between international and internal war. Although external intervention 
studies are related, they do not cover the regional dimensions of internal wars in an integrated 
way. Some evidence supports the links between external and internal conflict, and display that 
they have a jointly negative impact on economic activity. This further increases the risk of 
violence, and makes the point of ‘conflict traps’ that lock poor countries and neighbouring 
regions in a cycle of deterioration and recurring violence. Furthermore, Doyle and Sambanis 
summarize that post-war peacebuilding environment might be different in conflicts that are 
internationalized, and that external impartial intervention might be required to break the 
conflict trap.90  
 
Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams argue that there are distinct differences between problem-
solving and critical theories of peace operations. Firstly, problem-solving theories focus on 
establishing instrumental practices to address pre-existing problems, where as critical theories 
are premised on an explicitly normative agenda. The instrumental approaches build on 
several normative assumptions that are left unexplored. An assumption is that international 
peace and security is a moral good itself, and violent conflict represents a ‘breakdown’ of 
normal social relations. Instrumental approaches assume that the great majority of people 
prefer peace to war and need only be presented with ‘paths’ to peace. There is a direct link 
between international peace and good governance at the domestic level. Furthermore, ‘good’ 
governance equates to Western-style statehood, democratization, neo-liberal economics and 
the existence of an active civil society. Secondly, another problem arises when peacekeeping 
activities are taken as a starting point and examined how they could be done better – this is 
self-referential. The problem is that this approach reveals little about the evolving role of 
peace operations in global politics or about the underlying rationale of the activities 
themselves. The instrumental approach is important in understanding peace operations and 
how they could be implemented more effectively. However, one should not miss on other 
theoretical engagements. It may be that without dealing with the structural causes of violent 
conflict (e.g. in global economy), the reassessment of peace operations’ techniques might be 
futile. Regardless if the two propositions are correct, the important point is that 
instrumentalism has been dominant and hence these questions have seldom been raised.91 
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This thesis attempts to avoid the trap of being self-referential. To achieve this, the research 
design attempts to match existing knowledge and insights to plausible futures. Furthermore, 
this thesis appreciates the structural causes of violent conflict and the existing gap caused by 
instrumentalist approaches. However, exploring further these normative assumptions fall 
beyond the scope of this thesis. One may argue that such exploration is not directly within the 
research interest of military strategic studies. Rather they are questions for political science in 
general - and security studies within international relations theory in particular92. In this thesis, 
strategy is understood as applying the military instrument in a prudent way within estimated 
future scenarios. The research interest is not on changing current or future world order, thus 
relying on critical theory is not feasible for this research. 
 
Many theoretical approaches have been taken to explain the occurrence, duration, termination, 
and magnitude of civil war. Economic, political, psychological, rational choice, constructivist 
theories all provide valuable insights. Economic theories suggest that unless property rights 
are respected and if economic activity is unprofitable; individuals and groups will have greater 
incentives for misappropriation. This would also lead to each individual and group privately 
providing for their security, thus challenging the authority of the state. Economic theories 
make the point that there exists a trade-off between productive efforts and criminal economic 
behaviour. The greater the amount of resources that can be appropriated, the weaker the state, 
and the lower the economical ‘opportunity cost of conflict’93, the greater will be the available 
supply of recruits to a conflict.94 Economic theories make the point that crime and criminality 
are risk conditions for a future conflict. Moreover, the factors that economic theories have 
identified may have an impact on the duration or ‘robustness’ of a conflict.  
 
However, a consensus on the explanatory power of these economic theories is yet to be 
reached. Empirical tests suggest quite robustly, that low levels of capita income (poverty) 
significantly exacerbate the risk of civil war. The negative effects of natural resources are 
difficult to demonstrate empirically and robustly, but certain so called ‘lootable’ resources 
(e.g. oil, precious stones) have been linked to conflicts and sustaining conflict factions. 
Research suggests that countries with a high dependence on natural resources face greater 
difficulties in reaching a durable peace.95 For the benefit of this research, economic theories 
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support the prospect that future conflict environments include impoverished areas. 
Furthermore, the duration of the conflict may be longer if the local economies are highly 
dependent on natural resources.  
 
Political theories have focused on group incentives, capacities and opportunities for an 
intrastate conflict. Plato himself identified key factors that are regime characteristics and 
political instability. Conflicts (i.e. in this case rebellions) are products of political grievance. 
They are more likely when there are opportunities for organized action. However, the 
interdependencies of democracy and civil war have not been statistically proven. Some 
preliminary evidence links peace to proportionate representation and systems with significant 
executive constraints. Moreover, research is controversial on the relation of ethnicity and 
violence. According to most studies, high levels of ethnic fractionalization do not increase the 
risk of civil war onset. However, they might make conflict duration longer and recurrence 
more likely. Some researchers point out very clearly that ethnic fractionalization is not the 
right approach in assessing risk between ethnicity and violent conflict. Stronger evidence has 
been found on explanatory power of ethnic polarization and dominance - rather than 
fractionalization. Polarization and dominance increase the risk of civil war occurrence. 
Ambiguity exists on how to measure this dominance. It is also uncertain what type of ethnic 
affiliation is most important (e.g. linguistic, religious, etc).96 The details of this debate go 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, political theories make the point that ethnic 
polarization and ethnic dominance generate risk conditions for conflicts. Theories also suggest 
that systems with proportionate representation are more likely to be peaceful.  
 
Establishing a correlation between ethnic fractionalization and nationalist ideology is 
challenging. There is a disjuncture between theory and empirical evidence. Nationalism is 
often seen as increasing risk of ethnic rebellion. However, measuring the conditions in which 
ethnicity will be used to support violence is difficult. Thus, it is logical that research 
explanations do not view ethnic identity as an inherent conflict cause. Instead, explanations 
utilise social interactions and systems to explain violence. It is of importance to note, that 
these research explanations ultimately rely on some pre-existing level of hostility.97 Pertaining 
to the focus of this research it is essential to understand that ideology alone may not be the 
sole reason for conflict. 
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Political theories also make the case on geographical location. Where ethnic groups are 
territorially concentrated, there is a higher risk of intrastate conflict. The aims of such conflict 
may focus on more self-determination or even secession. Secessionist wars will occur with 
greater probability for several reasons. First, when institutional centres collapse creating 
power vacuums. Second, where regional inequality creates demands for autonomy, which are 
not met. Third, where income gains from remaining within the predecessor state are not 
sufficient to offset the gains from greater autonomy. Fourth, where the ethnic makeup of 
regions is very different, supporting growth of nationalist ideology.98 These political theories 
substantiate that failed governance and challenging state authority are plausible risk conditions 
of the future. 
 
Economic and political theories suggest that risk of war recurrence and peacebuilding failure 
is higher in countries with low levels of local capacity (i.e. slow economic growth, high levels 
of poverty, and significant resource dependence) and in politically divided societies with 
many factions engaged in conflict over issues that define the identity of these factions.99  
Pertaining to this thesis, the above findings raise several considerations. If a society is 
politically divided, who should an intervening party support and on whom should it induce 
consent? On what foundations are such judgements made? The theories also emphasise that 
military means are not enough to achieve sustainable peace. However, the military component 
has a role by providing a safe and secure environment, which is a prerequisite for legitimate 
economic activity and transformation of the society.  
 
While some crisis management operations have succeeded and some failed, a partial 
explanation why this happens is the root causes. If the root causes are left untreated, and the 
capabilities for violence are left intact, then a risk of a failure of the peace is significant. One 
way to identify root causes is to divide them into defensive and offensive incentives. 
Defensive incentives arise in conditions of anarchy, where any central authority has collapsed, 
and each faction seeks to arm itself to protect itself. This causes a ‘security dilemma’ both in 
intrastate and interstate anarchy, where each defensive armament constitutes a threat to others. 
Offensive incentives arise when leaders and factions impose ideology or culture, seize 
property, or exploit state power and public sources for private gain, or all of these. At some 
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juncture during a conflict, the factions may have come to a ‘hurting stalemate’ in which no 
faction sees it can win, and are experiencing net costs of the continuing conflict.100 
 
In this thesis, there is a need to identify between the mission of a crisis management operation 
and the process that leads through a safe and secure environment to an enduring peace. One 
must understand that the successful implementation of the mandate is not sufficient for a 
successful peace process. Peace may be defined as an outcome of a dynamic process where 
the performance of crisis management, the reactions of the actors to the conflict, local 
capacities and the level of hostility, all have an impact on the outcome. This thesis will focus 
on the process. It is argued that for a peace process to endure it needs: (1) concentration of 
central power (i.e. the powerful must be recognized as legitimate, or the legitimate made 
powerful); (2) increasing state legitimacy through participation (e.g. elections, power sharing); 
(3) raising and allocating economic resources in support of peace101. Generally, a conflict-torn 
area requires external, international assistance or authority so that these three conditions 
prevail.102 The above arguments support the concept of comprehensive crisis management. 
 
According to Doyle and Sambanis’ study, there is a positive influence of transformative UN 
peacekeeping, which has combined multidimensional and enforcement missions. 
Multidimensional peacekeeping works well both with achieving sovereign and participatory103 
peace. UN missions seem to have their best effect in preventing lower-level violence and 
enabling countries to democratize and rebuild after intrastate wars. This is the case rather than 
UN missions’ ability to prevent resumption of full-scale war.104 In these cases, war recurrence 
is related more strongly to the levels of economic development105. Doyle and Sambanis 
appreciate the positive impact of UN missions, but underscore the effect of a strong economy.  
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Furthermore, there is some positive correlation between a UN mission and a peace treaty, 
which is not surprising, as many UN missions have required the existence of a treaty. Doyle 
and Sambanis find that enforcement alone cannot achieve participatory peace. Interesting 
though not surprising is that all traditional peacekeeping operations failed to support 
participatory peace. Traditional peacekeeping does not deliver, particularly compared to 
multidimensional peacekeeping. Traditional peacekeeping operations may be able sustain 
such a peace that exists, but are unable to build self-sustaining peace.106  
 
To conclude these theoretical considerations, this thesis builds on liberalism as a point of 
view. The international system is understood to be a dynamic social structure. Security is 
achieved by integration, democratization, rule of law and conflict resolution.107 Furthermore, 
deriving from the previous theoretical considerations is the theory of a peacebuilding space, 
which is explained in the next chapter. The theory is useful, because Doyle and Sambanis’ 
explore the fit between mandates of peace operations and the type of conflict. This thesis has a 
similar focus. 
 
2.5 The Scope, Framework and  Focus of Research  
 
Focusing on the consent of the parties to a conflict is justified for a variety of reasons.  Firstly, 
the consent principle is what one could call ‘primus inter pares’ amongst the principles of 
peacekeeping. These principles are consent of the parties; impartiality; and non-use of force 
except in self-defence and in defence of the mandate108. If one does not seek and expect the 
consent of parties to a conflict, in most cases one will take a side in the conflict. In such 
circumstances, the principle of impartiality is violated. Furthermore, the idea that consent 
needs to be induced to the parties only through military means does not resonate well with 
idea of non-use of force. Secondly, the existence or non-existence of consent amongst parties 
to a conflict has implications on a multitude of factors. Some of them are listed below: 
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- Political legitimacy within contributing nations’ domestic politics as well as 
international relations: Will the idea of inducing consent be feasible in a unilateral, bi- 
or multipolar world? 
- Legal authority derived from e.g. UN or NATO Charter: Is the operation in question 
mandated to operate as a UN Chapter VI or VII mission? Is it a NATO Article 5 or 
non-article 5 operation? These aspects reflect on:  the rules of engagement for a 
military force; military force structure and posture, its capabilities and modus 
operandi. A consideration is do regional organizations have the necessary capabilities. 
- Overall effectiveness and accomplishment of aims: How well has inducing consent 
actually supported reaching the overall aims of crisis management? Operations in 
areas of Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Somalia, Iraq, Sudan, Haiti, DRC109 and 
Afghanistan serve as basis for such reflections. 
Although this thesis will not be able to focus on these considerations, they make the point that 
it is actually consent that is ‘primus inter pares’ amongst principles in peace support 
operations. 
 
This thesis will limit its scope to the following three dimensions. Firstly, military crisis 
management (i.e. peace support operations) is understood as relating to multinational and 
comprehensive crisis management. Such efforts are undertaken in support of a peace process, 
or a prospect of such a process. Secondly, the thesis will focus on military – political strategic 
level considerations110. This is because the military–strategic level provides advice to the 
political decision level. Such advice pertains to deployment and employment of military 
means and ways in a crisis management operation. Thirdly, the focus is on the time before 
political decisions to commit to a crisis management operation. This is because military 
advice should be delivered prior to authorizing military crisis management operations. The 
time before political decisions is relevant for military-strategic advice, whilst after the 
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decision the military efforts gravitate towards more of an operational nature (i.e. 
implementation of mandate). 
 
This study does not focus on which actor should intervene (e.g. UN, EU, NATO, AU etc.). On 
the other hand, this thesis appreciates that who intervenes has important implications on 
legitimacy and prospects for success.111 Nonetheless, this thesis provides examples of some 
activities these actors undertake, and reflects on matters related to legitimacy.  
 
Neither is the development of applicable military capabilities for peace support operations in 
the scope of this study. Such development efforts derive from political-military strategic level 
definitions of aims, freedoms and possible constraints. Only thereafter, it is possible to 
develop operational requirements for future capabilities112. Therefore such considerations fall 
into the realm of operational art as well as capability development and procurement. Thus, 
they are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
The framework of this thesis is founded on three cornerstones: peacebuilding space; the scope 
of peace operations (see picture 1 before); and spoiler theory. The peacebuilding triangle (see 
picture 2 below) is a metaphor for the peacebuilding space after a conflict. The available space 
is determined by the interaction of the triangle’s three sides: local capacities (LC), 
international capacities (IC), and hostility (H) level. The greater local and international 
capacities and lower the hostility; the greater will be the space for peacebuilding. The theory 
assumes a strictly positive level of IC, given the support and legitimacy offered sovereign 
states by international law and norms. All three variables: LC, IC, and H, can be measured as 
indices, ranging from zero to one. Doyle and Sambanis argue with validity and reliability that 
this peacebuilding triangle is the political space, or effective capacity, for building peace.113 
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International 
capacities (IC)
Local capacity (LC)Level of hostility (H)
LC = 0 LC = 1
IC = 0
IC = 1
H = 0 H = 1
 
Picture 2: The peacebuilding triangle (Doyle and Sambanis). 
 
As an example, picture no. 3 below depicts a peacebuilding space where all variables are 
approximately at 0.5 levels. 
LC
IC = 0.5
H = 0.5 LC = 0.5H
IC
 
Picture 3: Example of peacebuilding space. 
 
Furthermore, the framework builds upon the idea that the political process of a peace 
operation takes place within such a peacebuilding triangle. This suggests that crisis 
management operations should not be attempted unless such a space is available. Thus, the 
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activities of a peace operation are fitted into this peacebuilding space as depicted in picture 4 
below.  
Peacemaking Peace 
Enforcement
Conflict 
Prevention
Peacekeeping
Post-conflict peace-building & 
preventing relapse into conflict
Ceasefire
Conflict
Political 
process
International 
capacities
Local capacity
Level of 
hostility
 
Picture 4: Political process of a peace operation fitted into the peacebuilding space. 
 
The conceptual framework of this thesis draws upon the idea; that there are identifiable and 
plausible future scenarios pertaining to the global international system (see picture 5 below). 
Furthermore, within these future scenarios it is possible to identify specific risk conditions 
that constitute for crises. Some of these crises merit for military crisis management operations, 
which include the usage of military capabilities primarily for peace enforcement and 
peacekeeping. These operations support a political process and operate within the 
peacebuilding space described earlier. Peace enforcement and peacekeeping activities are 
utilised to protect a political peace process, which is a vulnerable target to spoilers. 
Theoretical approaches on such spoilers and typology114 of spoilers are described in chapter 4. 
The research focus is on feasibility of peace enforcement (i.e. inducing consent) and 
peacekeeping (i.e. relying on compliance), their relation, as well as how they overlap with 
peacemaking (see picture 5 below). 
 
                                            
114
 Typology: “study of or analysis or classification based on types or categories”, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/typology, 22.2.2011. 
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Global future scenarios
Future crises 
(risk condition)
Peacebuilding space
 
Picture 5: The conceptual framework of the thesis. 
 
2.6 The Research Aim and Questions 
 
This research aims to promote understanding and increase awareness, within military 
professionals as well as their political superiors, on what can be achieved115 by the use of 
military force in crisis management operations in conflicts of the next decade. To achieve this 
aim, the research concentrates on the focal research question: Should military components 
induce consent or rely on the compliance of conflicting parties in crisis management 
operations of the next decade (2020 – 2030)? This focal problem necessitates responses to the 
following supporting research questions: 
- What kind is the operating environment of crisis management in the next decade? 
 What are the essential changes to the contemporary environment? 
- What are the preconditions and implications of attempting to induce consent vis-à-vis 
to relying on compliance?  
 Under what circumstances is it advisable to attempt inducing consent? 
                                            
115
 Mats Berdal advocates this distinction: “…what it is we expect the use of force or forces to achieve 
as opposed to do.” See Berdal (2009), p. 121, and Adebajo et al. (2001), p. 71. 
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 Under what circumstances it is of decisive importance to seek and nurture the 
compliance of the parties? 
As pointed out earlier the most outstanding conceptual challenge of modern crisis 
management is the principle of consent. And it is not a problem only at the operational level - 
but challenges the entire decision-making structures of crisis management operations. This 
standpoint validates the relevance of the research problem.  
 
2.7 The Research Method and Process 
 
This thesis utilizes qualitative methodology supported by the Delphi-method. The utilization 
of Delphi-method is described in chapter 3. Analysis is founded on content analysis, whilst 
interpretations are based on the accepted scenarios and responses provided by Delphi-
panellists. Where applicable, interpretation was supported by questions that pertain to 
strategic studies116. 
 
The research process followed the below structure and sequences. In the first phase, the 
contemporary crisis management operations were described based on document research. 
Thereafter strategic trends and drivers, which may have an impact on global future scenarios, 
were described. These trends and drivers encompass political, economical, social, 
technological, environmental and military dimensions. They were identified from the UK 
Ministry of Defence and NATO publications. Derived from identified trends and drivers by 
NATO, four different future scenarios were presented. They depict the overall strategic 
context in which conflicts occur, and any future crisis management operation may have to 
operate. Subsequently, the outlook of future conflicts was described both in general terms and 
specific context (i.e. causes of conflict or risk conditions). Based on the depicted document 
content analysis deductions were made on the operating environment of a future crisis 
management operation and the first round of Delphi-questions were formulated.  
 
                                            
116
 Here I refer to the following questions: “(1) What is it all about? (i.e what are the stakes at hand?); 
(2) What strategic effect are we having?; (3) Is the strategy selected tailored to meet our political 
objectives?; (4) What are the propable limits of our power as a basket of complementary agencies to 
influence, and endeavour to control, the enemy’s will?; (5) How could the enemy strive to thwart us?; 
(6) What are our alternative courses of action or inaction? What are their prospective costs and 
benefits?; (7) How robust is our home front?; (8) Does the strategy we prefer today draw prudently and 
honestly upon the strategic education that history provides?; (9) What have we overlooked?.” See 
Baylis, John; Gray, Colin S.: Strategy in the Contemporary World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2010. 
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The aim of the first round of Delphi-questions was to identify the risk conditions that merit for 
a military crisis management operation (ie. peace support operation including peacekeeping or 
peace enforcement). These questions were presented to a panel of experts (i.e. Delphi-panel). 
By identifying the risk conditions, as well as the overall strategic context that the conditions 
relate to, it was possible to define the operating environment of a future military crisis 
management operation. These definitions were validated based on the recommendations of 
the Delphi-panel. The first round of Delphi-questions provided the basis for relevant 
hypotheses of the second round of Delphi-questions. 
 
The identified operating environments provided the background, against which the idea of 
inducing consent or relying on compliance was tested and analysed. Descriptions of operating 
environment and hypotheses on feasibility of peacekeeping and peace enforcement were tested 
on the Delphi-panel during the second round of Delphi-questions. The aim of the second 
round of Delphi-questions was threefold. First, to identify what kind of peacebuilding space is 
likely in each risk condition. Second, to distinguish what is the ‘ecology’ of a conflict. Third, 
to identify significant and other spoiler types, which have an impact on political processes and 
subsequently on peace support operations. Once the peacebuilding space, the ecology of 
conflict and the spoilers pertaining to each risk condition were defined; it was possible to 
evaluate how applicable peace enforcement or peacekeeping activities would be for a desired 
end state. Spoiler management strategies depicted by Stephen Stedman were matched to each 
conflict, and their applicability evaluated.  
 
Thereafter, the collected data was collated and analysed to determine a collective view of the 
panel, as well as to identify contradictions or insubstantial arguments (chapter 4.3). 
Preconditions and implications that were raised in a similar way by at least two panellists 
were accepted, permitting that other panellists did not contest these views. Some unique, yet 
plausible, preconditions and implications were accepted, permitting sufficient argumentation 
of these views was provided. Tentative unique findings, contested views, contradictions and 
insubstantial arguments were iterated with the panel. Acceptance of hypotheses is based on 
panellists’ responses, and they depict a collective majority view. Categorization of collected 
material followed the framework of research questions and hypothesis. The overall findings 
were then evaluated against contemporary literature to ascertain validity and reliability (see 
chapter 4.3.3). Finally, derived from the research findings deductions and recommendations 
were made. Picture 6 depicts the research process. 
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DESCRIPTION OF OPERATING ENVIRONMENT AND
CONSEQUENT HYPOTHESES
PREUNDERSTANDING
IDENTIFYING PLAUSIBLE FUTURES AND RISK CONDITIONS
IDENTIFYING RELEVANT RESEARCH MATERIAL
TESTING HYPOTHESES ON INDUCING CONSENT, 
RELYING ON COMPLIANCE, PRECONDITIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
FORMULATING FRAMEWORK OF THESIS
RESEARCH FINDINGS
DISCOURSE
DEDUCTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
LITERATURE 
REVIEW
LITERATURE
REVIEW
1st DELPHI-ROUND
& ITERATION
2nd DELPHI-ROUND
& ITERATION
 
Picture 6: Research process. 
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3 FUTURE PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
 
“The problem of uncertainty remains notwithstanding changes in organization, technological 
advances or any so called ‘revolutions in military matters’. Uncertainty derives from the 
complex and interactive nature of war. In the foreseeable future this fog of war will remain; 
thus it is better to adapt by adapting ways and means – and allowing one to act in spite of this 
uncertainty.”117 
 
To envisage future there is a need to be cognizant of current affairs. For defining the operating 
environment of a future peace support operation, a prerequisite is an understanding of 
contemporary crisis management and peace support operations. These operations are 
described in chapter 3.1. The rest of chapter 3.1 will identify the plausible global futures, 
prospects for conflicts in general, and prospects for peace support operations in particular. 
These futures and prospects are foundations for identifying future operating environments of 
peace support operations, which is done in chapter 3.2.  This chapter describes the Delphi-
method that was used to gather research data. Thereafter, the aim of the first round of Delphi-
questions is described as well as the findings of the first round. Pertaining to operating 
environments of a future peace support operation Chapter 3.3 provides a summary of the 
deductions made. Overall, chapter 3 answers to the first supporting research question: What 
kind is the operating environment of crisis management in the next decade?  
 
3.1 Identifying Futures 
 
3.1.1 Contemporary Peace Support Operations 
 
Contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations focus on four thematic issues. Firstly, 
they support ceasefire agreements between two or more parties. Secondly, they support peace 
processes and national authorities after civil conflict. Thirdly, they extend initial security and 
stability gains into longer-term peace building. Fourthly, they provide security and protection 
in response to conflict.118 The African continent is the focal area for UN peace operations119. 
                                            
117
 Desportes, Vincent: Deciding in the Dark, Economica Ltd, Paris, 2008, pp.113. 
118
 UN New Horizon (2009), pp. 5-6. 
119
 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): Multilateral peace operations: Africa, 
2008, SIPRI Fact Sheet, July 2009, http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS0907Af.pdf (29.6.2011). The 
UN sent 70% of all peace operation personnel it deployed worldwide in 2008 to Africa. Eight of the 13 
operations in 2008 with Chapter VII powers were in Africa. For further details of contemporary 
 38  
 
 
Pertaining to supporting ceasefire agreements, there are long-standing monitoring and 
observation missions in Cyprus, the Golan, Jammu and Kashmir, and Western Sahara that 
continue to help deter violence. These missions are limited in size, mandate and cost. 
However, in some cases their presence may encourage Member States to divert attention 
away from finding a political solution. The UN mission in Lebanon illustrates how resource-
intensive and challenging such operations can be in a volatile environment.120 
 
In supporting a peace process and national authorities in some countries, peacekeeping 
missions face distinct challenges in helping to lay the foundations for sustainable peace. A 
troubled transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and a difficult peace process 
between northern and southern Sudan are straining these two large missions. These missions 
are struggling to strengthen political processes, which depend on regional and international 
support. Deterring and containing violence and protecting civilians are critical and demanding 
parts of their task. Execution of these tasks, in the face of ongoing conflict, is complicated by 
two specific challenges. Firstly, there are inadequate capabilities for the tasks on hand. 
Secondly, there are differences of view on what ‘robust’ peacekeeping can and should be 
expected to accomplish. Large and remote territories in which these missions operate increase 
their difficulty as well as cost.121 
 
Many UN peacekeeping missions are attempting to extend initial security and stability gains 
into longer-term peace building. In Haiti, Liberia and Timor-Leste, these missions have 
succeeded in establishing basic security and supporting political processes. The conditions for 
sustainable peacebuilding are in place. Supported by the UN, international financial 
institutions and other partners, national governments must lead in setting strategies to deliver 
tangible peace dividends and economic development. Peacekeeping missions must improve 
their ability to contribute to peacebuilding and, where called upon, to coordinate a broader 
effort. Peacekeeping transition and exit strategies depend on countries providing for their own 
security, and the UN will need to find effective ways to support this goal through better rule of 
law and assistance to security sector reform.122 
 
                                                                                                                                        
operations, see: SIPRI Map of Multilateral Peace Operation Deployments, 
http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIPKOMAP1210.pdf (29.6.2011). See also The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS): The Military Balance 2010, Oxford University Press, London, 
2010. 
120
 UN New Horizon (2009), pp. 5-6. 
121
 UN New Horizon (2009), pp. 5-6. 
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In Chad and Sudan’s Darfur, UN missions are trying to minimize the effects of ongoing 
conflict. Their activities are focused on protecting civilians and providing security for 
humanitarian efforts. The willingness of major parties to these conflicts to accept and 
cooperate with peacekeepers is critical. The scale and remoteness of the territory make these 
two missions among the most expensive and difficult UN operations ever. In the absence of 
an agreed political solution, mitigating the conflict and preventing mission failure are the only 
viable strategies. These missions will likely continue to require major investment of capacity 
and resources for years to come.123 Overall, the above problems are compounded by a 
perception that the Security Council has forgotten to observe guidance provided by Brahimi. 
The guidance called for the need to match politics to peacekeeping, and resources to 
mandates.124  
 
As relevant examples, NATO, European Union and the African Union also conduct 
contemporary crisis management operations.125 Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
UN, NATO has ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Libya and Kosovo126. The current 
operation in Afghanistan is NATO’s most significant operational commitment to date. 
Alongside, NATO is using coercive military force in an effort to protect civilians under threat 
of attack from the Gaddafi regime of Libya. In Kosovo NATO is supervising the dissolution 
of the Kosovo Protection Corps and helping to create a professional and multiethnic Kosovo 
Security Force. Alongside these operations, NATO is focused on detecting and deterring 
terrorist activity in the Mediterranean, and at-sea counter-piracy operations off the Horn of 
Africa. Furthermore, NATO supports the African Union in its peacekeeping missions on the 
African continent. In Iraq NATO continues to support the establishment of effective and 
accountable security forces.127 Overall, NATO aims defend its interests and contribute to 
peace in every part of the Euro-Atlantic region128. Since 2004, the European Union has been 
conducting EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Under a UN resolution,129 this mission 
has an executive function and is able to deploy considerable reserve forces to the area at short 
notice. Since 2008, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA has protected vessels delivering food aid to 
Somalia, and vulnerable vessels in the area. The operation also aims to deter and prevent acts 
of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. EU also supports Somalia by training 
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 UN New Horizon (2009), pp. 5-6. 
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 Jones et al. (2009), p. 8 
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 For further details of contemporary operations, see: SIPRI Map of Multilateral Peace Operation 
Deployments and IISS: The Military Balance 2010. 
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 UN resolutions : UNSCR 1386 (2001), UNSCR 1970 (2011), UNSCR 1244 (1999) 
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 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm (29.6.2011) 
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 NATO Strategic Concept, pp. 7-12, 20. 
 40  
 
Somali security forces in Uganda.130 The African Union is conducting peace support operation 
in Somalia (AMISOM) to stabilize the security situation, and to create a safe and secure 
environment in preparation for the transition to the UN131. 
 
3.1.2 Selecting Scenarios 
 
Tarja Meristö and Mika Mannermaa have defined a good scenario. According to them, a 
scenario should be plausible including context, chain of events as well as in a psychological 
sense. Comprehensibility and clarity are trademarks of a good scenario. Meanwhile a scenario 
should be trustworthy and logically coherent. The assumptions within the scenarios regarding 
actions and choices made by humans are founded on values, attitudes, cultural perceptions and 
traditions. Thus, the scenarios do not conflict with social reality. A scenario comprises of 
relevant actors, actions, choices, references, connections, timings and materials.  Scenarios are 
neither generalized or summarized opinions of a desired or feared state of the future; nor 
should they be variants of a common basic trend. Scenarios should derive from different 
foundations and therefore be fundamentally different descriptions of states of the future.132 
 
For the requirements of this research, the future scenarios need to be unrestricted so that they 
qualify for a diploma thesis for the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies. Restricted 
scenarios would be available, but for reasons of transparency, they were not applicable. 
Secondly, the scenarios need to define the operating environment where crisis management is 
conducted. Finally, the scenarios need to evolve from and focus on security related context. 
This is paramount so that the scenarios provide a platform for examining the research focus of 
consent and compliance in a crisis management operation. 
 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Multiple Futures Project – Navigating 
Towards 2030 fulfils the general and research specific requirements. The study focuses on 
future threat environments, thus it is suitable for this research. The study has been conducted 
by identifying drivers that may have an impact on the future. Thereafter four different futures 
have been defined based on the drivers. Related to these different futures specific risk 
conditions have been identified. By examining these risk conditions against each future, the 
study has come up with deductions on security and military implications. 
                                                                                                                                        
129
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Although the NATO study fulfils the requirements, one must point out certain reservations 
also. First, the study is very much risk and vulnerability centric, it is not phenomena centric. 
Therefore, it may miss certain issues - mainly positive (benign) developments that have global 
impact. Secondly, it is focuses on protecting the people of the NATO Alliance. Thus, it 
concentrates on well-being of population within the Alliance, and may miss negative (malign) 
developments harmful to populations elsewhere. Thirdly and obviously, the study has political 
and normative intentions in the background. In most cases, for a security institution any study 
assessing the operating environment will attempt to justify the institutions raison d’être. 
Notwithstanding these reservations, the NATO study is rigorous in its logical approach and 
amongst the available studies, the best suited for this research. Where relevant the NATO 
study is augmented with the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence study on the future 
character of conflict, as well as by the State of the Future 2010 study133. 
 
3.1.3 Strategic Trends and Drivers as Foundations 
 
Strategic trends that are visible today are likely to have an impact on the global scenario 
around 2020 to 2030. Climate change will be the most significant; and unless significant 
measures are achieved by 2020, its impact may be impossible to contain. With the power of 
China, India and possibly Brazil rising, a simultaneous a shift towards multi-polarity will be 
underway. China’s economic power will be predominant in Asia and its influence will be 
global. Other powers, such as Russia and Iran, will also be seeking to secure wider influence. 
All these emerging powers will seek requisite influence in international organisations.  
Critical resource shortages may also be reached by 2020; with some oilfields in the Middle 
East exhausted. Developed nations’ relative advantages in defence technology may have been 
surpassed by emerging powers. However, the United States may have maintained its relative 
military advantage.134 This means that there may be a more heterogeneous international 
system. Whilst there are more actors with influence, there are more potential partners and 
adversaries. The heterogeneous system may have more potential conflicts of interest, and it is 
likely that any Western oriented value system is not globally predominant. Any strategic 
assessment of feasible crisis management approaches need to take note of the above. In a 
complex, heterogeneous, interdependent and contested system all comprehensive and effect-
based approaches become even more challenging. 
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 www.tulevaisuus.fi/topi, (18.11.2010). 
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 The Millennium Project: 2010 State of the Future, Print section, Washington, 2009. 
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Alongside these strategic trends on must identify drivers that may have an impact on possible 
futures. Friction, integration and asymmetry are structural drivers, which have been 
influential throughout history. They are assessed to remain so for centuries. Friction over 
distribution of power is the degree of ease with which decisions are made in the international 
system. In essence, friction functions as a relative power meter - ranging from cooperation to 
confrontation. Economic integration including globalisation is the degree to which national 
and regional economies trade. It portrays their levels of functional integration. States will 
continue to rely on globalisation for their prosperity. As globalisation requires cooperation, it 
will have a stabilising effect. However, globalisation also creates tensions. In some cases, it 
may be a driver of instability and conflict. Asymmetry of states and political entities is the 
relative discrepancy between states in terms of wealth and power. Asymmetry influences 
international relations in terms of both development and security. Examining the interrelation 
of the structural drivers highlights six deterministic drivers. They are: (1) changing state 
capacity, (2) resources and their allocation, (3) climate change, (4) use of technology, (5) 
demographics, and (6) competing ideologies. It is assessed that these deterministic drivers 
will have the greatest impact on security in the coming decades.135 These drivers provide the 
foundation for the possible futures, thus it is pertinent to define them in more detail. 
 
Changing state capacity reflects the distribution and management of power at the state level. 
States that cannot adapt to the changing global context will risk collapse, and many such 
failures will be accompanied by substantial outbreaks of violence. The poor governance, 
economic deprivation and inequality that characterises failed and failing states is likely to 
spread to neighbouring states. Resources and their allocation encompass availability, 
affordability, access and competition for essential resources, including energy, water, food and 
other essential commodities136. During the future decade, it is expected that there is a 
considerable increase in demand for energy. Many countries will remain critically dependent 
upon energy imports and securing them will be vital. Any long-term significant change in the 
‘average weather’, climate change, may have an impact on international relations and create 
instability, especially in those states that are already vulnerable to other pressures. Use of 
technology denotes the evolution and availability of technology up to 2030. The physical and 
virtual networks that support globalisation will have to be protected. Demographics reflect 
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domestic population trends related to birth, death, age, income, ethnicity, and the other 
characteristics of a state’s population. It includes migration, urbanisation, and other external 
factors. The world’s population is rising and this will lead to increased demands for resources. 
Some states will regard the security of their food and water supplies as issues of national 
survival and will act accordingly. Within EU countries, a changing demographic balance 
towards a more multi-ethnic society means that some conflicts may create risks, including 
extremism, within EU communities. Competing ideologies and worldviews deal with 
alienation and confrontation based on different values, religions, identities and historic 
geopolitical perspectives. Ideologies and worldviews will remain significant factors and 
people will continue to fight for their beliefs. Neither ideologies nor worldviews will be 
geographically bounded.137 The trends and drivers described above are the building blocks for 
the futures that follow. Plausible futures stem from the interaction and interdependency of 
these drivers.  
 
3.1.4 Four Plausible Global Futures 
 
The relevant drivers in Future One “Dark Side of Exclusivity” are climate change, resource 
allocation, economic integration, and competing ideologies and worldviews. The Dark Side of 
Exclusivity describes how globalisation, climate change, and the misallocation of resources 
significantly affect the capacity of states to maintain sovereignty. Weak and failed states 
generate instability in areas of interest, and present the states of the developed world with 
strategic choices regarding how to react. This future concentrates on the friction between the 
developed or ‘market’ states and the developing states. The future is complicated by 
nationalism, the misallocation of resources, poverty, frustration, demographic pressure, and 
deteriorating environmental conditions.138 
 
The relevant drivers for Future Two “Deceptive Stability” are asymmetry, demographics, 
resource allocation, and competing ideologies and worldviews. Deceptive Stability highlights 
the requirement to manage the demographic shift resulting from aging populations and young 
migrants. Additionally, resource allocation is both effective and efficient as the resource-rich 
parts of the world become part of the dominant system. However, a wide range of problems 
persists in the less developed regions of the world that are resource-poor. This dichotomy is 
further exacerbated by the lack of intervention by liberal democracies absorbed with domestic 
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priorities. Ensuing tensions and poor economic and cultural integration worsen pre-existing 
domestic and transnational security issues such as crime and terrorism. The overarching theme 
of this future is preoccupation with domestic concerns in the developed states, which leaves 
them less able to react to instability and geopolitical risk.139 
 
The relevant drivers in Future Three “Clash of Modernities” are competition of ideologies 
and worldviews, demographics, and the use of technology. Clash of Modernities sketches a 
world where a strong belief in rationalism coupled with technological innovation has enabled 
advanced-network societies to connect virtually across the globe. Continued globalisation and 
technological advances have helped drive urban centres in the developed world to become 
mega-hubs of wealth and culture. The governance of this developed sector is diffuse, multi-
layered and network-centric. Thus, virtual networks create problems and solve them in real 
time. The disconnected, segregated, and disassociated frontier areas suffer the greatest 
tension. Further destabilising these regions are organised criminal elements that engage in 
human and black-market trafficking, intellectual and technological piracy, and illegal arms 
trading. Authorities within developed states focus primarily on keeping these disruptive forces 
at bay by managing flows of trade, information, resources, and the recruitment of workers that 
traverse the borders between the urban cores and outlying areas.140 
 
The relevant drivers of Future Four “New Power Politics” are friction in international 
decision-making; competing ideologies and worldviews; conflict over resource allocation; and 
a lack of economic integration. New Power Politics describes growing absolute wealth, 
accompanied by the widespread proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or effect. Power 
politics characterize this future. Competing regional powers dominate a truly multi-polar 
world. These powers have established a fragile balance in which globalisation and 
international rules and norms are challenged by competition for resources and influence. 
These states may not have a global reach, but regionally they play a significant role in shaping 
world politics by promoting their strategic interests and competitive advantage. Competition 
and demand for resources, particularly in ungoverned spaces, continues unabated as the most 
powerful states continuously strive to improve their economies and protect their 
populations.141  
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One may argue that these futures are comprehensible. Importantly, they do not appear as 
generalized or summarized views. This is because they derive from distinct combinations of 
the structural and deterministic drivers. Thus, they appear logically coherent – and are not 
sheer imagination. With these scenarios as overall strategic settings, it is pertinent to examine 
in more detail future conflicts, which are described in the following chapters. 
 
3.1.5 Prospects on Future Conflicts 
 
General landscape of conflict. Future conflict will not be a precise science. Thus, conflict will 
remain an unpredictable and uniquely human activity. Adversaries (i.e. states, state-proxies 
and non-state actors) as well as conventional and unconventional threats will blur. Conflicts 
will include conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal elements in mixed modes of 
operations. Some adversaries will not respect distinctions between civil and military 
operations. The battle space will be global in both geographic and virtual space, and highly 
congested. All domains of conflict, including densely populated and poorly governed urban 
areas will be contested by a wide variety of actors. Volatile commodity prices and financial 
markets, transnational organized crime and environmental changes may lead to political and 
security instability. This pertains to societies that lack the resources to cope with such shocks. 
Countries emerging from conflict are particularly vulnerable. The range of threats will spread, 
with increased proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyberspace, and other irregular 
threats. There is a real risk that these threats will be met with limited or partial responses142. 
Conflict will remain focused on influencing people, and thus the battle of the narratives will 
be a focal point.143  
 
Struggle for control over resources may increase the likelihood of conflict. Direct conflict 
between an EU country and a major power is judged unlikely. However, wars involving the 
major powers or their proxies are probable. It is possible that EU countries will be involved in 
coalition action against a state actor possessing significant military capabilities. The incidence 
of intrastate violence, with both state, proxy and non-state actors will remain a continuing 
theme. Positive impacts of globalisation should drive greater interdependency. However, 
resource shortages build and pressures caused by climate change create potential for 
instability. Thus, underlying tensions are likely to further increase. The developed world may 
not be able to retain sufficient military advantage over rising powers in all circumstances, 
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which may embolden actors where previously they had been deterred. Access to resources and 
the ability to move them will become an increasingly important facet of international tension 
and conflict. Thus, a competition to secure these assets may ensue.144 
 
In the future decade there will be a growing number of states competing for access, resources 
and influence which, coupled with the failure of some states, is likely to result in a 
background of intrastate violence in Africa, Central America, Central Asia and the Middle 
East.145 Additional factors, such as religious-based extremism, can be expected to add further 
volatility to this mix. Rivalry may take the form of conflict between proxies, although these 
proxies could remain difficult to control. Having seen the continued proliferation of WMD, 
many states may have developed and deployed these systems. The possession of nuclear 
weapons will remain a goal of many aspiring powers. This is because possession of such 
weapons is perceived as essential for survival and status. 146 
 
Access to technology required to overmatch adversaries may be severely eroded and may 
increase the political risks of intervention. Non-lethal and directed energy weapons, space and 
cyber technologies will be available to many actors. Disruptive technologies may emerge that 
overturn conventional military thinking and render specific capabilities less effective or even 
ineffective. For example, high-end novel threats, including counter-space capabilities, could 
seriously challenge access to theatres of operation. Easily obtained but relatively low-tech 
light weapons may constrain freedom of manoeuvre. Throughout history, the ‘paradox of war’ 
reveals that thinking adversaries avoid strengths and gravitate towards areas of perceived 
weaknesses. Adversaries will avoid conventional military operations in which they are 
unprepared to confront developed world forces. Instead, they will attack in ways that one 
might consider irregular or asymmetric, but are anything but asymmetric to them.147 
 
The distinctions between state and non-state actors will blur even further. Violent non-state 
actors will evolve to be better able to exploit information based technologies, to influence 
global opinion and to disrupt communication and economic links on an even greater scale. 
They will have developed higher levels of lethality to counter protection systems, and they 
may have access to weapons of mass destruction together with the will to use them. In the 
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future decade non-state actors are not second-rate threats. Military activities across the mosaic 
of conflict will become increasingly blurred. It could become increasingly difficult to achieve 
military objectives in a complex urban and overpopulated environment in which one may be 
forced to operate. While military defeat of adversaries will be achievable and indeed a 
necessity, this in itself will rarely deliver political goals without cohesive comprehensive 
approaches. 148  
 
Context and origins of future conlicts. In the “Dark Side of Exclusivity” future the prospect of 
failed governance and challenges to state authority are key risks. Previously stable 
governments may be destabilised, and an increase of potentially hostile states is possible. 
Proliferation of WMD continues. This development undermines national and international 
law. The friction between developed and developing states is likely to cause uncontrolled 
migration, illegal immigration and human exploitation. Violations of territorial integrity are 
possible as well as population unrest. Overall, these developments may lead to vulnerability of 
strategic chokepoints and thus affect free flow of resources. The spread of radical ideologies 
alongside the prospect of ethnic, religious or ideological conflicts and spillover are likely.149 
Failed states, uncontrolled migration, ideological conflict, endangered rule of law and threats 
to resource allocation portray the conflicts of this future. 
 
Whilst uncontrolled migration and ethnic, religious or ideological conflicts remain risks; an 
additional important risk in future two “Deceptive Stability” is transnational organized crime. 
Alongside crime, a key risk in this future is related to the demographic shifts.150  Uncontrolled 
migration, ideological conflicts and organised crime are the likely portrait of conflict in this 
future. The conflicts of future three “Clash of Modernities” might have a slightly different 
emphasis. In this future extremism of marginalised groups, conflicts between incompatible 
belief systems and ideological conflicts are highlighted. Criminal or rogue elements may 
exploit technology and thus disrupt vital interdependent computer networks151. This future’s 
conflict landscape includes extremism, ideological conflict and technological network crime. 
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Competition for ideological supremacy and resources that may lead or include interstate 
rivalry are the dominant features of conflict in the fourth future “New Power Politics” 152. 
 
There are some potential sources of threat: individuals, criminal organisations, non-state 
actors, specific states and nature. Super-empowered individuals who have overcome 
constraints and rules may wield unique political, economic, intellectual, or cultural influence 
over people and events. Another threat is organised crime with the aim of committing serious 
crimes or offenses in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit. Non-sovereign entities (i.e. non-state actors) expressing extremist values and ideas 
may exercise significant economic, political, or social power and influence at a national, and 
in some cases international, level. Rogue states may act without respect for other states or 
global norms. Confrontational powers resort to force or threaten the use of force 
disproportionately to what is at stake. Finally yet importantly, nature may also pose a threat. 
The physical world exists and changes on its own accord.153 
 
3.1.6 Prospects on Future Crisis Management 
 
Predicting future demand for peace support operations (i.e. peacekeeping or peace 
enforcement) is notoriously difficult. In 1998 for example, it was generally agreed that large-
scale UN operations were ending, discredited in the Balkans and Central Africa. Yet the next 
year, UN transitional administrations were launched in Kosovo and Timor-Leste. 
Nevertheless, these operations did not give a clear picture of peacekeeping’s future. No further 
transitional administrations have been mandated since 1999. No new UN missions of any kind 
have been deployed in South America and the Asia-Pacific region. The UN will face similar 
surprises and anomalies in future.154 The strategic uncertainties of the future decade will 
challenge predictions even further. 
 
Past trends suggest that a rapid decline in state income is a likely predictor of internal conflict. 
Alongside this, it is possible to identify a number of regional trends that are likely to shape the 
future of peace support operations. In both Asia-Pacific and continental South America, large-
scale peace operations are not a typical feature of conflict resolution. Although a number of 
regional organizations do deploy monitoring missions in these areas, there is currently little 
demand for a UN role. In Europe, peacekeeping remains an important tool for stability. 
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However, strong regional organizations limit the demand for the UN and it retains only a 
residual role in Kosovo and Georgia. The main potential theatres for peace support operations 
are Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caribbean and Central America.155  
 
The future of peace support operations depend on their ability to manage volatile 
environments, to take on varied tasks in managing threats to peace, and to help put in place 
the critical early foundations for sustainable peace. Consensus as well as clarity on policy and 
requirements for robust peacekeeping and protection of civilians is central to the success of 
future peacekeeping operations. Peace support operations remain a part of a political solution, 
not an alternative. They are one of a range of international peace and security tools and must 
be considered alongside other available responses. Peace support operations must be engaged 
only as an accompaniment to an active political strategy, which provide clear direction. The 
global resources available for UN peacekeeping are finite. Political strains in one context can 
reverberate as weakened consensus in another context. Resource demands of one operation 
can mean diminished personnel, equipment and funding for others. Perceived weakness or 
capitulation in one environment can lead to increased provocation of UN peacekeepers in 
another.156 In the next decade, the interdependence of politics, resources and use of military 
force in peace support operations remains an integral feature. 
 
Divisions over peacekeeping and sovereignty are misleading because the majority of large-
scale UN operations are deliberately designed to extend rather than limit the authority of 
states. The Security Council is normally in the business of strengthening governments rather 
than changing regimes. This fact, often overlooked, is essential to explaining some recent 
successes and failures of peacekeeping.157 Understanding this underlying feature may help 
guide future deployments. 
 
Current debates about a possible UN peacekeeping operation for Somalia present an extreme 
case of what the extension of state authority may require. There are roughly 80 000 armed 
individuals in Somalia. Their loyalties are fluid, and it is unlikely that they will ever form a 
coherent coalition for or against a UN mission. Yet currently, several factions deemed hostile 
to UN control a large swathe of Somali territory, while the government (with an army of 
approximately 2,000 only) has control primarily in and around the capital. Additionally, there 
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is a substantial threat from foreign fighters using Somalia for a proxy war. Deployment of a 
peacekeeping operation to extend the authority of the Somalia government is a conceptual 
possibility. However, it faces three key obstacles. First, the scale of the challenge would 
require UNIFIL-scale158 resources. Second, a lack of international and regional confidence in 
the viability of the current Somali state has meant that no such concentration of troop 
contributors is available.  Third, in the absence of a broader political settlement, there is some 
evidence that international forces would not just encounter resistance but exacerbate it. 
Conversely, the last year has seen halting yet real progress towards a political settlement. It is 
possible that a viable peace – and, by extension, a viable Somali state – could emerge on two 
conditions. The first is sufficient political support to a national government from domestic 
actors, the UN and international community. The second is the deployment of a substantial 
international force against the backdrop of that political settlement to protect that government 
from inevitable spoilers and deter revolts. So long as those conditions do not apply (as they do 
not at present), the question of whether the Security Council decides to authorize a UN force 
for Somalia is secondary; the primary reality is that no one will contribute forces.159 
 
Several factors may be deducted from the futures and future conflicts that will have an impact 
on future peace support operations. There will be a particular need for peace support 
operations, sometimes in large-scale theatres with limited infrastructure, requiring robust 
‘expeditionary’ capabilities. These operations are likely to face opposition from hardened and 
sophisticated ‘spoilers’. Spoilers will often have international state or non-state support in 
both internal and interstate contexts. There will be further pressure on peacekeepers to play a 
primary or supporting role in extending the authority of weak or contested governments. 
Complex and divisive politics not only within conflict settings but also at the regional and 
international levels will add complexity. These divisions are about the conflicts and the 
interests and values involved in resolving them. Peace support operations will be challenged 
by major financial and political obstacles to increasing supply among existing troop 
contributors to the UN. To overcome these challenges reinforcements from diverse sources 
are a necessity. Continued involvement in challenging crisis management scenarios (e.g. 
Afghanistan) of troop contributing nations, will constrain their capacity to deploy or lead 
multinational operations, and limit alternatives for ‘robust’ UN peacekeeping.160  
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The global economic crisis is forcing many governments and organizations to scale back 
conflict management, humanitarian and development assistance. However, the global demand 
for military and police capabilities remains high. Stretched bilateral and regional capacities 
may increase likelihood of UN peacekeeping being called upon to act as an instrument of last 
resort, yet with fewer resources and diminished support.161 Both unknown future demands as 
well as uncertainty about available global resources render the task of defining future needs of 
peacekeeping inherently difficult. UN peacekeeping remains a comparatively inexpensive 
provider of post-conflict security. Thus, demand for the tool is unlikely to falter. Future 
requirements will need to be considered in the context of a constrained financial environment. 
Meeting these demands will entail a new and comprehensive approach to resource generation 
and incentives required to deliver results in the field.162 
 
Pertaining to the future, an interesting point of view is that due to better outlook of 
populations on a whole (i.e better education and so forth), the world and eventually operating 
environments of crisis management are changing. There are shifts in cultures and society 
classes, which need to be factored in any planning. Furthermore, all actors within a conflict 
appear parallel and ‘melt’ together. This means that within the same risk condition there are 
different factors with varying levels of impact on the conflict. The quest is for better 
understanding on what impact do these factors have.163 Furthermore, the idea of ‘threat’ needs 
to be identified with more precision. This is because general security politics includes only 
domestic and international issues. To expand these limited points of view, human security 
allows addressing emerging threats more effectively.164 
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3.2 Identifying Operating Environments of Future Peace Support Operations 
 
3.2.1 Utilising Delphi-method 
 
The Delphi-method is useful when evaluating future societal or technological developments; 
changes in operating environments; and whilst formulating action plans for organisations.165 
Members of a Delphi-panel are usually recognized as experts in a certain field, and they are 
asked to give their future oriented estimations about the development of a certain matter. The 
method is often characterized as a method for structuring a group communication process, 
thus it has a wide number of applications in different areas. Fundamentally, the Delphi 
method is a version of survey analysis – especially a form of survey research that involves 
repetitive questioning of respondents.166 
 
The key characteristics and foundations of the method are anonymity of respondents, iterative 
nature and feedback. The aim of anonymity is that persons or the organisations they represent 
do not argue, but rather the arguments and their content form the fundamental part of the 
research material. The iterative nature means that the respondents have the possibility of 
changing or add their arguments during the process. Feedback aims to increase the 
understanding and awareness of all the Delphi-panelists on the subject matter.167 
 
Osmo Kuusi has defined that the Delphi-method requires for a panel of experts to be formed. 
These experts will inform the researcher separately about their view on the subject matter. The 
first round Delphi-questionnaire can be exact or cover wider questions that will be more exact 
in the following rounds. The experts will be given feedback about the other answers, though 
anonymous, before the next round of the questionnaire. This provides the possibility for the 
experts to change their answers, after getting the feedback, at least once during the process. 
Previously one of the main goals of Delphi-projects used to be consistency, but in Delphi-
inquiries today this is often not seen necessary or even desirable.168 The method is particularly 
applicable for this research as the future cannot be examined with precise analytical methods. 
Alongside that collective and subjective estimations are probably useful in the evaluation of 
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the focal research problem, which occurs in a wide and complex context. In order to avoid the 
majority influence and the influence of strong personalities; the anonymous work of the panel 
is useful.169 The Delphi-panellists for this research are depicted in table no. 1 below.  
panelist organisation reasons for selection 
Norman Atkins, 
Colonel 
Royal Netherlands Army 
Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, 
United Nations 
Sudan Integrated Operational Team, Office of Operations, 
DPKO. Previously team leader in Military Planning Service, 
DPKO with 5 years working experience at DPKO level. 
Pekka Haavisto, 
Member of Parliament 
Parliament of Finland 
Special Representative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 
Crises in Africa; Member of Foreign Affairs Committee and 
Defence Committee since 2007. 
Gabor Horvath, 
Brigadier General 
Hungarian Defence Forces 
European Union Military 
Staff 
Director of Plans and Policy Directorate in the European 
Union Military Staff. General Horvath has more than 5 years 
of experience related to crisis management.  
Kari Huhta, 
Journalist 
Sanoma News Corporation, 
Finland 
Diplomatic Editor of daily newspaper “Helsingin Sanomat”. 
Kari Huhta has over 30 years of experience from reporting 
from conflict areas and following foreign and security policy 
issues. 
Timo Kantola, 
Ambassador 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
of Finland 
Ambassador of Finland to Organisations for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. More than 23 years working 
experience on foreign affairs; served as Director of Unit for 
Security Policy and Crisis Management (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs); and as Deputy Representative to the Political and 
Security Committee of the European Union. 
Jasbir Lidder, 
Lieutenant General (retd.), 
Indian Army 
United Nations Mission in 
Sudan 
As current Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (since 2009) and former Force Commander UNMIS 
2006 – 2008, General Lidder has extensive experience of 
operating at political – military level of crisis management. He 
has more than 6 years of experience related to UN 
peacekeeping at command or senior staff positions. 
Anne Sipiläinen, 
Ambassador 
Permanent Representative 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
of Finland 
Finland’s Ambassador to the Political and Security Committee 
of the European Union from August 2007 until July 2011. 
Finland’s Permanent Representative to Western European 
Union. 
Table 1: Delphi-panellists. 
These panellists provide views from a political point of view (Haavisto, Kantola, Sipiläinen); 
from a policy planner and adviser to political level (Atkins, Horvath, Kantola, Lidder, 
Sipiläinen); as political-military level experts (Atkins, Horvath, Lidder); and as an informed 
‘critical’ view (Huhta). Although limited in number, these panel members provide 
comprehensive coverage of the political-military strategic level considerations. This is 
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essential for the scope and focus of this thesis. Furthermore, the panel members represent 
primary experts in either a national or an organisational context.  
 
3.2.2 The First Round Delphi-questions 
 
The aim for the first round Delphi-questions was to identify and delineate the operating 
environment of a future military crisis management operation (i.e the first supporting 
research question). The questionnaire had five main objectives. Firstly, it explored the 
validity and relevance of the structural and deterministic drivers. Secondly, it attempted to 
affirm the plausibility of the futures described, which were derived from the drivers. The third 
objective was to explore if the future conflicts derived from and connected to specific future 
scenarios were logical. The fourth objective was to identify the potential sources of conflict. 
The most important objective was to identify the risk conditions (i.e. conflicts) that would 
merit for a military crisis management operation (ie. peace support operation including 
peacekeeping or peace enforcement). Initially, there were 33 risk conditions relating to four 
different futures. The questionnaire is included as appendix 3 and respondents’ responses as 
appendix 4. The questionnaire was sent to seven respondents in November 2010. By May 
2011 five respondents had replied170. The below summary and deductions derive from those 
responses. 
 
3.2.3 Summary of the Findings 
 
The panel found both the structural and deterministic drivers valid and relevant. However, 
they made two significant observations. The first reservation was that the drivers are identified 
from an ‘etatist’171 approach rather than from a comprehensive one. One may argue that the 
structural drivers apply regardless of which entities are being analysed: states, societies, 
organisations, or inter-personal relations. The comprehensive viewpoint is constituted by the 
deterministic drivers, which cover all the dimensions of a PESTE172-analysis. The second 
reservation was related to the concept of competing ideologies. Some members of the panel 
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argued that these ideologies actually do not compete, but should actually be countered with a 
respect for diversity. As it is implied that something needs to be countered, then the ideologies 
actually do compete – here one should not confuse original phenomenon with desired action. 
 
Similarly, the panel found the four different futures plausible. The reservations presented 
focused on the viewpoint of the underlying descriptions. This was not surprising since the 
future scenarios are products of a collective security organisation of primarily developed 
world nation states. Importantly, the conflicts (i.e. risk conditions) that related to specific 
futures were accepted as logical and were not contested. 
 
The sources of threats were also accepted. However, they were accepted with comments 
acknowledging other potential sources of threat. Firstly, it was highlighted that states would 
remain as sources of conflict - regardless if they were rogue or failed. Secondly, they stressed 
that overpowered and oligarchic international organisations could pose threats. Thirdly, whilst 
not strictly a source; the breakdown of the international legal framework, or organisations that 
uphold it, were identified as sources of threat. 
 
In the fifth part and most importantly, the Delphi-panel agreed that the following twelve (12) 
risk conditions would merit a peace support operation including peace enforcement and 
peacekeeping activities. These risk conditions arose from 33 risk conditions in four different 
futures. The risk conditions below are listed in descending order according to support 
received: 
1. Interstate rivalry  
2. Failed Governance 
3. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict 
4. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces 
5. Transnational criminal movements 
6. Uncontrolled migration  
7. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories 
8. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes 
9. Extremism of marginalised groups 
10. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or weapons of mass effect (WMD/WME) 
11. Consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes 
12. Technological exploitation by criminal or rogue elements 
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Table no. 2 below shows the number of respondents in favour, against or undecided on the 
idea that a risk condition would merit a peace support operation. 
 
Respondents: 
Risk conditions that merit a peace support operation 
Aye Nay (?)* 
1. Interstate rivalry  5   
2. Failed Governance 5   
3. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict 5   
4. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces 4 1  
5. Transnational criminal movements 4 1  
6. Uncontrolled migration 3 2  
7. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories 3 2  
8. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes 3 2  
9. Extremism of marginalised groups 3 1 1 
10. Proliferation of WMD/WME 3 1 1 
11. Consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes  3 1 1 
12. Technological exploitation by criminal or rogue elements 1 3 1 
Uncertain: “Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties”  
It was not possible to interpret the responses in an unambiguous manner. 
Legend: (?)* stands for undecided responses. 
   
Table 2: Risk conditions that merit a peace support operation. 
 
These risk conditions pertain to specific futures. These futures have an impact on the overall 
strategic setting where a peace support operation functions. Thus, it is pertinent to make this 
differentiation.  Table no. 2 below depicts these relationships. 
Future 1: 
“Dark Side of Exclusivity” 
Future 2: 
“Deceptive Stability” 
Future 3: 
“Clash of Modernities” 
Future 4: 
“New Power 
Politics” 
1. Failed governance 
2. Potential spill-over of ethnic, 
religious, ideological conflict 
3. Vulnerability of strategic 
chokepoints and infrastructures 
in ungoverned spaces 
4. Uncontrolled migration. 
5. Potential disputes over 
previously uninhabited and 
resource-rich territories 
6. Proliferation of WMD/WME 
7. Consequences from 
environmental 
catastrophes/changes 
1. Transnational 
criminal 
movements 
2. Potential spill-over 
of ethnic, religious, 
and ideological 
conflict 
3. Uncontrolled 
migration. 
 
1. Extremism of marginalised 
groups 
2. Territorial and extra-
territorial border disputes 
3. Technological exploitation 
by criminal/rogue 
elements 
4. Potential spill-over of 
ethnic, religious, and 
ideological conflict 
1. Interstate 
rivalry 
 
Table 3: Risk conditions that merit a peace support operation within specific futures. 
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3.3 Deductions Pertaining to Future Peace Support Operations 
 
The primary deduction is that the risk conditions that merit a peace support operation are very 
distinct from each other. This distinction is exacerbated by the different overall settings of the 
international relations system in each specific future. This implies that any crisis management 
operation should be tailored to fit its respective case.  
 
The potential spillover of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict is common to the first three 
futures. The existence of such a crosscutting risk condition implies that future peace support 
operations will continue to be challenged by issues related to their legitimacy. Furthermore, 
uncontrolled migration appears in two futures. In the first future, the uncontrolled migration 
appears in a world, which is polarized between developed and developing states. In second 
future, the uncontrolled migration appears in a world, where states with capabilities to react to 
are preoccupied with domestic internal issues. Thus, they are less able or willing to react. 
 
Although it was not tested on the Delphi-panel, it is reasonable to assume that the above-
mentioned twelve risk conditions are likely to appear intertwined – and not as isolated sterile 
conditions173. This is especially the case in future one, where failed governance may cause 
uncontrolled migration – or vice versa. Furthermore, failed governance may lead to 
uncontrolled spaces that threaten strategic chokepoints. 
 
The differences between the risk conditions are highlighted when they are tested against 
fundamental strategic questions174. To provide a few examples, failed governance may not 
directly threaten other states, but the vulnerability of strategic chokepoints does. Failed 
governance is likely to have many undesired effects but it raises the issue of viewpoints and 
standards by which judgments are made. For instance, viewpoints of international 
organisations, superpowers, nation-states, leadership and population are varied. Different 
stakes are at hand, if one compares transnational crime with conflicts related to ethnicity, 
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religion or ideology. To suppress crime one defends legality within a national and - or 
international legal framework. To mitigate ethnic, religious, or ideological conflict one needs 
to balance between reciprocal respect and the legitimacy of alternative views. The nature and 
scale of immediate security concerns are quite different, when interstate rivalry is compared to 
uncontrolled migration. Uncontrolled migration is extremely vague by definition. In practice, 
it raises questions on scale, direction, impact, responsibility to protect, moral norms, 
legitimacy and legality of actions175. Comparing interstate rivalry and uncontrolled migration, 
one realises that the stakes involved are different. Thus, it is expected that political objectives 
are different – hence the strategies selected should also be different. Pertaining to proliferation 
of WMD/WME, nation-states and international organisations are faced with the dilemma of 
preventive (i.e. against potential threat) and pre-emptive (i.e. against imminent threat) 
measures. In these cases legality, legitimacy, likelihood and lethality arise, as well as the 
merits of action against inaction. To conclude, all the above considerations have an impact on 
the robustness of home fronts of countries participating in a peace support operation. 
 
Furthermore, the concept of an opposing force, or enemy in classic military terms, is also very 
different. In an interstate rivalry situation, the intervening force may be looked as an impartial 
party by the rival parties – or biased towards the other. In the risk conditions pertaining to 
crime, identifying the opposing force (i.e. criminals by legitimate legal standards) is 
straightforward - at least on a conceptual level. The same applies to extremism of 
marginalised groups – as long as they are perceived as extremist both legally and legitimately. 
However, identifying opposing forces in risk conditions related to uncontrolled migration or 
ideological conflict is precarious – and quite likely a futile counter-productive exercise. 
 
The Delphi-panel was actually responding to the question of overall international capacity to 
intervene by pondering which risk condition merits a peace support operation. This finding 
will be elaborated in the second round of Delphi-questions, which assumes that the potential 
overall international capacity to conduct peace support operations is high. However, in the 
future “Deceptive Stability” the will to do so is low. This is due to the risk of so-called 
‘strategic inattention’.  
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From a historical perspective, the risk conditions are neither novel nor new. These risk 
conditions derive from both the recent past and times even centuries ago. For instance, one 
may argue that piracy at sea in the 17th and 18th century, or the contemporary drug-trade 
related conflicts of Latin America, as well as modern cyber-crime are all forms of 
transnational crime. Such crime has exploited and continues to exploit existing technologies. 
All other risk conditions have also occurred in the past. Thus from the viewpoint of practicing 
strategy, we are actually fortunate. History provides strategic education. The distinction is 
that the risk conditions occur in novel futures. Hence, lessons learned from the past should be 
fitted to the case at hand. 
 
 
4 INDUCE CONSENT OR RELY ON COMPLIANCE 
 
“Ridiculing idealism is short-sighted, but idealism untested by pessimism is misleading.”176 
 
Chapter 4 begins by explaining theory pertaining to spoilers. Thereafter, deriving from spoiler 
theory and the peacebuilding triangle consequent hypotheses are presented. These hypotheses 
are tested with the Delphi-panel and subsequent specific research findings and future 
prospects are presented. Chapter 4 concludes in a summary of the findings and a discussion 
supported by contemporary literature. 
 
4.1 Theoretical Perspectives and Consequent Hypotheses 
 
It is common that peace processes have spoilers. The problem of spoilers is activated once 
there is a commitment, either formal or informal, towards a peace process. In order to conduct 
peace support operations one must know who’s peace is being kept (i.e. parties of the peace 
process) and the substance of that peace177. Furthermore, one must comprehend by whom, 
where, when, how and why is a peace process threatened. To manage the spoiler problem one 
needs better comprehension of the actual problem. First, one needs to understand typology of 
spoilers. Secondly, one needs to explore intellectual approaches or strategies in managing 
specific spoiler problems. Finally, one needs to be aware of challenges related to 
implementing these strategies. 
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4.1.1 Managing Spoilers Within Peace Processes 
 
Spoilers do not exist in wars, but are created within peace processes. Spoilers exist only when 
there is a process to undermine. Such a peace process begins when at least two parties to a 
conflict have committed themselves to a peace agreement. A peace process creates spoilers 
because it is rare in conflicts for all leaders and factions to see peace as beneficial. Even if 
parties come to value peace, they rarely do so simultaneously, and they often disagree over the 
terms of an acceptable peace. A compromise in the form of a negotiated peace usually has 
losers: some who do not achieve their war aims. A compromise by definition requires the 
parties to accept that some of their demands are not met.178 One may argue that there is an 
analogy between peace processes and the UN Charter. One can elaborate that individuals and 
groups that threaten local, regional or global peace are spoilers of the UN Charter’s aims of 
international peace and security179. Thus in this research Stedman’s spoiler definition180 is 
expanded to include threats (i.e. groups and individuals) to international peace and security. 
 
To understand the typology of spoilers, one must appreciate that spoilers have different 
dimensions, which are: number, position, type and locus. If the number of spoilers is more 
than one, the peace process faces a compound challenge. Any approach chosen to deal with 
one spoiler has implications for approaches used to deal with others. For example, actions 
taken to weaken one spoiler may inadvertently strengthen others. By position spoilers are 
either inside or outside of an agreement. To undermine a peace process inside spoilers 
typically use strategies of stealth, whilst outside spoilers often resort to violence.181  
 
Limited, total or greedy are different types of spoilers. Primarily they differ on the aims of the 
spoiler, and secondarily on the commitment to achieving those aims. Limited spoilers have 
limited goals (e.g. a share of power, basic security for followers etc.). Limited goals do not 
imply limited commitment – goals can be non-negotiable. At the other end of the spectrum are 
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total spoilers. They pursue total power and exclusive recognition of authority whilst holding 
immutable preferences: that is their goals are not subject to change. Furthermore, pragmatism 
required for compromised settlements is rare. Total spoilers often advocate radical ideologies, 
for them total power is the means for radical transformation of society. Between the limited 
and total spoiler lies the greedy spoiler, that holds goals that expand or contract based on 
calculations of cost and risk. When faced with low costs and low risks the greedy spoiler may 
expand its limited goals. Vice versa, when faced with high costs and high risks spoiler’s goals 
may contract.182  
 
The final differentiation that Stedman provides is the locus183 of spoiler behaviour – that is 
whether it is the leader or the followers that generate the behaviour. If it is the leader, then 
parties may alter the spoiler type if their leadership changes. Such a change may be enough to 
transform a total spoiler to a limited spoiler. However, in some cases the followers are the 
locus of spoiler behaviour. Stedman’s case study suggests that in Rwanda in 1994 this locus 
of spoiler behaviour was witnessed.184 
 
International actors that have overseen the implementation of peace agreements, custodians of 
peace processes, have pursued three general conceptual strategies in managing spoilers. The 
first of them is inducement, which is giving the spoiler what it wants.185 It entails taking 
positive measures to address the grievances of factions who obstruct the peace process186. The 
other is socialization, which means changing the behaviour of the spoiler, so that it adheres to 
a set of established norms. The third is coercion. That is punishing a spoiler for its behaviour 
or reducing its capacity to undermine and destroy a peace process. In practice, each of these 
conceptual strategies has specific configurations more complex than the general version 
described. It is also important to note that international actors have shown to employ more 
than one strategy – either simultaneously with different emphasis or in a sequence.187 For the 
benefit of this research, coercion is examined with more depth.  
 
Coercive diplomacy and the application of force are two variations of the coercive strategy. 
The other two are what Stedman calls the ‘departing train’ and ‘withdrawal’ variations. The 
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departing train strategy combines a judgment that a peace process will go irrevocably forward, 
regardless of whether a spoiler joins or not. The metaphor implies that a peace process is a 
train leaving the station at a preordained time: once set in motion, anyone not on board will be 
left behind. This strategy may require active measures to limit the ability of spoilers to 
destruct the peace process and protect those that are committed to the process. The withdrawal 
strategy builds on an assumption that a spoiler wants an international presence during the 
peace process. The aim of the strategy is to punish the spoiler by threatening to withdraw 
international support and peacekeepers from a peace process. It is a blunt instrument. If 
implemented, it hurts those that have fulfilled their obligations and rewards any spoilers 
opposed to international involvement.188 Overall, the idea of using force against spoilers raises 
several challenges for peace support operations. First, identifying the typology of spoilers is 
one challenge. Second, if a spoiler group represents a significant proportion of the local 
population, then using force against popular local groups may make the process of national 
reconciliation exceedingly difficult and jeopardize the prospects for a self-sustaining peace.189  
 
Stedman provides a theoretical approach to matching the above strategies to different 
spoilers. Stedman’s standpoint is that total spoilers cannot be accommodated. Thus, they must 
be defeated or marginalized. Stedman argues that greedy spoilers can conceivably be brought 
into a settlement – if the costs of war are sufficiently high. Furthermore, a limited spoiler can 
be accommodated by meeting its non-negotiable demands. Greedy spoilers may also be 
accommodated. However, there are risks in such accommodation, as it may whet the greedy 
spoilers’ appetite to demand more concessions.190 These considerations suggest that peace 
enforcement could be feasible against total and greedy spoilers. 
 
According to Stedman, total spoilers cannot be appeased through inducements, nor can they 
be socialized. Coercive diplomacy may also be dangerously counterproductive; if custodians 
fail to carry through threats, a spoiler’s position may be strengthened. By revealing the 
inadequacy of international force, a total spoiler adds to its domestic reputation for coercive 
strength. The withdrawal strategy is not feasible, as the total spoiler has all to gain if the peace 
process fails. However, appropriate strategies for managing total spoilers are the use of force 
or the departing train strategy. Stedman claims that few custodians are willing to use force, 
thus they should strengthen the parties of peace so they could defend themselves. The 
                                                                                                                                        
187
 Stedman (1997), pp. 12 – 17. 
188
 Stedman (1997), pp. 12 – 17. 
189
 Bellamy, Alex J.; Williams, Paul; Griffin, Stuart: Understanding Peacekeeping, 2nd edition, Polity 
Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 227 - 229, 280 – 283. 
190
 Stedman (1997), pp. 12 – 17. 
 63  
 
departing train strategy would legitimize the parties of peace and delegitimize the spoiler. It 
would deprive the spoiler of resources (e.g. capital and weapons) that can be used to 
undermine peace.191  
 
Inducement is an appropriate strategy for managing limited spoilers, but it depends on the 
bargaining range established by the other parties who have already committed to peace. If the 
demands of a limited spoiler cannot be accommodated, then the remaining strategies are 
socialization and coercion. Obviously, the threat or the use of force may prompt a counter 
escalation of violence by - so far - a limited spoiler.192 
 
As the greedy spoiler is not a total spoiler, there are at least prospects of bringing it into a 
peace process. Socialization is the appropriate long-term strategy towards a greedy spoiler. 
In the short term, this spoiler presents a serious dilemma. As inducements alone will only 
whet the appetite of the greedy spoiler; the legitimacy and illegitimacy of its demands must be 
clearly distinguished. In addition, depending on the risk-taking and cost insensitivity of the 
spoiler, the use of coercive measures may be required to impose costs and create limits to the 
spoiler’s demands. However, relying solely on a coercive strategy ignores that even greedy 
spoilers have legitimate security goals, which can only be accommodated by inducements.193 
 
In practice the selection and implementation of appropriate strategy is influenced by 
limitations that custodians of a peace process are subject to. The best strategy for managing a 
conflict may not be a feasible strategy for a custodian considering a wider range of interests. 
What needs to be done and what actors are prepared to do should not be confused. This 
applies both to invidual states as well as to international organisations. Even the UN has an 
interest in protecting its reputation and peacekeeping institution. Moreover, the UN has 
specific limitations as its representatives in the field (i.e. the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General, SRSG) are constrained by the direction and commitment of the Security 
Council. The SRSG’s ability to induce or punish, or rule on the legitimacy of demands, 
depends on the support of the member states. Besides these limitations, the most considerable 
liability in managing spoilers is member states that are patrons of the spoilers. However if 
these patrons are sincerely supportive of the peace process; then they provide the SRSG 
substantial leverage and credibility. The typology of spoilers advocates that a peace process 
entails numerous uncertainties and immense complexity. To manage the spoiler problem one 
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must identify several factors. One must identify the aim of the spoiler; intentions behind acts 
of non-cooperation or aggression; and commitment of the spoiler. Furthermore, one must 
distinguish spoiler leaderships’ control over its followers; unity within a spoiler; and likely 
effects of actions. Such actions should have an impact on the spoiler’s willingness to continue 
aggression. Impact of actions on other parties to a peace process and interested external actors 
should also be appreciated.194 
 
Case studies conducted by Stedman suggest four general findings about managing spoilers. 
First, case studies illustrate that spoiler type, number of spoilers, and locus of the spoiler 
problem are variables that affect robustness of strategies for managing spoilers. Second, 
studies highlight that peace process custodians must understand and diagnose the spoiler 
problem correctly. Third, quite often the custodians’ rules and beliefs used to cope with the 
complexity of peace processes actually defeat them. Fourth, there are examples of successful 
spoiler management, which implies that spoilers need not destroy peace processes. This is if 
custodians create robust strategies, seek international consensus for such strategies, and 
recognize the applicability of normative power.195 These findings call for prudent analysis, 
appropriate cognizance of problems, correct selection on point of view and matching 
applicable strategies to manage a peace process. 
 
Furthermore, Stedman provides examples of organisational blinders. A custodian must not 
assume that parties to a conflict, or peace process, will act in good faith throughout the 
process. Such a process is uncertain, complex and dynamic – it will evolve. If within such a 
process, a custodian follows blindly ‘traditional’ peacekeeping values (i.e. neutrality, 
impartiality and consent), it will constrain attempts to challenge spoiler behaviour. Therefore, 
principles of UN peacekeeping have developed to: (1) consent of the parties; (2) impartiality; 
and (3) non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate196. When faced 
with uncertainty and complexity, custodians have a tendency to redefine their aims and 
measures of success to one overriding accomplishment. Stedman defines this as a ‘holy grail’ 
syndrome. For instance, when implementing a peace agreement, the UN often drops its 
commitments to various other components of the agreement to focus on holding an election. 
When spoilers plunge their countries into war, the UN attempts to obtain a cease-fire.197 This 
critique is partly true and logical, and partly not.  Case studies support this point, but from an 
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organizational aspect, especially a military dimension, the selection of aim and main effort are 
justified and prudent practice. Secondly, it is logical that custodians should be responsive to 
the dynamics of a peace process198. 
 
Unity and coordination among external parties, correct definition of the problem199, 
establishing legitimacy for strategy, and applying such a legitimate strategy are all common 
denominators for successful spoiler management. External patrons’ support to spoilers, or to 
ending of such support, has been a focal denominator of failures and successes in spoiler 
management. This implies that a common understanding of legitimate and illegitimate 
demands of the spoilers must exist. Such an understanding defines a unified stance on what 
demands should be met and what rejected. Existence of such understanding has been a success 
factor.  This legitimization is an integral part of spoiler management, which implies two 
points. First, solutions to internal conflicts do not arise solely from the parties of a conflict. 
Successful management of internal conflict has relied on willingness of external actors to take 
sides on legitimate and illegitimate demands. Second, if external consensus and a coherent 
strategy are used in conjunction, the setting of a normative standard can be an effective tool 
for crisis management.200 These findings necessitate some considerations. Pertaining to 
contemporary affairs and as an example, is the Taliban movement a total, greedy or limited 
spoiler? In addition, does it represent a significant part of the population? Pertaining to the 
future and the international capacity dimension of a peacebuilding space, will requisite 
normative standards exist to make such judgements in the next decade? Furthermore, do these 
two findings, understanding and legitimization; apply only to post-conflict and intrastate 
conflict situations? One may argue that achieving such normative standards requires 
comprehension and consequent legitimization, even before a conflict and in a wider 
international setting. 
 
In planning for and executing a spoiler management strategy it is important to identify 
patrons, sensitize them to their appropriate role and utilise the leverage they provide. The 
focal question is what is the typology of spoilers in each risk condition? Regardless of the 
typology of spoilers, all of them may require coercive measures to be managed. Stedman 
provides a theoretic model, but one has to consider that all conflict situations have mutations 
                                            
198
 For support on this obvious point, see Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 56-59. 
199
 Werner et al. (2005) pp. 273-276. For example, third party intervention must be careful when they 
pressure belligerents to ceasefire that they are not encouraging a settlement, which is not consistent 
with belligerents’ perception about likely causes of conflict. Luttwak (1999), pp. 36-44 provides related 
argumentation. 
200
 Stedman (1997), pp. 51-52. 
 66  
 
of all three spoilers.  Stedman’s approach is initially incremental: first an array of political 
crisis management measures then coercive measures. To summarize the strategies, total 
spoilers are managed by the departing train or use of force strategies. Limited spoilers merit 
for initial inducement and if that fails then socialization and coercion. Initially greedy 
spoilers are managed by long-term socialization and inducement on their legitimate demands. 
In the worst case, the illegitimate demands of greedy spoilers must be countered with 
coercion. The incremental approach related to these strategies has an important consideration 
for military capabilities. One cannot design and mount a military component initially as a 
peacekeeping force and thereafter expect it to move into peace enforcement mode – without 
prior planning and preparations201. Thus, deciding on posture of a peace support operation is a 
pertinent strategic decision at the outset before committing to an operation. 
 
4.1.2 Incentives and Ecology of a Peacebuilding Environment 
 
Though the idea of matching spoiler management strategy to the typology of spoilers is useful, 
the issue needs more scrutiny. Understanding incentives of spoilers is important alongside the 
typology. Establishing stable peace requires that the defensive and offensive202 incentives of 
factions, including leaders and followers, be addressed. If a peace treaty that outlines the post-
conflict settlement is signed, then the parties’ preferences and incentives have been revealed 
to some extent. However, as peace treaties are rarely followed to the letter, the patterns of 
compliance with a treaty help to distinguish true preferences and identify moderates from 
extremists. Thus, custodians must understand treaties as well as parties stand towards these 
treaties in all respects. Furthermore, it is a prerequisite that custodians follow how compliance 
evolves in a dynamic setting of peacebuilding.203 Whilst peace support operations have grown 
in size and complexity, so too has the nature and organization of spoiler groups evolved. The 
spectrum of spoilers ranges from comparably rag-tag rebel groups to organized armies or 
fighters using asymmetrical tactics. In cases where there is no adhered peace agreement, at 
least UN peacekeepers are increasingly the object of spoiler violence – including from the 
involved states themselves.204 Overall, peace operations need to be flexible. They need to 
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adjust their mandate given the observations of cooperation or conflict on the ground, and 
based on the assessment of the operation about the nature of the conflict205. 
 
Furthermore, spoilers do not operate in a vacuum. Successful implementation of peace 
support operations requires that the ‘ecology of the peacebuilding’ environment (i.e. operating 
environment in military terms) is understood.206 The ‘ecologies’ are a combination of three 
dimensions. The first dimension is coherence. Are the factions coherent or incoherent? That 
is, do they or do they not follow the orders of their leaders? Secondly, the factions reflect 
varying degrees of reconciliation or hostility. If they have reached a ‘hurting stalemate’, they 
accept the peace process. On the other hand, if they have been dragged to peace negotiations; 
they do not sincerely accept the peace process207. Thirdly, there are few or many factions.208 In 
a strategic situation where factions of a conflict are few, hostile and coherent209, both formal 
and effective authority, including the will to use them, is needed. This suggests that a 
capability for peace enforcement is necessary. If factions are few, hostile and incoherent210 
prospects of sustainable peace are extraordinarily difficult. Such situations call for exceptional 
multilateral and international commitment. A grim outlook for a peace process is where there 
are many, incoherent and hostile factions in an area of extremely low local capacity (e.g. poor 
economy). For such cases partition, and for the remainder of country, a substantial civilian and 
developmental capacity-building effort with a long-term approach alongside trusteeship-like 
authority is suggested211. All these ecologies call for various levels of external political 
authority. Thus, they make a case in support of peace enforcement that supports such an 
authority. 
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4.1.3 Consent and Use of Force 
 
Consent is not an absolute quality. On the contrary, it can be enlarged and built upon by an 
enterprising outside force. However, the basic distinction between consent-based operations 
and enforcement, where some degree of war fighting logic must be accepted, remains valid. 
“In war, however limited the objective or the resources allocated to achieve it, the need to 
break the will of the opponent and bear the risk to these resources marks the difference from 
peace.”212 
 
Developing on the idea that consent is not an absolute quality; then consent may be 
recognized as variable, multilayered and malleable. The level and nature of consent changes 
across a mission, thus it may be recognized as variable consent. Parties that give their consent 
at the outset may change their minds and vice versa. Parties may also be divided in their view 
of whether or not to grant consent. The level of consent may be shallow or deep. Shallow 
consent occurs if parties tolerate a peace operation, and they seek to neither undermine an 
operation nor cooperate proactively. In contrast, deep consent implies that actors actively 
cooperate with the peace operation.213 Thus, the idea of consent being variable resembles the 
idea of the existence of greedy spoilers and the possibility of recognizing locus of the spoilers. 
 
The idea of multilayered consent affirms Stedman’s distinction on the locus of spoilers. While 
the leadership of a faction may give their consent, it does not always imply that local fighters 
will do likewise – and vice versa. This is emphasised when the conflict is not between two 
disciplined armed forces, which is often the case in ‘new wars’. In these cases instructions 
from political leaders are less likely to be implemented by subordinates. It is argued that the 
level of consent is malleable (i.e. influenced or controlled) through ‘consent management’ 
activities. If consent is understood to be a fluctuating factor; then peace support operations 
have an important role. Peace support operations should be able to promote and maximise 
consent, as well as mitigate the possible loss of consent in cases where the use of force is 
essential. The aim of consent management is to strengthen an operation’s legitimacy214. As an 
example, consent management techniques include patrolling in order to engage closely with 
the local community; public information campaigns; conducting quick-impact projects; and 
providing capacity-building assistance. Although these activities contribute to peacebuilding, 
their primary objective is to improve relations between the peacekeepers and the local 
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community. The overall aim is to strengthen and deepen consent, and enable consent 
management in challenging times.215 Conceptualizing consent in these three categories 
corroborates the logic of Stedman’s ideas on spoiler management. Coercive spoiler 
management includes the use of force, which peace support operations are able to conduct. 
 
The concept of peace support operations insists that it is possible to use force in a peace 
operation without losing impartiality. This is based on the idea that neutrality and 
impartiality are distinctly different concepts. Impartial peacekeepers discriminate between 
belligerents and treat similar breaches in comparable ways. Impartiality means treating 
everyone according to the same principles, whereas neutrality means opting not to take a 
position. Impartiality might actually require the use of force, if spoilers seriously challenge an 
ongoing peace process. Any such use of force must be directed at specific breaches of a peace 
agreement or mission mandate. Furthermore such actions must be conducted discriminately 
and proportionally, and meticulously explained to the host population.216 This is because 
consent remains the foundation of a peace operation - although it is variable, multi-layered 
and malleable. Thus, consent cannot be overlooked. 
 
The following example and argumentation suggest that consent of state actors is required, 
which gravitates peace support operations towards peacekeeping. Alongside this, the 
argumentation suggests that consent of non-state actors is not always required, which then 
pertains towards peace enforcement. Earlier missions were able to use force decisively or at 
least project it, while the mission in Darfur has been far more troubled. This suggests that 
rather than talking about a ‘Mogadishu line’ in peacekeeping (i.e. deploying where there is no 
consent from some non-state actors) we should identify a ‘Darfur line’ that the UN 
peacekeeping cannot afford to cross. This is deploying where there is no real consent by the 
state. With only weak consent of the state missions may be able to mitigate humanitarian 
crises, but they will not be able to establish or sustain a political or security framework. Lack 
of consent by a non-state actor does not necessarily undermine the logic or support for 
peacekeeping, if there is a recognized state and a broadly supported political framework for 
that state’s extension of its authority in the country. Haiti’s gangs did not consent to the use of 
force to clear them from the slums of Port-au-Prince – but the operations against them have 
still contributed to peace.217 
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Reflecting on the idea that logic of war fighting applies to peace enforcement; it is pertinent to 
highlight an ingenious formulation of UNTAC Force Commander General Sanderson. He 
stated that in peace operations military missions should follow: “… an interposition strategy, 
but not between opposing forces. Rather, it is between a highly moral act sanctioned under 
international law and supported by international consensus, and any person or group which 
might threaten it.”218 
 
4.1.4 Hypotheses on Peace Enforcement and Peacekeeping 
 
Reflecting on the UN model of peace operations and theorizing on the timeline before and 
after a peace treaty: it is obvious that hostility of factions exists before a peace treaty. 
However, spoilers are in most cases identifiable only after a peace treaty. Thus, for the sake of 
peace enforcement both ecology of a conflict (especially hostility of factions) and typology of 
spoilers (especially greedy or total spoiler) are plausible determinants for peace enforcement. 
Peacekeeping as safeguarding consensual factions and limited spoilers is also evident. To 
theorize further, peace enforcement activities could be divided into three conceptual 
categories, as depicted in picture 7.  Firstly, in the timeline before a ceasefire, one may argue 
that there may be peace enforcement, which is biased towards one or more of the parties of a 
conflict (i.e. PE biased)219. The primary motive of such enforcement is to protect any 
peacemaking activities, deter its opponents and coerce different factions and parties towards 
peacemaking. At a minimum, such enforcement should constrain total spoilers, until a time 
that they no longer affect the process. Secondly, there is peace enforcement that is impartial 
towards all parties of a conflict (i.e. PE impartial). This type of peace enforcement does not 
favour any faction and applies an equal ‘yardstick’ towards all parties. The primary motive of 
this enforcement action is to protect the peacemaking activities. Thirdly, in the timeline after a 
ceasefire, there is the third conceptual peace enforcement activity. This enforcement targets 
the spoilers of a peace process (i.e. PE spoilers). The primary motive is to coerce spoilers 
towards acceptance of a peace process and deter any spoiler from disrupting the process. 
Pertaining to evident dynamic nature of peace operations, one may argue for a desired 
direction of transition. The biased peace enforcement should cause transition towards 
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 General John Sanderson as quoted in Jianwei Wang: Managing Arms in Peace Processes - 
Cambodia, UNIDIR, 1996, p. 71, downloaded from http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-
111-4-en.pdf (12.01.2011). UNTAC: United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. 
219
 For a comprehensive discussion of pre-emptive and preventive measures, see Doyle (2008). 
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impartial or spoiler types of peace enforcement. Peace enforcement related to spoilers should 
ideally transition to peacekeeping. 
 
Peacemaking Peace Enforcement (PE)
Peacekeeping (PK)
Ceasefire
Conflict
PE spoilers
PE biasedPE impartial
 
Picture 7: Conceptual categories of peace enforcement. 
Drawing on the theoretical models of peacebuilding triangle, ecologies of conflict and spoiler 
typology; it is feasible to formulate hypothesis relevant to the research interest. The 
foundations and logic in formulating hypotheses are presented in the following. Pertaining to 
the peacebuilding triangle and level of hostility, if the level of hostility is high, then it is 
expected that there is a requirement for peace enforcement. Alternatively, if the level of 
hostility is low, then peacekeeping may be sufficient. Pertaining to the peacebuilding triangle 
and international capacity, if the amount of international capacity is high, then it is expected 
that there is a possibility for peace enforcement. Alternatively, if the amount of international 
capacity is low, then only peacekeeping measures may be plausible. Pertaining to the 
peacebuilding triangle and local capacity; if the amount of local capacity is high, then it is 
expected that peace enforcement may not be possible. This is because external intervention 
may encounter robust resistance. Alternatively, if the amount of local capacity is low, then 
peace enforcement may be possible. This is because it is likely that external intervention 
would encounter less highly capable military capabilities. This is to say that the intervening 
force would be able to maintain ‘escalation dominance’ relying on both qualitative and 
quantitative relative advantage. 
 
The three ecologies of peacebuilding, that are relevant for examining use of force, all call for 
various levels of external political authority. Therefore, they make a case in support of peace 
enforcement - in support of such an authority. In these ecologies, a key factor that merits 
peace enforcement appears to be the hostility of factions. Pertaining to ecologies of conflict 
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and perspectives for peace enforcement; if factions are few, hostile and coherent, the hostility 
factor may necessitate peace enforcement. Coherence of the factions implies that the effects of 
coercive measures are more predictable, than with incoherent factions. In parallel, peace 
enforcement may be necessary, if factions are few, hostile and incoherent. However, 
incoherence challenges predicting effects of coercion. As said earlier, an ecology of many, 
hostile and incoherent factions is a grim outlook for a peace process. Alongside long-term 
capacity building and external transitional authority, even in this ecology the hostility factor 
may necessitate coercive measures – that is peace enforcement. 
 
Pertaining to spoiler typology; a conflict that involves either total or greedy spoilers or both; 
then there is a requirement for peace enforcement. Consistent with Stedman’s spoiler 
management strategies, limited spoilers do not merit peace enforcement at outset. This being 
the case, existence of limited spoilers was not evaluated to merit peace enforcement measures 
when formulating the hypotheses. They were not considered as primary reasons for coercive 
measures. 
 
Furthermore, as this research is future oriented, it is pertinent to evaluate future overall setting 
in which peace support operations might be conducted. Peace support operations are not 
conducted in a vacuum. The identified four plausible futures all provide specific settings for 
these operations. For the purpose of this research, these settings relate to the peacebuilding 
triangle’s dimensions: international and local capacity. International capacity is evaluated 
being high within developed states in all futures except in “Deceptive Stability”. However, 
one may evaluate that actual political will to utilise this high capacity remains variable and 
difficult to predict. In the future “Deceptive Stability” the underlying theme is strategic 
inattention, thus the international capacity for military interventions is evaluated as low220. 
Within a majority of the risk conditions (i.e. 8 out of 13) local capacity is predominantly low, 
although asymmetric situations may occur. Asymmetry pertains to situations where, one or 
more of the parties to a conflict possess high capacity, whilst one or more have a low capacity.  
Situations with more or less equal capacities are obviously plausible. 
 
These theoretical considerations are within the scope of this research in formulating 
hypotheses. However, using peace enforcement requires prudent assessment. Amongst many 
considerations, one must assess what strategic impact coercive use of force may have on the 
operating environment. Effects of short-term tactical engagements are likely to have crucial 
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importance for the effectiveness of stabilising a peacebuilding environment. Unless this 
thoroughly understood, it is uncertain if the occasional robust actions would be productive221. 
Therefore the research questions also evaluate the preconditions and implications. 
 
Each risk condition that merits a peace support operation has been assessed and described. 
The hypotheses are formulated primarily to assess the feasibility of peace enforcement. Vice 
versa, the risk conditions that do not explicitly merit peace enforcement action are expected to 
cope with peacekeeping approaches. The assessment and description has been done within the 
theoretical framework of peacebuilding triangle222, ecologies of conflict223 and spoiler 
typology. Table 4 illustrates descriptions of the risk conditions and related hypotheses. 
 
No. DESCRIPTION OF RISK CONDITION AND RELATED HYPOTHESES 
1 Failed Governance. Consistent with the risk condition’s definition local capacity is low. Plainly due to the fact of failed 
governance local hostility level is not necessarily high – thus it is assumed low. Obviously, hostility can rise over time 
due to other intertwined risk conditions. By definition, the ecology is incoherent. The significant spoiler type is assumed 
to be greedy, which could be the failed state’s leadership regime. Alongside greedy spoilers, limited spoilers are likely. 
They could be both the failed state’s leadership regime and the local population. Hypothesis no. 1: It is likely that in 
such a risk condition, greedy spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures. 
2 Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict. The level of local hostility is potentially high and also very 
significant. The factions are assumed to be coherent as ethnicity, religion or ideology unites them. In the worst case, 
the significant spoiler type is total alongside limited spoilers, which are moderates within the factions. Hypothesis no. 2: 
It is likely that in such a risk condition, total spoilers exist, and this justifies for coercive spoiler management strategies 
including the use of military force (i.e. peace enforcement measures). Hypothesis no. 3: It is likely that in such a risk 
condition the levels of local (i.e. within in mission area of operations) hostility are high, thus military capabilities are 
necessary to protect any political peace process. 
3 Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces. Levels of local capacity are low, which 
is due to the overall setting that this specific future implies. Local level of hostility is not a significant feature – thus it is 
assumed low. The ecology of conflict may be any combination. The significant factor is that the significant spoiler type 
is likely to be greedy, with the potential for total spoilers. Hypothesis no. 4: It is likely that in such a risk condition, 
greedy spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures. 
4 Uncontrolled migration. It is likely that local capacity is low at migration’s areas of origin, but local capacity may be 
either high or low at receiving areas, where migration directs itself. The local level of hostility towards developed states 
has the potential to be high, which is consistent with the overall setting of the future scenario. The significant spoiler 
type is limited.  It is likely that there are many factions, which are generally reconciled and incoherent, due to the lack 
of organized leadership. Hypothesis no. 5: It is likely that in such a risk condition limited spoilers are significant, which 
necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any humanitarian aid operation. Hypothesis no. 6: It is likely that 
international and national legitimacy and legality considerations restrain from the use of any military force at arrival 
areas, to prevent migration directing itself to those areas. 
5 Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories. It is likely that levels of hostility, between 
parties of any dispute and towards any external intervening forces, are high. The ecology of conflict is likely to involve 
few factions that are coherent, as the disputed issues unite the factions. The factions are hostile towards each other 
and parties that are external to the dispute. The significant spoiler type is limited, which have both legitimate and 
illegitimate claims to previously uninhabited territories. Alongside this greedy spoilers are likely to be involved and 
emerge. 
Hypothesis no. 7: It is likely that limited spoilers with both legitimate and illegitimate demands are involved, which 
necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any political mediation process as well as coerce limited spoilers 
on their illegitimate demands. Hypothesis no. 8: There is an evident potential for the emergence of greedy spoilers, 
which justifies for peace enforcement measures. 
6 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or weapons of mass effect. It is not possible to estimate the levels of local 
capacity – both high and low are plausible. However, the levels of hostility towards any external intervenor are 
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 See Berdal (2009), pp. 100-121 for contemporary examples. 
222
 Doyle and Sambanis (2000), pp. 781 – 783. 
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 Doyle and Sambanis (2006), pp. 321 – 333. 
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potentially high, thus the ecology is hostile. Factions are likely to be few and coherent. The significant spoiler type, be 
it a statelike organisation or non-state actor, is likely to be greedy. The aim of such a spoiler is to gain as much power 
and influence as possible. Alongside this, there is the potential for total spoilers. Hypothesis no. 9: It is likely that both 
greedy and total spoilers pertain to these cases, which justifies for peace enforcement measures (pre-emptive 
measures) in support of any political peace and mediation process.  
7 Consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes. In this case, the levels of local capacity may be either 
high or low. There is no evident reason for the level of hostility to be high, thus it is assumed as low. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that populations that are affected remain reconciled and coherent at least initially.  If any spoilers arise, they 
are likely to be limited, with legitimate and possible illegitimate demands. Hypothesis no. 10: It is likely that in such a 
risk condition, only limited spoilers are initially plausible. This necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any 
humanitarian aid operation. 
8 Transnational criminal movements. In this case, the ecology of conflict is hostile as criminal elements oppose those 
safeguarding legality. The significant spoiler type is greedy. Hypothesis no. 11: It is likely that in such a risk condition, 
greedy spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures.   
9 Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that the 
significant spoiler type is limited, which have both legitimate and possible illegitimate demands. Hypothesis no. 12: It is 
likely that in such a risk condition limited spoilers are significant, which necessitates the use of military capabilities to 
protect any political peace and mediation processes. 
10 Extremism of marginalised groups. In this case, the local capacity level is likely to be low, which is usually related to 
marginalisation and eventual extremism of different groups. The local level of hostility is likely to be high towards 
external parties and especially towards developed nation-states. The ecology of the conflict is hostile with few factions. 
These factions are more coherent than incoherent, as the extremist groups usually feature internal cohesion. The 
significant spoiler type is total. Alongside total spoilers, limited spoilers may appear. Limited spoilers would be the 
moderates of these factions, but extremism implies that the amount of moderates is not significant. Hypothesis no. 13: 
It is likely that in such a risk condition, total spoilers exist, and this justifies for and this justifies for coercive spoiler 
management strategies including the use of military force (i.e. peace enforcement measures).  
11 Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes. In this case, the local capacities may be varied: e.g both high against 
high and high against low are possible. The local level of hostility towards external parties and developed states is 
potentially high; thus the ecology of the conflict is hostile. However, the significant spoiler type is limited, with both 
legitimate and illegitimate claims. Greedy spoilers may appear and emerge alongside limited spoilers. Hypothesis no. 
14: It is likely that in such a risk condition limited spoilers are significant, which necessitates the use of military 
capabilities to protect any political peace and mediation processes. Hypothesis no. 15: It is likely that greedy spoilers 
appear alongside limited spoilers, which would necessitate peace enforcement measures.  
12 Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements. In this case, the ecology of conflict is hostile as criminal 
elements oppose those safeguarding legality. The significant spoiler type is greedy.  Hypothesis no. 16: It is likely that 
in such a risk condition greedy spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures.  
13 Interstate rivalry. In this case, local capacities are assumed to be high (relative to opposing force) as they are used to 
challenge external states. Initially the level of local hostility is low, but as rivalry develops, it has the potential to be 
high. Therefore, the overall ecology involved few parties that are likely to be coherent in a hostile setting. As states 
compete, the significant spoiler type is greedy. Hypothesis no. 17: It is likely that in such a risk condition, greedy 
spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures. 
Table 4: Descriptions of risk conditions and hypotheses. 
 
These descriptions and hypotheses were tested with the Delphi-panel during the second round 
of Delphi-questions. Alongside these hypotheses, the respondents were questioned on their 
views on existing trends and perspectives for each risk condition. See appendix 5 for 
questionnaire. The responses are described in the following chapters.  
 
4.2 The Second Round Delphi-questions and Responses 
 
The following chapters draw upon Delphi-panellists’ responses provided during the second 
round of Delphi-questions. The detailed responses are in appendix 6. Importantly, the 
following chapters contain the consolidated finding
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question: What are the preconditions and implications of attempting to induce consent vis-à-
vis to relying on compliance? Furthermore, the respondents’ consolidated views on the 
hypotheses are described. 
 
4.2.1 Failed Governance 
 
Preconditions. Cognizance of what is good governance versus what is failed governance is a 
fundamental precondition for anyone planning, participating or conducting a peace support 
operation.224 Acceptance from the international community, relevant regional actors and local 
parties are preconditions that need to be met for a peace support operation to be conducted 
successfully. Beside acceptance, sufficient support from the international community is a 
prerequisite. Guiding principles on what merits intervention would be useful, although 
currently such principles do not exist225. 
 
To launch an operation there must be a clear interest to intervene. These interests of different 
nation states and international organisations derive from at least the political and economical 
dimensions. Furthermore, interests must translate to a clear will to intervene. The political and 
all other operational considerations must translate to mandate documents (e.g. a UN Security 
Council Resolution). The military perspective requires a definition of the desired end-state for 
a logic sequence of planning including an exit strategy. The extent of the planned effort must 
be manageable. This means that the practical resources must be sufficient for the scope of the 
mission. 
 
A political process must be in place - even if it involves greedy spoilers. A feasible political 
process remains crucial in any crisis management undertaking, with the military capabilities 
supporting that effort. Pertaining to the political process and for remaining impartial a 
prerequisite will be the involvement of all relevant parties and factions. On another issue, the 
panel provided a pertinent contradiction. One view suggests exploring that, to avoid becoming 
a part of the crisis, the military action should ideally have ‘one time only’ character. 
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 This point is supported by the argumentation available in United Kingdom Ministry of Defence: 
Global Strategic Trends - Out to 2040, Strategic Trends Programme, Development, Concepts and 
Doctrine Centre (DCDC), 4th edition, 2010, pp. 10-14, 17. Also Hermann, MG; Kegley, CW: Ballots, a 
barrier against the use of bullets and bombs - Democratization and military intervention, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, vol 40 (3), September 1996, pp. 454. 
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 On the point pertaining to desire for documented principles, the view of the respondent is in slight 
contradiction to what Jane Stromseth has argued (see chapter 2, Holzgrefe et al. (2003), p.233). 
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Furthermore, the military actions should have a decisive impact on the developments.226 The 
opposing view argues that this simplifies peace operations too much. Furthermore, it argues 
that crisis management is a political-military endeavour. Thus, the two elements cannot and 
should not be separated.227 In light of what chapters 2 and 3 offer, that peace operations are 
dynamic in nature and require perseverance, the latter argumentation seems more relevant. 
 
A fundamental precondition is that defining spoilers is founded on the selected point of view. 
One must appreciate that spoilers are defined from the peace process point of view (i.e. parties 
of a peace process and their external interlocutors). If this is the case, then a military 
prerequisite is that specific guidance is needed on directing actions against spoilers. Spoilers 
must be universally agreed within the peace process as spoilers. 
 
The responsibility to protect civilians will have an emphasis in the future. If there is a prospect 
of a great number of civilian casualties or large refugee movements, then intervention is more 
likely. The level of hostility that is visible is not a single factor, as alongside that the potential 
for escalation of hostility needs to be considered. Another consideration relates to the potential 
for greedy international spoilers alongside spoilers defined within the process. 
 
Implications. Implications are related to preconditions, because the initial standpoints 
themselves are not rigid. In a crisis there is a dynamic influencing the preconditions. From the 
outset of a peace support operation an ‘evolution’ of the preconditions begins. Such an 
evolution involves the nation states and international organisations amongst various other 
dimensions.  
 
An important implication arises from the passage of time since the beginning of an operation. 
Unless substantial progress is apparent, a review of the mandate will surely take place 
especially if the situation turns more hostile. An operating environment can quickly change. 
 
Using peace enforcement in failed governance situations has both advantages and 
disadvantages. Peace enforcement may bring order to states and assist states in stabilizing 
security situations. However, peace enforcement may cause serious local fractionalisation. For 
instance, displacing a former leader may be successful, but the leader’s followers may not 
back down as easily228. Interventions may also escalate the level of hostility.  
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 Respondent 3 during iteration of second round findings. 
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 This is supported by Stedman’s ideas on locus of spoilers. 
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Establishing a safe and secure environment has an important implication. In such an 
environment the population has no incentives to arm itself. However, it is self-evident that 
sustainable development cannot be provided by military means. Military means can merely 
protect aid and development endeavours. A situation of failed governance implies failure in 
governance across the board, which implies that one cannot focus on one area alone. The 
problem that arises is ‘local ownership’ of a process. One can build a ‘façade’ but true local 
ownership is still challenging to develop. 
 
Hypothesis. Hypothesis no. 1 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition greedy spoilers exist, 
and this justifies for peace enforcement measures. Overall, this hypothesis is accepted.229 
However, some reservations are highlighted.  A fundamental reservation is that defining 
spoilers is a point of view, as was elaborated earlier. It is accepted that the greedy spoiler type 
is likely to be significant. However, the scenario is likely to be complex. It is plausible that 
other spoilers exist alongside the greedy spoiler. Thus, it is pertinent to appreciate any local 
demands that no one group or spoiler raises above the others. 
 
Regarding the coercive measures, it is vital to comprehend that overall circumstances dictate. 
If the level of violence is low, it would not convince the international community that a crisis-
management operation is necessary.  The low level of violence would imply a more 
peacekeeping character for the operation – this is monitoring and verification type 
activities230. These actions are in support of the governance and not coercive. 
 
However, the potential for escalation and possible follow on effects should be considered. 
This implies that the military capabilities must be prepared for coercive measures. To stress 
this point, it is understood that decisive actions could be necessary in support of a political 
peace process, whilst all relevant actors should be involved in that process. 
 
4.2.2 Potential Spillover of Ethnic, Religious or Ideological conflict  
 
Preconditions. A political framework and a strong peace negotiation process are the 
overarching matters in this scenario. Alongside the generic preconditions, this scenario of 
potential spillover raises several questions: What is the interest to intervene amidst tensions? 
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 Respondents on hypothesis 1: two accept, three partly accept, one does not accept as a generic 
rule, one undecided.  
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Is it possible to define the mission specifically enough? It is clearly a balancing act between 
interests and defining a mission. There must be a consensus on the legitimacy of any 
intervention. To reach such consensus those intervening must rally for support. Overall, the 
political framework must provide an idea of a ‘way to success’ and a ‘way out’.  
 
Initially it was argued that this is an ‘illogical’ type of conflict as versus a ‘logical’ type of 
conflict. As an example, a logical type of conflict may have its root cause in economy. 
Furthermore, it is argued that illogical type of conflict has root causes in ethnicity, religion or 
ideology. Based on this point of view it is important to highlight ideological reconciliation. 
However, during the iteration it was argued that such a distinction between logical and 
illogical conflict is not plausible, and such distinction simplifies conflict resolution. 
Argumentation builds on the view that even in an ideological based conflict the underlying 
logic can be identified. Such conflict arises from various reasons with economic deprivation 
amongst them.231 Based on what chapter 2 offers on identifying offensive and defensive 
incentives as well as addressing opportunity and grievance factors, one may argue that an 
underlying logic can and must be identified. However challenging the identification of conflict 
logic may be, one is inclined to argue that such logic exists. 
 
Furthermore, it will be of utmost importance to identify the total spoiler or spoilers. This 
identification is fundamental for the political process, comprehensive approach and military 
planning sequence. This remains the case although there is not a direct causality between the 
existence of a total spoiler and a high level of hostility232. It is likely that there will not be a 
peace enforcement mission, unless the level of hostility is high. 
 
The approaches towards this risk condition must be solid. One must appreciate that there are 
no ‘quick fix’ solutions. For example, in a conventional conflict a ‘quick fix’ is usually 
available: capture the land or kill the enemy. However, in sub-conventional conflict there is no 
quick fix. This calls for robust comprehensive capabilities, which are not necessarily military 
capabilities. 
 
Implications. There are varieties of implications that interventions may cause in this risk 
condition. A specific challenge is that some conflicts have root causes that extend to almost 
prehistoric times. This only emphasises the previous appreciation that there are no quick fix 
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 This contradiction arised from views between respondent 1 and respondent 3. 
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 Political theories pertaining to ethnicity provide support for this finding, see chapter 2. 
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approaches to this scenario. Thus, it is expected that reaching sustainable peaceful conditions 
will take a long time. A view in support of this point is that a number of the long duration UN 
operations follow the borderlines of cultural belief systems.  
 
Depending on the circumstances, intervention may cause a complete breakup of socio-
economic structure – and thus cause a ‘vacuum’. Planners at all levels need to look at all 
implications - the implications need to be appreciated and responses planned. A key concern 
is what impact does intervention have on stability: does it disrupt or support stability? 
 
Another specific challenge is the prospect of becoming a party to the conflict. This is because 
a failed governance scenario is not the ‘classical’ setting of peace support operations. For 
example densely populated areas, cities and towns, are particularly challenging operating 
environments. Beyond the physical domain, the perspective that a conflict is ‘illogical’ makes 
operational judgements challenging. It is likely that without a strong peace negotiation process 
the military component will evolve into being a party to the conflict.  
 
Hypotheses. Hypothesis no. 2 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition total spoilers exist, 
and this justifies for coercive spoiler management strategies including the use of military force 
(i.e. peace enforcement measures). Hypothesis no. 3 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition 
the levels of local (i.e. within in mission area of operations) hostility are high, thus military 
capabilities are necessary to protect any political peace process. These hypotheses were 
accepted233, but reservations are also raised. As the levels of hostility are likely to be high, it 
is pointed out that this scenario is not necessarily a crisis management operation environment, 
but rather a war-fighting scenario. Pertaining to hostility an important point was raised. It is 
argued that there is no direct causality between the existence of a total spoiler and high level 
of hostility234. This is to say that not all total spoilers automatically generate high levels of 
violence. This argumentation is elaborated, that if there is hostile total spoiler then surely 
peace enforcement is used. However, if level of hostility is not high there will not peace 
enforcement type mission. In any case, the follow on effects must be considered. 
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 This point is supported by Stedman (1997), pp. 26 – 36. This finding also validates that it would not 
be sufficient to assess an operating environment on spoiler typology only. The ecology of conflict (i.e. 
the levels of hostility) must also be appreciated. 
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4.2.3 Strategic Chokepoints and Infrastructures in Ungoverned Spaces235  
 
Preconditions. This is viewed as a logical type of conflict scenario, where the players are 
more predictable and their interests are easier to find out as compared to other risk conditions. 
The risk condition has a clear relation to economic interests. Thus, it is possible to plan for a 
clear-cut concept of operations – yet the classic tenets of planning apply236. However, the 
timeline cannot be open-ended. Although international capacity maybe high, the time one can 
sustain operations is a concern.  
 
The perception of this conflict being a logical type conflict is substantiated by the view that 
this conflict arises from economical interests237. Therefore, it is difficult to identify military 
actions conducted by the international community in this scenario. However, this does not 
exclude that individual states or coalitions may take military action. Piracy may be the 
exception, where the EU or NATO would intervene, but intervention would require more 
prerequisites. The key question is which actors have strategic interests in the issue? 
Alongside local actors, these actors can also be states that are located faraway. 
 
One may argue that this risk condition does not have relevance to the contemporary anti-
piracy operations of the Horn of Africa, where the only weakness is the legal constraint. This 
is to say that the coercive measures are not strong enough. The vulnerability of strategic 
chokepoints is a more grand interstate level conflict scenario. The Strait of Hormuz serves as 
an example. Iran does not dare to threaten the strait, which is not coincidence. A view is that 
such a threat would be an immediate case for war by the USA side. This makes the point that 
faraway states may have interests in truly strategic chokepoints or infrastructures. 
Nevertheless, it is consistently argued that there is scope for peace support operations in this 
scenario238. 
 
The Delphi-panel provided conflicting views related to acceptance. It is argued that the 
political will to intervene is paramount, whilst the local acceptance is not considered. This 
suggests that the priority order of preconditions changes in this scenario. The conflicting view 
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is that vulnerability should also be experienced as a problem at the local and regional level. 
A mission cannot appear from nowhere. It is also argued, that there should not be a conflict of 
interest with a powerful local or regional actor. Local or regional actors should have similar or 
parallel interest as any intervening force. Furthermore, it is argued that intervention is not 
plausible in a chaotic situation.  
 
Pertaining to implications, the conflict should be compartmentalized to a specific area, with 
the intent that the conflict should not have an effect in a wider sphere. To be successful a 
crisis management operation, with military capabilities, needs to balance and phase its efforts. 
There may be phases with a preventive role. Obviously, there should be way out of the 
conflict – one must offer some closure for those threatening chokepoints.  This implies that 
one needs to negotiate with the actors and offer a course out towards an end state. A crisis 
management operation cannot simply deploy, execute the tasks and leave. Within a reasonable 
timeframe, one must reach a lasting and durable solution. 
 
Hypothesis. Hypothesis no. 4 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition greedy spoilers exist, 
and this justifies for peace enforcement measures. Overall, this hypothesis is accepted239. The 
reservations are not directed at the hypothesis as such, but rather towards the definition of a 
strategic chokepoint and the originator of an intervening force. The panel has different views 
on what is truly strategic, as was elaborated earlier. In relation to this, the panel provides a 
view that international community as a whole would not be likely to intervene. Rather an 
intervention would be conducted by individual states or coalitions with a strategic interest in 
the matter. 
 
4.2.4 Uncontrolled Migration 
 
Preconditions. The classic generic tenets of planning remain valid, but the principle of 
responsibility to protect civilians is stressed. The contemporary peacekeeping operation in 
Sudan’s Darfur supports the point. The operation is a deterrent and committed to protection of 
civilians. Even without a peace agreement, troops are there. On the other hand, political 
preconditions are different and more diffuse. For example, there is willingness to conduct a 
peace support operation in Sudan but not in Zimbabwe. Therefore, the interest viewpoint is 
                                            
239
 Respondents on hypothesis 4: three accept, two partly accept. 
 82  
 
emphasised in this case. The political pressure of nations to participate is a precondition, as 
well as humanitarian and logistic pressures. 
 
Regarding military capabilities, one cannot dismiss the possibility that military capabilities are 
used. However, the security situation should be extremely severe for it to necessitate military 
means. In a failed state scenario, military capabilities may be used, but not targeting the 
population. Military means may be needed to secure delivery of aid, but mindful that the 
humanitarian aid agencies are extremely careful about their integrity. Overall, this risk 
condition does not fit well as a scenario for military crisis management. This risk condition is 
more related to humanitarian aid efforts and policing.  
 
Implications. Operating in an uncontrolled migration scenario is judged as not particularly 
risky for a peace support operation. Therefore obtaining a mandate for the operation should 
not be difficult.  It is likely to receive wide support from the citizens of participating nations.  
However, on an operating level there is always a potential for skirmishes. This raises the 
question on how to step in and remain impartial. Furthermore, it is important to note, that the 
hostility towards states at areas of arrival is not a precondition. Rather it is an implication of 
the effects of migration, such as deteriorating living conditions.  
 
Hypotheses. Hypothesis no. 5 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition limited spoilers are 
significant, which necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any humanitarian aid 
operation. Hypothesis no. 6 is: It is likely that international and national legitimacy and 
legality considerations restrain from the use of any military force at arrival areas, to prevent 
migration directing itself to those areas. The hypotheses are accepted with reservations240. 
The main and obvious reservation is that military capabilities would not be used to target any 
population. On a wider and different perspective, uncontrolled migration is not seen as a 
scenario that would merit for military means in a crisis management operation, but rather 
frontier guard and border control capabilities. 
 
                                            
240
 Respondents on hypothesis 5: three accept, one accepts if situation severe, one undecided.  
Respondents on hypothesis 6: four accept. 
 83  
 
4.2.5 Potential Disputes over Previously Uninhabited and Resource-rich 
Territories  
 
Preconditions. These disputes are more likely to occur intrastate. They are not likely in 
uninhabited areas241. Examples of disputes that pertain to uninhabited areas are few. The risk 
condition involves not only the states involved but also external stakeholders. For example, 
one has to assess what is the influence of USA, China, Russia or India in such a risk 
condition. Although there is no imbalance yet – there is an imbalance developing.  In this 
scenario, it is likely that a peace support operation would be mandated, but the strength of the 
mandate remains in doubt. 
 
If the dispute has high impact on states, then military means may be employed even in a 
preventive manner. The challenge is finding a balance between the international demands and 
international law. If the dispute is highly violent, then the threshold for international 
intervention is high and very much dependent on how critical the resources are. Furthermore, 
the distinctions between the spoilers are not pertinent to the actions taken in this scenario242. 
This is to say that military means are employed regardless of the spoiler type – the interests 
involved dictate in this case. Evaluation of the conflict’s effects should not be limited to the 
local area. Effects on a regional or even global level should also be evaluated. Alternatively, 
one may evaluate the potential time span that the dispute would affect international trade. 
Identifying the local counterpart and existing interests is an important precondition, as well as 
a solid answer on local ownership. 
 
Overall, the setting is problematic, as there are a limited number of areas where such disputes 
may arise. The Arctic area does not provided such scenario as disputes have been and are 
likely to be settled through political means. Alongside this, the demands of China at South 
China Sea have been countered by political and diplomatic means: that is states emphasising 
their strong ties with the US. In contrast, areas that are resource-rich but habited may cause 
conflicts; as is the case in the Great Lakes area in Africa. These potential conflicts would be 
the school examples for robust intervention, where the responsibility to protect would be the 
main incentive. 
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Implications. The evident implication is that these disputes are likely to be settled through 
political means. However, in certain areas the responsibility to protect would be a significant 
incentive for interventions. Besides these considerations, one must prepare for contingencies 
to avoid flare up and seek agreement over arising disputes. 
 
Hypothesis. The hypotheses no. 7 is: It is likely that limited spoilers with both legitimate and 
illegitimate demands are involved, which necessitates the use of military capabilities to 
protect any political mediation process as well as coerce limited spoilers on their illegitimate 
demands. The hypotheses no. 8 is: There is an evident potential for the emergence of greedy 
spoilers, which justifies for peace enforcement measures. Hypothesis no. 7 is accepted and 
hypothesis no. 8 is partly accepted243. Acceptance is subject to reservations. Firstly, it is 
pointed out that actually all three types of spoilers (i.e. limited, greedy or total) may appear as 
the significant spoiler. Secondly, it is highlighted that this scenario is likely to happen in 
habited areas rather than in uninhabited areas. 
 
4.2.6 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction or Weapons of Mass 
Effect244  
 
Preconditions. For this risk condition to merit for an intervention or a crisis management 
operation it is tantamount that misuse is not only a local concern, but leads to larger areas. 
Thus, the risk condition has an evident escalatory potential. It is understood that this risk 
condition is an extremely dangerous one, as implications of actions are numerous and they 
could be grave. The implications include at least spillover effects, accidents and 
contingencies. Overall, nothing should be left for chance in the planning for countering this 
risk condition245. However, it is argued that the military preconditions are less generic. There 
is more ‘free hand’ in this case246. This is to say that the military planning must take into 
account all imaginable contingencies, but there are fewer restrictions imposed on the planning.  
 
The political preconditions come back to classics. The evaluation comprises of the risks (i.e. 
scope and type of risks) as well as the overall setting. In this case, preconditions are 
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dependent on the spoiler type. If the spoiler is a small non-state actor247, then it is likely that 
actions by the international community would be taken quickly248. This would not be the case 
if the spoiler were a state actor (e.g. North Korea or Iran). This is due to the grave escalation 
prospects.  
 
A similar and almost parallel argument is that in order to intervene, the country that is about 
to gain WMD/WME capability must be new and an emerging one – not a country that has 
already established that capability (e.g. Pakistan). Gaining legitimacy for such an intervention 
should be possible (e.g. Second Iraq War 2003). Furthermore, it is also hard to imagine 
anything beyond a setting, where one actor is in illegitimate possession of WMD/WME. 
Anything with more actors or more complicated is hard to portray. 
 
It is argued that a political process must be executed before any military action.  Actions taken 
must be precise and short duration. The exception is the safeguarding of WMD/WME 
facilities, which may be a long-term undertaking. Besides this, it is plausible that against 
relatively weak actors pre-emptive or preventive interventions could be conducted. 
Furthermore, in a crisis the relevant organisations must be able to work multiple times faster 
than now. Their current mode of operating is too protracted.  
 
As a counter-argument, it is stated that matching a crisis management strategy to this scenario 
is extremely difficult, and therefore it should not be explored further249. This counter-
argument is indirectly supported by the argumentation that states that this risk condition 
negates the international organisations. Support can also been deducted from the statement 
that the military planning has more liberty (i.e. ‘free hand’) in this case. 
 
Implications. As stated earlier the implications include at least spillover effects, accidents and 
contingencies. If there is a substantial amount of WMD/WME involved, or the use of military 
force is very likely, then the planning must be conducted so that success is assured. Success 
must be very sure, because the political risks are so great. Although the physical effects of a 
failure may be limited to local or regional level, the political effects will have a much larger 
impact. 
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Hypothesis. The hypothesis no. 9 is: It is likely that both greedy and total spoilers pertain to 
these cases, which justifies for peace enforcement measures (pre-emptive measures) in 
support of any political peace and mediation process. The hypothesis gains acceptance 
amongst the panel, although the finding is not robust250. The reservations are encompassed in 
the above preconditions. 
 
4.2.7 Consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes 
 
Preconditions. The generic preconditions remain pertinent in this risk condition, and it is 
likely that fewer restrictions are imposed on planning. Evaluating the extent (e.g. type, amount 
and time) of support provided would take into account what else is going on. In addition, 
internal political and foreign policy considerations would be conducted. Regarding 
compliance of the effected countries, it may be that the countries are not necessarily fully 
compliant. For example, Pakistan displayed some reluctance in receiving aid after the 
earthquake in 2005. This example emphasises that countries do have a constitutional right to 
decline from external help. 
 
It is worthwhile to note, that this risk condition is not directly linked to the security situation. 
For example, NATO’s relief operation after the earthquake in Pakistan had no security 
implications. Thus, there is no clear linkage between this risk condition and the applicability 
of spoiler theory. This is because the risk condition does not directly originate from human 
actions. 
 
Implications. It is important to understand the desired end-state. That is how to hand over 
responsibility to civilian elements, and especially how to hand over the responsibility in a 
deprived yet developing country. To stress this point, the effects of tornados in USA are 
completely different from the impact they would have in a developing country. 
 
Coordination by the supporting international community is vital. The coordination issues 
relate to interoperability and command and control structures. Furthermore, coordination is 
required to manage the challenges presented by supporting states will to be seen and 
recognised. 
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If conflict components appear in this scenario, then that would obviously change the situation. 
It may also be that there is an ongoing conflict that had not merited a crisis management 
operation, but then an environmental catastrophe occurs which merits a crisis management 
operation. 
 
Hypothesis. The hypothesis no. 10 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition, only limited 
spoilers are initially plausible. This necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any 
humanitarian aid operation. The hypothesis is accepted251. Military capabilities might be 
needed to prevent looting, protect against gangs and so forth. The only reservation is related to 
the point of view, that there is not a linkage between this risk condition and the applicability 
of spoiler theory. 
 
4.2.8 Transnational criminal movements 
 
Preconditions. This risk condition does not constitute for a full-blown peace enforcement 
operation, but rather peace enforcement in support of a law and order policing operation. 
These operations do not necessarily require an international commitment, as a lot can be 
achieved by bilateral or regional multilateral cooperation. For instance, many naval forces of 
the world are countering the drug barons in the West Indies and proliferation of their 
activities.  
 
The approach towards this risk condition should be low key and benign.  If in support of 
police forces, the key preconditions arise from the capability evaluation of the police 
component. If their capabilities are not sufficient, then military capabilities may be used in 
support. Thus, military capabilities should be used as a last resort. 
 
Contemporary examples of this risk condition can be seen in Mexico, Central America and 
even in Russia. The precondition is that the local capacity to resist intervention is low, but 
other factors need also be considered. For example, the Mexican government resists 
international intervention to support its campaigns against the drug cartels – Mexico is one of 
the states that emphasises sovereignty. Emphasis of state sovereignty varies from country to 
country and from region to region, but in certain areas, the participants of an intervention 
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force are a very crucial factor. As Afghanistan shows fighting criminality (e.g. drug crime) 
and attempting nation building simultaneously is extremely challenging. However, USA 
conducts joint campaigns with Columbia targeting drug crime there (i.e. Plan Colombia). The 
challenge is that drug crime instigates many other forms of activity (e.g. corruption of law 
enforcement bodies). In Columbia, there is functioning government albeit its legitimacy may 
have been questioned. The Plan Colombia has slightly increased its legitimacy, and the 
government is more or less approaching democratic standards. However, fighting crime in one 
country has the effect of moving crime to another deprived area252. Therefore, this is a serious 
threat for example in Mexico, small Central American states, Caribbean states and West 
African states.253 
 
A full-blown crisis management operation would not be conducted without an UN Security 
Council resolution. To pass a resolution the risk condition needs to have a clear linkage to 
security and stability. Peace enforcement is plausible in this scenario but only with specific 
restrictions. Criminal movements with elements of terrorism, drug trade or human trafficking 
could merit for peace enforcement type measures. These movements are likely to be 
connected to failed governance type scenarios. Enforcement should be precise (i.e. ‘surgical’) 
measures.  
 
To summarize these preconditions - this risk condition merits a peace support operation in 
support of wider law and order policing operations. The military aspect should be low key and 
benign. The military capabilities deployed should be tailored to supplement and augment the 
police forces. The political considerations relate to state sovereignty and compliance towards 
external interventions. Furthermore, the findings suggest that a functioning government in the 
area provides a better starting point for combating transnational crime. The challenge of 
simultaneous risk conditions (e.g. transnational crime in a failed or deprived country) calls for 
phased and comprehensive approach, which is likely to require a full-blown peace operation 
mandated by the UN. 
 
Implications. Four main issues relate to the implications. Firstly and after all, this is a 
criminality problem thus legal considerations become a priority. Considerations must cover 
penal code and the right to arrest type matters. As an example, the right to arrest on national as 
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well as international waters must be clearly mandated. During the operation, one must have a 
lucid understanding about: “Who are you countering?” Secondly, implications are related to 
international legitimacy. For instance in the case of piracy, there must be a definition between 
the problems of criminality and the problems related to unhindered sea lines of connection. 
Thirdly, without a clearly defined timeframe for the operation, there is a risk of losing focus 
and exhausting resources. The fourth point is that both the authorizers and the participants of 
an intervening force must be prepared to counter follow on effects. Overall, unless these 
considerations are sufficiently covered, there is the prospect of drifting into a violent spiral. 
 
Hypothesis. Hypothesis no. 11 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition greedy spoilers exist, 
and this justifies for peace enforcement measures. This hypothesis divided the Delphi-panel. 
Those accepting the hypothesis emphasised specific restrictions. Criminal movements with 
elements of terrorism, drug trade or human trafficking could merit for precise peace 
enforcement type measures, which would require a UN mandate. Those not accepting the 
hypothesis argue that peace enforcement in support of law and order policing operations is 
accepted. However, the important distinction is that there is no compromising with criminal 
elements. There will be no negotiations with criminal movements – but rather efforts to 
prevent and limit criminal actions alongside other policing measures. Therefore, criminal 
elements cannot be defined as greedy spoilers, and the hypothesis is not accepted in this 
form254. 
 
4.2.9 Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties  
 
Hypothesis no. 12 is : It is likely that in such a risk condition limited spoilers are significant, 
which necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any political peace and mediation 
processes. This hypothesis was not accepted255. This is consistent with the findings of first 
round of Delphi-questions, which were ambiguous on this risk condition. Some panellists 
agree with the description that limited spoilers exist. However, the linkage to the spoiler type 
is especially difficult. It is argued that if the case is about a total spoiler, may be then it would 
easier to visualize. 
 
It is argued that interventions are done only on a very selective basis. For instance, no 
discussion of intervening in China or Russia has occurred in the past decades, although 
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internal tensions have existed. In Libya’s case, Gaddafi’s rule has been tolerated for decades. 
This suggests that the power politics of great powers overrides concerns about responsibility 
to protect. 
 
The threshold for intervening with incentive of ‘responsibility to protect’ is high, and is likely 
to even higher in the future as authoritarian regimes gain more influence within the 
international system. The threat must be a direct threat to the physical security of a 
population. Current situation in North Africa in general and in Libya in particular serve as 
examples. Only when the physical security of citizens was clearly threatened was there enough 
incentives for the UN Security Council to pass a resolution and nation states to act 
accordingly.  
 
A point of view that accepts the hypothesis raises the question: Where is the point that 
actually sparks the international community to take action? This would encompass a series of 
actions including sanctions, arms embargo and movement restrictions (e.g. no fly zones). If 
intervention is conducted, it happens on a case-by-case basis. The generic preconditions apply: 
(1) one must be able to define the mission; (2) there must be sufficient resources; and (3) there 
must be an interest to intervene. There are examples where this type of intervention has 
occurred, and the implication has been the change of the ruling regime. This implies that the 
local ownership has to be planned beforehand. 
 
4.2.10 Extremism of marginalised groups  
 
Preconditions. Extremism of marginalised groups is a risk condition that is always present in 
a crisis management scenario. In these scenarios, there are multiple actors present, of which 
some are likely to be marginalised and become extremist groups. However, the impact of 
extremist marginalised groups is often local or at the most regional256. Furthermore, 
extremism is usually religion oriented. It is important to note that such groups are not 
inevitably total spoilers257. However, groups like Al-Qaida could be considered as total 
spoilers. In contrast, Hezbollah and Hamas can be considered as greedy spoilers. They work as 
proxies for Iran and Syria at times, but act as limited spoilers in their aims pertaining to their 
own area. Hezbollah has been flexible - which supports the greedy spoiler theory; whilst 
Hamas has functioned tactically – which also supports the greedy spoiler theory. However, 
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Hamas has behaved as a total spoiler towards Israel. This is an interesting point. It suggests 
that overall, a spoiler may be considered greedy, but it has elements of a total spoiler towards 
one or more parties. The fundamental question is from whose point of view is a group 
considered a total spoiler. Al-Qaida arrived to the scene as a new phenomenon, not respecting 
boundaries. In contrast and as an example, a Palestinian suicide bomber may attack in Israel - 
but is not likely to attack in Spain. 
 
The quality of the extremist group has an impact on the international community’s standpoint. 
If the situation builds up international support for intervening, then intervention may happen 
quickly. Otherwise, an intervention does not occur quickly. Unless the level of violence is 
high, it is unlikely that an intervention would be conducted. In addition, the military capability 
of the country in question has an impact. A dangerous prospect is if a country with high 
military capability is falling to extremist hands. Nevertheless and as a contrast, if the rise of an 
extremist group is about to oust otherwise difficult actors, then this may imply that the 
international community only follows the developments. 
 
Alongside the classic tenets of planning, several preconditions should be emphasised when 
attempting to counter extremism of marginalised groups. Any intervention must have 
international legitimacy and the consent of the host state. The intervening force must be 
aware that host states will invite, but will want to retain control. Consideration is also needed 
on whose perspective justifies for peace enforcement. Alongside this consideration, the level 
of violence is an obvious precondition. In planning and implementing a peace support 
operation it is important to remind oneself, that extremism is only a sub-factor of wider 
challenges. As a political precondition, it is essential that parties are brought to a negotiation 
table. 
 
In relation to political preconditions, it is stated that by categorically excluding Islamists from 
peace negotiations the developed states commit a grave mistake. This exclusion is founded 
only on Western states’ own perceptions. Such exclusion means that intervening international 
actors take sides with one or more of the actors. Furthermore, this implies that the intervening 
actors are actually a part of any such crisis. Thus, they are unable to get all the relevant actors 
into a negotiation process. A prerequisite for remaining impartial will necessitate the 
involvement of all relevant parties and factions. 
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Implications. Implications depend on levels of severity and extremism. If extremism had led 
to armed conflict, they also depend on the presence of a cease-fire agreement. An extremist 
group may cease to exist or stop endangering the security situation, but another one may 
appear. This prospect pertains to a concept of ‘breading ground’ for these movements.  
 
One implication is physical segregation, which is against instinct of the panellist providing 
this view. However, one may establish zones of separation, as has been explored in the Darfur 
Peace Process. Such cantonments or demarcation lines must be an agreed effort, with external 
monitoring and verification of adherence. (e.g. UNAMID conducting monitoring and 
verification in Darfur). It is essential to consider thoroughly how different components of the 
population are treated. 
 
In relation to repercussions, it is possible that such movements attempt to take revenge on 
intervening forces at their home fronts. The political evaluation and considerations must take 
into account the possible ramifications against the states participating in the intervention. If 
external intervention is conducted, but there is support for the spoiler from external parties or 
states, then the process is likely to become more difficult. Overall, it is essential to be 
prepared for a long-term approach. 
 
Hypothesis. Hypothesis no. 13 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition total spoilers exist, 
and this justifies for and this justifies for coercive spoiler management strategies including the 
use of military force (i.e. peace enforcement measures). This hypothesis was accepted with 
substantial reservations258. It is most pertinent to note that the panel does not conceive 
extremism of marginalised groups inevitably as a total spoiler. Furthermore, the requirement 
of a political process is stressed. Alongside these reservations, the supporting contemporary 
example is the operation in Afghanistan. 
 
4.2.11 Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes  
 
Preconditions. The dispute over Kashmir area is a classic example of this type of dispute. In 
the dispute between North and South Korea, the northern counterpart could be considered as a 
classic greedy spoiler. The case of North Korea may require preventive measures, as there is a 
potential for serious counter-reactions. Generally, more often the case is about protecting an 
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achieved peace process. It is usually not a case of intervening and using peace enforcement 
means.  
 
There is always room for negotiation, but the challenge is that one must reach agreement on a 
huge array of issues. However, it will not be possible to identify legitimate or illegitimate 
demands. Furthermore, it is likely that external military capabilities are only used, once parties 
are committed to a peace process. This is done to safeguard the process. 
 
Legitimacy for the intervention is a precondition. Thus a mandate is necessary, but not 
necessarily a UN Security Council resolution. The mandate should have a sufficient peace 
enforcement dimension (e.g. UN Charter chapter VII type mission). Even if parties to dispute 
have not requested external parties to intervene, they should allow it and not actively resist it. 
 
Implications. A peace agreement itself is an implication. An agreement is the objective 
towards which all efforts are aimed at. The first priority is an effective political process, which 
requires unity on the issue from the international community. The use of military capabilities 
is a supporting measure. 
 
Hypotheses. Hypotheses no. 14 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition limited spoilers are 
significant, which necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any political peace 
and mediation processes. Hypotheses no. 15 is: It is likely that greedy spoilers appear 
alongside limited spoilers, which would necessitate peace enforcement measures. These 
hypotheses were acceptedl259. It was agreed that the presence of a greedy spoiler would merit 
for a full-blown peace enforcement operation. In this case, more judgement is required to 
balance mission requirements with deployable resources. Pertaining to hypothesis no. 14, the 
specific challenge is the difficulty of identifying legitimate and illegitimate demands. 
 
4.2.12 Technological exploitation by criminal or rogue elements 
 
Preconditions. Countering this risk condition requires that a combination of police forces, 
security agencies and military services act in cooperation. The same precondition exists in 
countering transnational crime. Crimes that occur in cyberspace are related to this risk 
condition. Military crisis management has limited roles in these scenarios. Military means are 
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likely to be limited to intelligence gathering and logistical support. Almost contrary to this it is 
argued that peace enforcement against cybercrime would be most suitable and even subject to 
plausible development measures260. 
 
Pertaining to interest to intervene, it is worthwhile to note that effects of exploitation may be 
very collateral. Criminal activities on the internet serve as an example. The criminal activities 
may not be physically tangible, but they are still very significant.  
 
Hypothesis. Hypothesis no. 16 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition greedy spoilers exist, 
and this justifies for peace enforcement measures. This hypothesis received lucid support 
alongside views, which do not accept it. The opposing views built the argumentation on the 
foundation that military ways and means, peace support operations, do not have a role in 
countering this risk condition. Quite intentionally, the hypothesis does not describe the ways 
and means how such peace enforcement could be conducted. It is plausible that the military 
means could be intelligence gathering and logistical support, but importantly the military 
could also kinetically target criminal or rogue elements that actually exploit technology with 
malicious intentions. These enforcement actions should obviously be conducted in support of 
law and order policing operations, if the exploitation is of criminal nature. With the above in 
mind, the hypothesis is partly accepted, but the finding is not robust261. 
 
4.2.13 Interstate rivalry 
 
Interstate rivalry is a classical scenario, which typically has regional power struggle origins. 
Alongside this, new scenarios for interstate rivalry may emerge. For an example, the 
economical penetration of China to Africa may generate different scenarios than regional 
interstate rivalry. Furthermore, interstate rivalry is contextual. Rivalries exist even in Europe. 
In Asia, they relate to the rising powers: China and India are examples. Though rivalries exist, 
it does not directly translate to conflict. Many countries of the world are beyond a so called 
‘conflict mindset’. Nonetheless, this is not the case in Africa. 
 
Pertaining to the ‘conflict mindset’262, there are several factors that affect rivalry gravitating 
toward conflict. Firstly, there is political inclusiveness - specifically the lack of inclusiveness. 
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This is considered as a factor, because rivalries do not tend to escalate in democracies. 
Secondly, the level of development has an impact. It is stressed that development also includes 
the level of democracy, which is a significant factor as autocracies are more likely to go to 
conflict263. Besides this, the stakes involved in the developing world are relatively lower. This 
is to say that a conflict would surely cause casualties, but not to the scale as a conflict between 
developed nations is likely to cause. This implies that for developed states the stakes are 
relatively higher. 
 
Preconditions. The three generic preconditions apply when considering intervention in an 
interstate rivalry or conflict. Firstly, there must a definable mission for the operation. The 
defined mission must entail a desired end-state as well as a plausible exit strategy. Secondly, 
there must be sufficient interests (e.g. political and economical) for different nation states and 
international organisations to intervene. Thirdly, it is obvious that sufficient resources, which 
correspond to the scope of the mission, are available. These generic preconditions are 
prerequisites for a logic sequence of military planning. Alongside these generic preconditions, 
several preconditions pertain especially to interstate rivalry.  
 
Some form of a peace agreement or at least an armistice should exist. Without a credible 
negotiation contact, armistice or agreement, intervening in peace enforcement mode is not 
plausible. Such a negotiation contact or agreement reflects the level of local acceptance that 
should exist. Furthermore, international consensus on intervention is essential. International 
acceptance does not necessarily need to be thorough (i.e. ‘full’) acceptance264, but the 
intervention must abide to international law. Nevertheless, situations do not necessarily play 
out as interventions. Although wider international consensus exists, the regional consensus 
may not exist. 
 
In most cases, interventions will require a UN Security Council resolution. The invasion and 
liberation of Kuwait serve as an example. Kuwait was a sovereign state, and its government in 
exile requested for assistance. The intervention was authorised by the UN Security Council 
Resolution. If the dispute is small-scale and has limited impact beyond the conflict area, then 
it does not necessarily require a UN Security Council mandate. However, some type of 
international structure should be in support of the process. For instance, some regional African 
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 “Research has shown that democracies rarely engage in war with one another. – democracies are 
less likely to be targets of military intervention. See Hermann, MG; Kegley, CW: Ballots, a barrier 
against the use of bullets and bombs - Democratization and military intervention, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, vol 40 (3), pp. 454-456 September 1996. 
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conflicts would require mediation processes led by regional organisations (e.g. ECOWAS or 
AU265). 
 
Pertaining to the overall circumstances, there should be a common understanding that an 
intervention would be successful in stopping the rivalry. This understanding would be 
substantiated if the rival parties are relatively weak or the level of rivalry is low.  
 
Furthermore, it is stated that the intervening force should be able to overwhelm one or both 
parties simultaneously. This relates to the number of parties involved. Initially one would 
think there are only two. However, there can be numerous parties that affect the situation. Yet, 
some of these parties may not be as important as others.266  
 
Implications. The implications of intervening in an interstate rivalry are numerous. A primary 
challenge is that impartiality should remain.267 This view is supported by literature and 
pertains especially to peacekeeping operations. A peacekeeping mission must implement its 
mandate without favour or prejudice to any party. Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the 
consent and cooperation of the main parties. Impartiality, however, should not be confused 
with neutrality, inactivity or inaction. This is to say that peacekeepers should be impartial in 
their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their 
mandate.268  
 
Pertaining to a desired end-state, an operation intervening in interstate rivalry must support 
and build towards a sustainable peaceful solution. This emphasises that there must be a 
linkage to a realistic negotiation process and plausible exit strategy. After a decision to 
commit to a peace support operation, a practical implication and concern for all is the speed at 
which forces deploy. 
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 Respondent no. 1 and 2 advocate this view. 
265
 Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), African Union (AU) 
266
 Respondents no. 5 and no. 7 advocate similar views on this point. 
267
 A contemporary example of the challenges is evident in dealing with Libya. How can the EU be 
impartial, if its member states have participated in the campaign under the NATO framework?  
268
 International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations: Considerations for Mission Leadership 
in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Edita Västra Aros AB, Stockholm, 2010, p 14. See also 
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO): United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations - Principles and Guidelines (2008), pp. 31-34. 
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Hypothesis. Hypothesis no. 17 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition greedy spoilers exist, 
and this justifies for peace enforcement measures. The hypothesis is accepted269, although its 
acceptance is subject to substantial preconditions. One reservation is that this hypothesis 
applies to an interstate conflict with regional character, and especially to a conflict between 
neighbour states. Alongside two undecided respondents, one respondent does not accept the 
hypothesis. The respondent’s opposing view is founded on the basis that as one must have the 
consent of the rivalries, thus a peace enforcement mode is not possible270. Overall, the 
formulation of this hypothesis was not fully appropriate. Although this risk condition pertains 
to interstate rivalry, the hypothesis did not explicitly distinguish if the spoiler is a state or non-
state actor. However, the supporting description depicted that spoilers would be state actors. 
Thus, respondents appeared to respond as if the spoilers would be state actors. 
 
4.2.14 Future Perspectives 
 
Regarding the international system, it is stated that the United Nations concept will remain in 
the next decade. The UN will remain as the authority ‘setting the rules of play’ and “news on 
the death of the UN are strongly exaggerated”.271 Whilst all new emerging powers remain 
involved in the UN system, the UN will be a forum of interaction and discussion. Pertaining 
to mandates for crisis management there is no change to current situation. There must be a 
mandate for crisis management actions, and these mandates should be evermore clear. The 
UN Security Council will be the authorizing body and provide these mandates. Organisations 
such as NATO will provide military capabilities, and continue to collaborate with other 
regional organisations (e.g. AU, Arab League) for support and coordination of efforts. 
 
Pertaining to failed governance scenarios, it is challenging to identify trends, as all past and 
recent situations have been individual cases. Nonetheless, it is likely that these situations are 
not going to decrease, but rather increase. However, the threshold for the international 
community to intervene is lower on a conceptual level, but not necessarily in practice. The 
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 Respondents on hypothesis no. 17: four accept the hypothesis; one does not accept peace 
enforcement mode but accepts a peacekeeping type operation; two panellists were undecided. 
270
 However, one may argue that this opposing view does not fully appreciate the definition of 
impartiality. The definition pertains to the consent of the main parties of a conflict. If there are other 
parties involved or proxy forces that have become uncontrollable; peace enforcement may be a 
necessity in resolving an interstate rivalry. If either of the main parties behaves as a greedy spoiler, 
defining peace enforcement becomes difficult. One may further argue that even in such cases peace 
enforcement may be relevant, for at least limited periods of time, provided that the actions conducted 
are consistent with the mandate. This elaboration supports the earlier notion that spoilers are defined 
from the peace processes point of view. 
271
 Respondent no. 6 
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military forces of many developed nations are being downsized, resulting in less facilitating 
military elements (e.g. material and personnel). This is to say that, developed nations will 
have less capability for faraway operations, whilst demand for them will remain great. 
Alongside the available resources, the contemporary will to commit to peace support 
operations is relatively low. There is a desire to limit commitments to short term only, which 
is evident in contemporary discussions within the EU. Large operations have gone on for long 
periods, and implementing exit strategies is challenging. Political will is waning alongside the 
strict financial limitations. 
 
Future crisis management operations are not solely military operations: they must be 
comprehensive approaches, which include the political, civilian crisis management, police and 
military elements. Such an operation must have quick impact projects to demonstrate quick 
progress alongside long-term development programs. Progress may take time, but it should be 
evident for the international community that developing failed governances towards self-
sustainability is important. 
 
The demand for an inclusive international process will remain as a precondition to resolve 
many of the risk conditions. This precondition is emphasised in situations related to potential 
spillover of ethnic, religious or ideological conflict. As this research suggests, there are 
reservations on defining some spoilers as total spoilers. Thus there will be a need to negotiate 
and involve all relevant actors. Resolving these conflicts and achieving sustainable peaceful 
conditions requires long-lasting and serious-minded commitment from the international 
community. According to the Delphi-panel, internal tension between technocratic efficiency 
and civil liberties did not merit for peace support operation. However, such scenarios may 
receive more attention and even merit for interventions, especially as media draws attention to 
them. Alongside this, future settings pertaining to extremism of marginalised groups are 
somewhat diffuse. Related future scenarios are both difficult to visualize, and likely to be even 
more fragmented than they have been in the past. 
 
Current trends continue to sustain migration including uncontrolled migration. Migration will 
continue in the next decade in either diffuse or forced forms. Migratory tribes that are armed 
and do not appreciate nation state borders will remain a feature. In these cases, one could 
explore the applicability and effectiveness of military capabilities as a deterrent. Alongside 
this specific type of migration (i.e. migratory armed tribes), wide comprehensive means to 
manage uncontrolled migration will be called for. Managing migration will raise ample 
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considerations. Some of these considerations pertain to the responsibility to protect. For 
example, challenging considerations are how to protect, when to protect and what are the 
interests of a limited number of people versus an entire nation’s interests. In generic terms, the 
needs of the periphery must be factored in plans and actions, whilst appreciating that 
migration will exist in the future. 
 
Disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories are likely to occur. 
However, these disputes are likely not to be so severe that they necessarily lead to armed 
conflict. Agreements are reached probably through political negotiations and mediation. 
Technology provides increasingly better estimates on availability and consumption of 
resources, and thus supports more accurate forecasts of potential problems. This provides the 
international community necessary awareness to mitigate potential disputes early on.  
 
Responding to consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes will strain the 
developed and developing world alike. As said, the developed worlds facilitating military 
capabilities are decreasing. This highlights the prerequisite for coordination amongst the 
international community. The primary coordination requirements pertain to burden sharing, 
pooling of resources, interoperability and command structures. Alongside these practical 
requirements, the will of individual nations to be noticed internationally as aid providers must 
be managed in an even-handed way.  
 
It is suggested that transnational crime will increase. If this criminality has high impact and 
thus is a major issue for external states, there will be interests to participate in controlling this 
risk condition. The ability to utilise military capabilities in support of police operations may 
decrease, but international police cooperation is likely to increase. The requirement for 
cooperation is exacerbated by any technological exploitation by criminal or rogue elements, 
which are also likely to increase and challenge societies. Such an exploitative feature as well 
as involvement of rogue elements, are likely to call for pre-emptive and preventive approaches 
to counter these challenges. 
 
Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes are more likely to happen intrastate. There is 
a possibility that territorial integrity is tested in Africa and the Middle East by manipulative 
power bases. However, pertaining to interstate rivalry it is stated that there is a greater 
potential for large-scale spillover in the next decade. Some of the rivals will have access to at 
least weapons of mass effect. Therefore, even local conflicts involving WMD/WME would be 
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an international concern. The earthquake and following tsunami in Japan (i.e. spring 2011) 
that caused a nuclear facility disaster demonstrates this. Effects will spread beyond a conflict 
area. 
 
Furthermore, interstate rivalry is not likely to appear in the developed world.  Moreover, it is a 
risk condition appearing in the developing world. This view is supported by the idea that the 
stakes involved are relatively higher in the developed world, and that developed nations are 
beyond the ‘conflict mindset’ that remains in the developing nations. It is likely that interstate 
rivalry will appear intertwined with different regional and ethnic dimensions. Despite this, 
there is limited possibility for intervention in interstate rivalries in the future. Some types of 
focused operations are possible, but operations involving large-scale military capabilities are 
not likely. Considerations related to intervening in these rivalries will take into account if the 
violence can be contained, and does rivalry in question have wider ramifications. Alongside 
these considerations, the applicability of peace support operations in interstate rivalry cases is 
related to the level, intensity and scope of violence.  
 
On a more generic note pertaining to the use of military power, one could explore the 
possibility of using ‘one time only’ and ‘decisive impact’ actions in support of a peace 
process. This is rather innovative thinking, and maybe against the mainstream thoughts 
advocating comprehensive approach. However, it must be stressed that the political-military 
interdependence is an integral feature of peace support operations. This interdependence is not 
directly related to the physical use of military force. Notwithstanding such physical use of 
military force, the coercive and deterrence dimensions of military force will remain. 
Nevertheless, if clearly defined and appropriately executed, such decisive use of military 
means should not be excluded from a comprehensive approach. Alongside this, it is stressed 
that overall a mandate authorizes an operation, whilst specific actions must remain within 
authority provided by a mandate. Contemporary military crisis management operations (i.e. 
peace support operations) have been developed based on lessons learned in the wars of former 
Yugoslavia. It appears that the lessons learnt from Afghanistan are only starting to be 
incorporated into peace support operations. The question this raises is, will there be 
international capacity and willingness to utilise these enhanced means and ways of conducting 
peace support operations in the next decade? 
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4.3 Summary of the Findings 
 
4.3.1 Induce Consent or Rely on Compliance 
 
Reflecting on the focal research problem: Should military components induce consent or rely 
on the compliance of the parties of a conflict, in crisis management operations of the next 
decade (2020 – 2030)? The research hypotheses were defined so that peace enforcement 
measures relate to inducing consent, whilst peacekeeping measures relate to relying on 
compliance. It is pertinent to note that peace enforcement measures do not exclude the use of 
peacekeeping measures. However, the hypotheses that suggest relying on peacekeeping 
measures do exclude peace enforcement measures. 
 
This research finds that some degree of peace enforcement will272 be feasible and necessary in 
at least the following risk conditions: (1) failed governance; (2) potential spillover of ethnic, 
religious, ideological conflict; (3) vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in 
ungoverned spaces; and (4) territorial and extra-territorial border disputes. Furthermore, some 
form of peace enforcement is probably necessary in risk conditions pertaining to: (1) 
extremism of marginalised groups; (2) potential disputes over previously uninhabited and 
resource-rich territories; and (3) interstate rivalry.  
 
The research findings suggest that peace enforcement is possibly utilised countering risk 
conditions related to: (1) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or effect; and (2) 
technological exploitation by criminal or rogue elements. Peace enforcement measures 
pertaining to countering transnational criminal movements are not uniformly accepted. This is 
mainly due to a conceptual reservation that criminal elements cannot be defined as greedy 
spoilers of a peace process. Nonetheless and based on the research findings, peace 
enforcement in support of police operations remains a possibility. 
 
Furthermore, this research finds that peacekeeping measures will be feasible and necessary in 
at least risk conditions pertaining to: (1) potential spillover of ethnic, religious, ideological 
conflict; (2) uncontrolled migration; (3) consequences from environmental catastrophes or 
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 The term will implies that this will happen with a high degree of certainty. The terms likely, probably 
and probable indicate that this is more likely to occur than not occur. The terms may and possibly 
mean that this is more likely not to occur – that is to say, it cannot be excluded. Similar expressions of 
probability related to future studies are described in: United Kingdom Ministry of Defence: Global 
Strategic Trends - Out to 2040, Strategic Trends Programme, Development, Concepts and Doctrine 
Centre (DCDC), 4th edition, 2010, p. 8. 
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changes; (4) territorial and extra-territorial border disputes; and (5) potential disputes over 
previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories. 
 
Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties does not seem to merit 
peacekeeping measures. This finding is consistent with both rounds of the Delphi-questions, 
and suggests two interrelated key points. Firstly, any threat must be a direct threat to the 
physical security of a population. Thus, decisions to intervene are related to the level of 
violence. Secondly, the power politics of great powers overrides concerns about the 
responsibility to protect. The table below provides an illustrative summary of the findings273. 
Posture of peace 
support operation 
Associated risk condition 
Primary reason for 
posture 
Assessment of 
probability 
peace enforcement failed governance greedy spoiler highly certain 
peace enforcement 
potential spillover of ethnic, religious, 
ideological conflict 
total spoiler highly certain 
peace enforcement 
vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and 
infrastructures in ungoverned spaces 
greedy spoiler highly certain 
peace enforcement territorial and extra-territorial border disputes greedy spoiler highly certain 
peace enforcement extremism of marginalised groups total spoiler probable 
peace enforcement 
potential disputes over previously uninhabited 
and resource-rich territories 
greedy spoiler probable 
peace enforcement interstate rivalry greedy spoiler probable 
peace enforcement 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
or effect 
greedy and total spoilers possible 
peace enforcement 
technological exploitation by criminal or rogue 
elements 
greedy spoiler possible 
peace enforcement transnational criminal movements support police operations possible 
peacekeeping 
potential spillover of ethnic, religious, 
ideological conflict 
high hostility highly certain 
peacekeeping uncontrolled migration protection of aid efforts highly certain 
peacekeeping 
consequences from environmental 
catastrophes or changes 
protection of aid efforts highly certain 
peacekeeping territorial and extra-territorial border disputes limited spoiler highly certain 
peacekeeping 
potential disputes over previously uninhabited 
and resource-rich territories 
limited spoiler highly certain 
Table 5: Illustration of key research findings. 
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 (1) Pertaining to peace enforcement. Hypotheses that were accepted: 1, 2, 4, and 15. Hypotheses 
that were partly accepted or with substantial reservations: 8, 13 and 17. Hypotheses no. 9 and 16 were 
accepted, but the finding is not robust. Hypothesis no. 11 was not accepted. (2) Pertaining to 
peacekeeping. Hypotheses that were accepted: 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14. Hypothesis no. 12 was not accepted. 
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4.3.2 Preconditions and Implications  
´ 
Below is a summary of findings presented in chapter 4.2. The summary reflects on the second 
supporting research question: What are the preconditions and implications of attempting to 
induce consent vis-à-vis to relying on compliance?  
 
Pertaining to generic preconditions, the findings offer several points. Firstly, there must a 
definable mission for the operation. The defined mission must entail a desired end-state as 
well as a plausible exit strategy. Secondly, there must be sufficient interests (e.g. political and 
economical) for different nation states and international organisations to intervene. Thirdly, it 
is obvious that sufficient resources, which correspond to the scope of the mission, are 
available. These are evident prerequisites for a logic sequence of military planning, and 
pertain to using military capabilities in all imaginable cases.  Importantly and alongside these 
rather obvious preconditions, the research findings suggest that three further preconditions 
pertain to peace support operations. First, one must identify the logic of conflict, consequent 
incentives and dynamics274. This is a requisite however illogical the conflict may seem. 
Second, one must understand transition from war to peace, from conflict to stability, from 
failed governance to good governance - and so forth275. Third, one must appreciate that the 
level of hostility is a key precondition in relation to authorization of coercive measures276.  
 
Alongside the generic preconditions, several specific preconditions should be summarized. 
Categorizing them is challenging, but in this research, they are elaborated based on the 
framework provided by the UN principles of peace operations277. Pertaining to consent, failed 
governance and interstate rivalry risk conditions specifically underscore the existence of a 
credible political process. Furthermore, extremism of marginalised groups as a risk condition 
emphasises international legitimacy for intervening. Although not robust, the findings suggest 
that inclusive peace process should be extended to include also total spoilers. Related to the 
use or non-use of force, it was highlighted that preconditions related to responsibility to 
protect civilians are somewhat diffuse on the political level. To merit coercive action there 
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 For support on this point and guidance, see United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (UKMOD): 
Security and Stabilisation: the Military Contribution, Swindon, June 2009, pp. 9-1 – 9-12. 
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 For support on this point and guidance, see UKMOD (2009), pp. 3-1 – 7-17. 
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 This point is supported in Gilligan, M, Stedman, J: Where Do Peacekeepers Go?, International 
Studies Review, vol 5, issue 4, pp. 37-54, December 2003. 
277
 As decribed earlier: (1) consent of the parties; (2) impartiality; and (3) non-use of force except in 
self-defence and defence of the mandate. 
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must be a direct threat to the physical security of a population278. In the risk condition related 
to extremism, the coercive measures have preconditions related to capability of resistance and 
justification. It was also suggested that threats to truly strategic interests would not merit 
peace support operations, but in contrary are causes for war. Overall, when intervening there 
should be a common understanding that an intervention would be successful in stopping the 
rivalry279. Maintaining impartiality was judged as especially demanding in the risk condition 
related to potential spillover of religious, ethnical or ideological conflict. It also is an 
important precondition in risk conditions related to territorial disputes. Time is a factor in 
maintaining impartiality – in several of the risk conditions there are no quick solutions. As an 
overarching issue the findings suggest that the spoiler theory is not applicable in all cases. 
However, when it is applicable - spoilers should be defined from the peace process point of 
view. 
 
The list of generic implications is shorter than the one on preconditions. From the outset of a 
peace support operation, an ‘evolution’ of the preconditions begins. This implication 
encompasses escalation prospects and the need to avoid and prepare for spillover effects. 
Furthermore, one has to be cognisant that coercive measures are likely to have unknown and 
undesired consequences – alongside the intended effects. 
 
Pertaining to specific implications, a self-evident implication is the need to generate a peace 
agreement - if it is not in existence at outset. The implication relates especially to territorial 
disputes. The use of force, especially in failed governance risk condition, must relate to the 
provision of safe and secure environment. Furthermore, the passage of time raises a dilemma. 
Crisis management should achieve results quickly; else political and home front support is 
challenged. However, as stipulated in many of the risk conditions there are no quick solutions. 
The passage of time also challenges operations. Pertaining to the risk conditions where 
defining what is being countered (e.g. risk condition related to criminality and exploitation), 
the idea of what is actually being countered must persevere over time. Else, an operation will 
lose focus and eventually fail, waste resources or both. Finally, a specific implication is that 
adversaries, especially extremists, taking hostile action beyond immediate area of operations, 
might challenge robustness of home fronts. 
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 Evans, G; Sahnoun, M: The responsibility to protect, Foreign Affairs, vol 81 (6): pp. 99-100 Nov-Dec 
2002. Evans and Sahnoun advocate this point by what they call ‘just cause’ threshold. They attach 
precautionary measures to the use of military force: ‘right intention’, ‘last resort’, ‘proportional means’ 
and ‘reasonable prospects’. 
279
 See also Jakobsen, PV: National interest, humanitarianism or CNN: What triggers UN peace 
enforcement ater the cold war?, Journal of Peace Research, vol 33 (2), pp. 205-215 May 1996. 
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4.3.3 Discussion on Research Findings 
 
The aim of the following discussion is to reflect on research findings and evaluate them based 
on what contemporary literature has to offer. The research findings on the main research 
question validate this statement: “Consent is a requisite for legitimacy and long-run 
sustainability, yet coercion will be required to deal with factions resisting or defecting from a 
peace process.”280 Even when there is broad support for a political process; splinter groups, 
rogue actors or individuals may use violence to undermine that process. Therefore, missions 
must be able to respond to them.281 However, in the future, where a context of limited supply 
is likely; three sets of factors will affect states’ choices as to whether to deploy peace support 
operations through the UN or other platforms. The first factor is risks and rewards. 
Governments are inevitably motivated to deploy forces where they see their national security 
or interests at risk282. Conversely, states will also weigh the risks of casualties and potential 
rewards present in any theatre. The second factor is range and regionalism. With the 
important exceptions of European forces under NATO and Asian forces under UN command, 
the majority of peacekeepers deploy within their region of origin or its immediate 
neighbourhood. The third factor is responsibility. Involvement in peacekeeping is a sign of 
international responsibility, as in China’s growing commitment to UN operations and the 
efforts of AU members to tackle Darfur. States are also drawn to the incentive of 
responsibility within or over a mission. Countries that are given operational command 
positions in the field, or political decision-making power within institutions, tend to be more 
committed to operations. Brazil’s leadership role in Haiti provides an example of both 
points.283 These three considerations supplement the identified generic preconditions. 
 
Pertaining to coercion three interrelated points should be raised. First, Peter Viggo Jakobsen 
has studied UN mandated peace enforcement operations284 and identified two distinct patterns 
leading to enforcement operations: one driven by national interest, the other by humanitarian 
sentiment. Obviously governments will work hard to mobilize support and accept a significant 
number of casualties when national interests are at stake. Humanitarian interventions, on the 
contrary, are driven by a combination of the CNN effect and good chances of success, as 
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 Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 303-304. 
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 Jones (2009), p. 17. 
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 Neack (1995), pp.182-184, 194-195. Neack has advocated this realist explanation earlier. 
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 Jones (2009), p.13. 
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 Jakobsen’s case selection is: Kuwait, Northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti. In this instance 
peace enforcement is understood as UN missions acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations. However, this does not imply that in all cases the use of coercive military force was 
allowed - e.g. see UNSCR 917(1994) on Haiti and 918(1994) on Rwanda. 
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governments are reluctant to take casualties when national interests are not involved285. Thus 
Jakobsen’s conclusions support the findings pertaining to preconditions on use of force, most 
notably the diffusion of political preconditions. 
 
Second, Mats Berdal provides argumentation in support of peace enforcement. In Sierra Leone 
in 2000, the UNAMSIL-operation286 should have given the impression of confidence and 
military superiority. Such impression would have been deterrence to spoilers. However, the 
mission failed to do so. Thereafter operation Palliser was launched in support of UNAMSIL 
by deploying British troops. Their modus operandi and eventual achievements prove that, in 
specific circumstances, peace enforcement and inducing consent are necessary. Operation 
Palliser played a key role in preventing UNAMSIL from collapse and Sierra Leone returning 
to full-scale war. Alongside other factors, this intervention was important. It put Sierra Leone 
on the path to recovery and sustainable peace with two primary contributions. First, the 
principal spoiler (i.e RUF287) was weakened. Two, the military intervention was followed by 
immediate diplomatic action and efforts for local security sector reform. This reform was 
crucially important for the long-term outcome.288 Furthermore, experience of operation 
Palliser lends support for the idea that some military actions may be decisive and with ‘one 
time only’ character. This is plausible permitting that operations are prudently limited in scale, 
scope, and time. In addition, the objectives should not conflict with objectives of an overall 
peace operation.289 Operation Palliser proved that peace operations could be placed back on 
track by weakening spoilers. This is true if a credible peace process exists. The key lesson is 
evident and supports research findings. Especially preconditions related to consent and 
defining spoilers from a peace process point of view gain support. One must evaluate military 
action in relation to long-term impacts within the peacebuilding space; and not merely focus 
on short-term impacts on the operational environment.  
 
The third point pertaining to operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo speak against 
relying on peace enforcement. Peace enforcement, or inducing consent, was the argumentation 
in support of operation Artemis conducted in 2003 in eastern DRC. The operation claimed to 
be ‘actively impartial’. However, here is the dilemma: while an intervening force may insist 
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 UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
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 RUF: Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone) 
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 Berdal (2009), pp.103 – 107. 
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 Bellamy et al.: Who's keeping the peace? Regionalization --, (2005), p. 194. “In contrast to the U.S. 
experience in Somalia, a notable feature of Operation Palliser was its ability to operate in a ‘firefighting’ 
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that its actions are impartial and reinforce that message, the local impact of those actions will 
not be neutral in political and military consequences. MONUC operating in support of 
FARDC has weakened the legitimacy of MONUC and indirectly complicated the overall task 
of stabilisation.290 Future peace support operations will remain challenged on how uphold a 
credible perception: impartiality is not neutrality towards the mandate; rather it is impartiality 
towards the parties. 
 
If peace enforcement is not the ‘silver bullet’, should one rely on compliance? Pertaining to 
this it is highlighted that the majority of large-scale UN operations are deliberately designed 
to extend rather than limit the authority of states.291 The Security Council is normally in the 
business of strengthening governments rather than changing regimes. This fact, often 
overlooked, is essential to explaining some recent successes and failures of peacekeeping – 
and may help guide future deployments. Missions often shift over time from having the 
implementation of a peace agreement as their base-line stance to extension of state authority 
as the central mission goal. Cases from the Sudan to Afghanistan have shown the limits on 
what troops can achieve when the credibility of national political process or national 
government is weak. In many cases, peace operations succeed thanks to effective mediation by 
their civilian leaders rather than simply by their military presence. Of course, a military 
presence is sometimes a precondition for mediation, deterring ex-combatants and creating 
‘political space’ for cooperation. The UN has shown both the willingness and an ability to 
shift from ‘implementation of a peace agreement’ as a baseline stance towards the ‘extension 
of state authority’. Put differently, there are two forms of ‘a peace to keep’292: (1) a viable 
political settlement between opposing forces; and (2) international support to a recognized 
state, whose authority can be defended and extended. Either one has been shown to constitute 
a viable political strategy within which the UN can operate. Many missions shift from one 
mode to the other, especially after elections. The second type of operation is obviously harder. 
In each case where the UN has pursued ‘extension of state authority’ mode as its baseline 
stance, its forces have been either led or supported by states with advanced military 
                                                                                                                                        
and enforcement capacity alongside a pre-existing UN mission. This was made easier by the idea that 
impartiality should be defined in terms of the UN’s principles and the mission’s mandate.” 
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 Berdal (2009), pp. 107- 115. MONUC: United Nation Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. FARDC: Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (DRC Armed 
Forces). As of 1 July 2010, MONUC was renamed the United Nations Organization Stabilization 
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 Current examples are UN operations in Haiti, Chad, Lebanon and Democratic Republic of Congo. 
The idea originates from Sierra Leone, when in 1999 the UN backed the government against opposing 
rebel forces. 
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 Fortna points to a dilemma related to the idea of ’a peace to keep’ - if this is a strict threshold, then 
peacekeeping renders itself irrelevant. Fortna (2004a), p. 273. 
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capabilities.293 This elaboration supports the findings overall, but especially understanding 
transition and how to achieve it. Furthermore and importantly, it supports the idea of relying 
on compliance is the viable long-term approach.  
 
Further elaboration on the feasibility of ‘extension of state authority’ supports the generic 
preconditions, and especially cases of failed governance. First, an essential factor will be the 
international community’s belief in legitimacy and long-term viability of a state in need of 
support. Second, the Security Council will not authorize such options if the state in question 
does not enjoy a degree of international legitimacy. Neither will troop contributors volunteer 
to undertake such operations unless they believe the state involved can ultimately cohere, or if 
the support that the state enjoys is outweighed by the dangers of the operation.294Alongside 
this, an internationally authorized humanitarian intervention could proceed without host state 
authorization, but it will not succeed unless it wins the support of significant majority of the 
local population295. Thus one can initially enforce (i.e to create safety, security and stability), 
but one must transform to a consent based approach over time. This reaffirms the point on 
cognizance of transition, and that consent is integral to a successful sustainable end-state. This 
also relates to the time aspect. Achieving a transformation towards consent simply requires 
time – it will not happen overnight. 
 
To conclude this discussion between the research findings and contemporary literature: one of 
the most compelling arguments in support of impartial peacekeeping as well as inclusiveness 
of peace process is UNTAC mission in Cambodia. There UNTAC did not resort to use of 
force against the Khmer Rouge although it did not comply with the peace agreement. In 
contrast, the SRSG consulted with them and devised a strategy of ‘patient persuasion’ and 
‘sustained pressure’. The peacekeeping operation’s military force was not used to coerce the 
spoiler. However, the military component was reconfigured to protect the electoral process 
that was a fundamental part of the peace process. Furthermore, impartiality was reinterpreted 
as to using military units of all factions, except Khmer Rouge, to assist in providing security 
during the election. The departing train strategy used to counter the Khmer Rouge proved to 
be imaginative and effective. UNTAC would not exclude a spoiler from the peace process, nor 
would the process be held hostage by the spoiler. The UNTAC mission left the spoiler to 
                                            
293
 Jones (2009), pp. 16 – 18. 
294
 Jones (2009), pp. 17 – 18. 
295
 Doyle et al. (2006), p. 320.  See also Werner, S: The precarious nature of peace: Resolving the 
issues, enforcing the settlement, and renegotiating the terms, American Journal of Political Science, 43 
(3): 912-934 JUL 1999. Werner advocates that renegotiation of terms of peace is pertinent, as 
compared to enforcement of those terms. 
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reengage in the peace process if it wanted to.296 This provides support especially for the 
research finding that existence of total spoiler does not translate to open hostility, which 
would then imply peace enforcement297. One may argue that revitalising what SRSG Akashi 
and Force Commander General Sanderson implemented in Cambodia in the 1990s would be 
useful. Useful for contemporary and future peace support operations that appear gridlocked 
with total spoilers this approach may provide renewed opportunities. 
 
5 DEDUCTIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Responses to the research questions were depicted in chapters 3 and 4. Deductions on risk 
conditions were presented in chapter 3.3. Chapter 5 will focus on deductions based on overall 
research findings; recommendations for Finnish national decision making on military crisis 
management; validity and reliability of this thesis; as well as propositions for future research. 
 
5.1 Deductions 
 
The overall interest of this research was to promote understanding on feasibility of peace 
support operations. Permitting that such understanding is achieved, the pendulum of 
intervention optimism and intervention pessimism may be avoided in the future. This research 
shows compelling evidence that such a pendulum is not substantiated. Both peace 
enforcement and peacekeeping are sine qua non for successful military crisis management in 
the next decade. Though not a surprising result, it is a robust one. This research advocates that 
instead of swaying between intervention optimism and pessimism: there should be honest and 
comprehensive appreciation of existing circumstances of any conflict. Founded on such 
appreciation, there should be legitimate authorization, prudent planning and determined 
execution of an applicable peace support operation. 
 
To emphasise the previous overall deduction, a synthesis of plausible futures and research 
findings is in order – see table 6 below298. One realises that a majority of risk conditions that 
merit peace support operations are likely to occur in the first future - “Dark Side of 
                                            
296
 For a detailed account, see Stedman (1997), pp. 26 – 36. 
297
 See chapter 4 on potential spillover of conflict; respondents no. 5 and 6 advocate this view. See 
also Dandeker, C; Gow, J: The future of peace support operations: Strategic peacekeeping and 
success, Armed Forces and Society, vol 23 (3), pp. 327-347 Spring 1997. Dandeker supports this 
view: “--These are not so much the consent of the conflicting parties or the use of force alone, but the 
challenges of maintaining sufficient support (or a suitable absence of opposition) in the eyes of different 
audiences both in the host state and further afield.” 
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Exclusivity”. However, in this future developed states may be unwilling to manage threats. In 
the second future, “Deceptive Stability”, domestic priorities may distract developed states’ 
from responding to threats. On the other hand, their rationalism may distract them from 
understanding the logic of conflicts emerging in the third future “Clash of Modernities”. In the 
fourth future, a prerequisite for intervening will be that intervention is a mutual strategic 
interest of competing regional powers. Such a prerequisite has impact on probability. When 
mutual interest exists, intervention is probable to maintain a fragile balance. Furthermore, 
coercive measures against those distracting such stability may be authorized or at least not 
resisted. Overarching through three of the futures is potential spillover of ethnic, religious or 
ideological conflict; which could be managed by a combination of inducing consent (i.e. peace 
enforcement) and relying on compliance (i.e. peacekeeping). Authorizing peace support 
operations that pertain to some of the risk conditions is not likely299, but as it remains a 
possibility, they should not be excluded as potential reasons for peace support operations.  
 
Futures:  
1. “Dark Side of Exclusivity” 2. “Deceptive 
Stability” 
3. “Clash of 
Modernities” 
4.  “New 
Power 
Politics” 
PSO posture:  Risk conditions that will or probably will merit peace support operations: 
peace 
enforcement 
 
Failed governance 
 
Vulnerability of strategic 
chokepoints and infrastructures in 
ungoverned spaces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extremism of 
marginalised groups 
 
 
Interstate rivalry 
 
peace 
enforcement 
and 
peacekeeping 
 
Potential spill-over of ethnic, 
religious, ideological conflict 
 
Potential disputes over previously 
uninhabited and resource-rich 
territories 
Potential spill-over of 
ethnic, religious, and 
ideological conflict 
 
Potential spill-over of 
ethnic, religious, and 
ideological conflict 
 
Territorial and extra-
territorial border 
disputes 
 
peacekeeping 
 
Uncontrolled migration 
 
Consequences from 
environmental catastrophes or 
changes 
Uncontrolled migration 
 
  
 Risk conditions that possibly merit peace support operations: 
peace 
enforcement 
 
Proliferation of WMD/WME  
 
 
Transnational criminal 
movements  
 
Technological 
exploitation by 
criminal or rogue 
elements 
 
Table 6: Scope and posture of peace support operations in the next decade. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
298
 This table is a synthesis of tables 3 and 5. 
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The research findings also reaffirm what is integral for practicing strategy: it must fit the case 
at hand. To fit strategy to the case, one must have a thorough comprehension of the case. To 
support such comprehension, this research accentuates pertinent preconditions and 
implications on conducting peace support operations in various risk conditions. In reality, 
when features of different future scenarios and combinations of risk conditions appear 
intertwined, achieving explicit comprehension is blurred. In planning for and conducting 
peace support operations one must avoid such a blur. One should thrive to analyse existing 
overall scenario, comprehend significant risk conditions and related spoilers, and be aware of 
other risk conditions and spoilers. Furthermore, one must understand how these are 
interdependent, when selecting strategies to cope with them.  
 
The identified preconditions are relevant, as they portray some thresholds that must be met to 
conduct a peace support operation. These lists of preconditions are not exhaustive, but valid 
and reliable. Once a peace support operation is underway, a dynamic process begins directly 
and indirectly affecting preconditions, as well as raising predictable and unpredictable 
implications. In this regard, the research highlights what at least should be anticipated. By 
identifying preconditions and implications that pertain to specific risk conditions, this research 
promotes understanding. The research highlights several unique findings related to 
preconditions and implications, which are elaborated below. 
 
First, some risk conditions have a logical attribute to them, whilst others may seem illogical. 
Such an attribute affects identifying aims, interests and incentives of parties and spoilers. In a 
conflict that appears illogical, the identification of aims and incentives is even less 
straightforward than in a logical conflict. Regardless of this challenge, understanding the 
underlying logic300 of a conflict is fundamental to understanding transition, which is described 
next. 
 
Second, practitioners of crisis management must possess cognizance of transition. To provide 
examples, this means that one must understand features and differences between war and 
peace; threat and safety; conflict and stability; failed governance and good governance; 
ideological conflict and peaceful coexistence – and so forth. Furthermore, one must 
comprehend how spoilers may transform. For instance, what is the transition process of a total 
                                                                                                                                        
299
 I.e. proliferation of WMD/WME; transnational criminal movements; and technological exploitation by 
criminal or rogue elements. 
300
 E.g. aims; offensive and defensive incentives; security dilemma; opportunity and grievance factors; 
relationships between actors. 
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spoiler to a greedy or limited spoiler? Moreover, eventually how do spoilers transform to 
support a peace process? Understanding transition is imperative for managing the dynamic 
evolution of preconditions, which begins at the outset of a peace support operation.  
 
Third, in crisis management operations spoilers must be defined from a peace process’s point 
of view. Defining spoilers otherwise is consistent with neither theory nor prudent practice of 
peace support operations. If spoilers are defined otherwise, it changes the nature of an 
operation towards war, where the logic is breaking the will of an enemy - and surrender.  In 
peace support operations, the logic is different: actions towards spoilers are intended to 
cause transition towards consent - not defeat. However, this research shows that spoiler 
theory is not applicable in all risk conditions where peace support operations are conducted. 
Within the realm of peace support operations, there are also other reasons for an operation’s 
posture and actions – mainly this is the case in peacekeeping. 
 
Fourth, it appears that ‘sufficient’ levels of hostility and violence is a prerequisite for 
conducting peace enforcement operations. This raises a dilemma within multiple dimensions: 
moral, legal, legitimacy and military capability to name a few. For instance, intervention 
should be less demanding if levels of hostility are relatively low. If one postpones intervention 
until hostility is relatively high, peacebuilding becomes evermore challenging. In such cases, 
the peacebuilding space is diminished from all three directions. International capacity is 
relatively less, as matching available means to desired ends is strained. Local capacity is likely 
to be lower due to sustained violence, violence causes loss of life and damage to 
infrastructure. Hostility threatens a safe and secure environment. Such a dilemma of 
intervention timing was not explicitly explored in this research. Nevertheless, this dilemma 
remains an important area of research and related to contemporary practice. 
 
Obviously, these findings may have ramifications on all levels of military activity including 
the strategic, operational and tactical levels. However, pertaining to military and political level 
interaction these findings raise specific considerations, which should be addressed.  
 
The logic of a conflict challenges all involved at the outset of any planning. A correct 
appreciation of the logic is fundamental for choosing the correct posture for a peace support 
operation. Is the posture more towards peace enforcement or more towards peacekeeping? The 
logic of a conflict remains a factor during implementation of an operation. To achieve desired 
effects one has to understand what consequences inducing consent or relying on compliance 
 113  
 
will have. The obvious guidance that this research advocates is that to support transition peace 
enforcement should counter offensive incentives. In parallel, peacekeeping should be utilised 
to avoid defensive incentives developing into security dilemmas. Alongside this, one must be 
mindful that bursts of tactical actions will to have effects throughout an operating 
environment – including its military-strategic and political-strategic levels. This also pertains 
to the idea of consent. One may argue that regardless of a peace support operation’s posture, 
consent is always an integral feature of a sustainable end-state. 
 
Cognizance of transition calls for an evaluation of several questions. What is the extent of 
effort towards a safe and secure environment, which increases the peacebuilding space by 
decreasing hostility? To what extent should military capabilities and expertise be utilised in 
security sector reform, which contributes to local capacity – and yet again increases 
peacebuilding space? What kind of capabilities should be developed for and deployed in 
peace support operations? This pertains to increasing international capacity dimension of the 
peacebuilding space. How these efforts are phased, sequenced and synchronized with other 
efforts a peace operation? Understanding how and why transition occurs within the 
peacebuilding space is fundamental. Without the described understanding - inducing consent 
is ‘the luck of the draw’, and relying on compliance is ‘wishful thinking with eyes wide shut’. 
 
In many of the risk conditions, the spoilers threaten transition. Thus the political level actors, 
that are custodians of a peace process, must distinguish the existing spoilers. Thereafter 
military and political actors must agree on a feasible spoiler management strategy. Once 
approach towards spoilers is agreed upon; then the military must generate the required 
capabilities, plan concept of operations and execute accordingly. In sum, all the above is very 
much the practice of strategy: matching ends to means. 
 
To conclude, it is pertinent to reflect on the nine fundamental strategic questions. Peace 
support operations are about supporting achievement of sustainable peace. Appreciating that 
consent is variable, multilayered and malleable - operations should affect the operating 
environment and actors to increase consent. Understanding the logic of conflict is a 
prerequisite for an applicable strategy supporting transition towards peace. Peace support 
operations should limit their scope to focusing on achieving transition on consent – not on 
achieving victory over enemies. Spoiler behaviour will remain as the focal factor thwarting 
peace processes. In futures of limited supply and infinite demands, the dilemma of timing 
interventions will be crucial on decisions over action against inaction. Both participation and 
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non-participation will continue to have direct and indirect effects on home fronts. Practioners 
of peace support operations are fortunate in at least one respect - it is possible to derive 
prudent and honest lessons from history. Continued involvement in peace support operations 
is a requisite that we do not overlook arising challenges. 
 
5.2 Recommendations for Finnish Military Crisis Management 
 
The deductions themselves serve also as general recommendations. However, pertaining to 
Finland’s national decision making on military crisis management, this research brings to the 
fore three interrelated considerations: (1) participation in peace support operations; (2) type of 
participation; and (3) requisite capabilities in relation to intervention timing. 
 
It is evident that decisions to participate in peace support operations with Finland’s military 
capabilities are political decisions. However, in this decision making one has to consider what 
point of view is used when defining interests and commitment to participate. Some of the 
relevant and possible points of view are: (1) an international organization’s; (2) Finland’s 
commitments and aspirations in and toward international organisations; (3) Finland’s overall 
foreign and security policy; (4) development of defence capability; (5) states in conflict area; 
and (6) population in conflict area. To comprehend the above, some possible contradictions 
should be highlighted. Firstly, from a development of defence capability viewpoint, it may be 
beneficial to participate in challenging peace enforcement operations, which are realistic 
settings for capability evaluation. However, from a conflict area states’ viewpoint an early 
intervention, with peacekeeping oriented monitoring and evaluation, might be crucial in 
avoiding conflict in the first place - or relapse into conflict. Finland’s commitments and 
aspirations in and towards international organisations may cause her to commit itself into 
peace support operations. As a result, limited resources are committed for a long time and not 
available in areas where other international organisations might need them. Besides these 
points of view, the actual agreed peace process or the prospect of such a process should be 
stressed when participation is considered. This is because to reach such a process, the logic of 
a conflict should be understood. From such a process stems the idea of transition as well as 
definition of possible spoilers. If this peace process point of view is neglected, one may end 
up participating in a strategic muddle. 
 
With a link to the above consideration, another consideration in national decision-making is, 
on which dimension of the peacebuilding triangle should we focus on with military 
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capabilities? Do we attempt to build one sector of local capacity, by focusing on security 
sector reform? Alternatively, should we focus on international capacity development, by 
participating actively in doctrine and concept development as well as capability development 
and training? On the other hand, should we focus on decreasing the hostility dimension, by 
participating in operations attempting to provide a safe and secure environment? Positioning 
oneself amidst these considerations may appear as blur. However, what is not a blur is that 
one should prepare to participate in both peacekeeping and peace enforcement measures, and 
not underestimate or exaggerate the benefits of them. Furthermore, it is pertinent that 
responses to these questions originate from an honest selection on point of view: selection has 
impact on interests and commitment. Although military capabilities and expertise may 
contribute to all the dimensions of a peacebuilding triangle, the military has comparative 
advantage in decreasing hostility levels by focusing on providing a safe and secure 
environment. This is achieved by both peace enforcement and peacekeeping measures. 
 
Within the Delphi-panel there is a stem of contradiction. One view is clear; there are no quick 
solutions to what was called ‘sub-conventional’ conflict (i.e. low intensity conflict). The other 
view called for further study on the feasibility of using force in a decisive, precise and one 
time only manner. Although it may seem to be in contradiction, this elaboration brings to the 
final point for national consideration. It is related to capabilities development. It may be 
argued, that some operations have provided meaningful support to wider peace support 
operations by operating decisively and with a ‘one time only’ approach301. Nevertheless, one 
must be mindful that no quick solutions are plausible for many of the risk conditions, and that 
time consuming challenges related to identifying spoilers and intervention timing exist. 
Therefore, one should reconsider the feasibility of rapid deployment capability. One may 
argue that in many cases, the sufficient situational awareness is available - it is the lack of 
will, not the speed of deployment, which is a primary precondition302. At least for the military 
mind, there is clear distinction between decisive, precise and one time only action as 
compared to rapid deployment capability. 
 
                                            
301
 E.g. operation Palliser. 
302
 See Baylis et al. (2010), p. 316 and pertaining references for elaboration. 
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5.3 Evaluation of validity and reliability 
 
Peacebuilding space and spoiler theory were selected as the theoretical approaches to support 
reliability. The theory of a peacebuilding space is widely cited and accepted, not least due to a 
robust research design by Doyle and Sambanis. Both peacebuilding space and their ecologies 
of conflict were integral in formulating research hypotheses. Stedman’s theory on spoilers is 
also widely citated, but the theory has not been developed further. Spoiler theory was 
fundamental in defining hypotheses. Although theories were useful, it proved that it is not 
sufficient to evaluate only the spoiler typology of a risk condition. The level of hostility is an 
evident focal determinant. One may argue that level of hostility defines the posture of a peace 
operation, whilst spoiler typology points to where coercive efforts should be directed. 
Selection of theories pertaining specifically to military crisis management and peace 
operations was beneficial. Relying purely on a framework provided by any of the international 
relations theories may not have produced a similar amount of normative considerations. Based 
on the above, one may argue that this thesis research design is founded on accepted theories 
and consequently relevant hypotheses. 
 
As this is a future oriented research, the Delphi-method was applicable in collecting expert 
views on decision to commit to peace support operations, plausible approaches within those 
operations, and factors that affect decisions and approaches. However, it is pertinent to note 
that panellists provide statements relying past and current experiences. It appears challenging 
to visualize simultaneously new trends and point out how they may affect peace support 
operations.  The first round of Delphi-questions acquainted the panellists with the overall 
scenarios and pertaining risk conditions. The findings of the first round are reliable as five out 
of seven respondents provided answers – and the findings are not contradictory to prior 
understanding. All respondents had a possibility of providing comments or alterations during 
iteration of the findings and deductions. The second round of Delphi-questions was conducted 
as interviews with an aim of testing the hypotheses. This was successful as the all seven 
panellists provided a wealth of focused and pertinent observations. All seven responded on the 
undisputed three risk conditions, whilst five provided answers to eight risk conditions and 
four respondents on all risk conditions. All respondents provided responses also on a 
macrolevel, which pertain to all risk conditions. This was logical as the undisputed risk 
conditions provided the majority of the argumentation. The iterative rounds included in the 
Delphi-process increased reliability, especially for the first round of findings. Although 
prepared to address the most pertinent observations, the iteration of the second round of 
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findings could have produced more considerations. Nevertheless, the discussion pertaining to 
research findings and contemporary literature enhanced validity and reliability.  
 
The citation analysis identifying relevant authors, subsequent literature study and establishing 
a comprehensive expert panel contributed to the validity and reliability of reference material. 
The Delphi-panel was sufficiently wide and diverse to produce plausible different points of 
view. Categorization of collected material followed the framework of research questions and 
hypothesis. Analysis of material was conducted by collating and comparing responses 
provided by members of the panel. Analysis aimed at identifying a collective view, unique 
findings, contradictions and weak arguments. Hypotheses and probability were evaluated 
based on support received from the panel. Literature references and the iterative rounds of 
questions to the Delphi-panel supported interpretation. 
 
Using the NATO scenarios as a foundation for identifying scenarios and risk conditions was 
an important decision on research approach. To ensure validity of this decision other 
references were verified303, and it was ascertained that the NATO scenarios and risk 
conditions would be sufficient for this thesis. This was because no major contradiction in 
comparison to other future scenario related work was identified. Furthermore, as NATO is a 
security-orientated organisation, their approaches and findings were applicable for military 
crisis management research. It is likely that in the realm of peace support operations NATO 
does not miss relevant risk conditions. Notwithstanding these considerations, NATO’s interest 
to advocate its raison d’être may emphasize the applicability of military capabilities over other 
means and ways. 
 
Although not exhaustive, this thesis provides both valid and reliable preconditions and 
implications pertaining to future peace support operations. The overall findings provide 
support for contemporary trends on future concept, capabilities and policies development. The 
generic and specific findings support further training, education and capability development. 
One may argue that this research; which is based on accepted contemporary theory, 
hypotheses derived thereof and utilising an expert panel, contributes to the realm of peace 
support operations. 
 
                                            
303
 UN and affiliated research ventures, UK MOD publications and State of the Future documents. 
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5.4 Propositions for Future Research 
 
Three areas of relevant future research may be highlighted. The first proposition relates to 
research conducted within the military itself. The military must sensitize itself at all levels 
from tactical to strategic, on how and why does transition occur in peace operations. Political 
science, development studies and so forth provide ample information on the matter. However, 
the military’s research interest should be on; how does the military contribute to a politically 
driven comprehensive peace process? How does the military support transition in various 
circumstances? The research interest is pertinent, because eventually it reflects on planning, 
directing military efforts, targeting process, etc. Furthermore, it is especially relevant within 
Finland. 
 
The second proposition pertains more to theory and practical application. Spoiler theory 
appears logical and it is cited widely quite some time after it emerged. However, it has not 
been further developed and expanded to reflect the evolving realm of crisis management. One 
may argue that a further developed spoiler theory could continue to provide relevant guidance 
for future crisis management. Continued research is suggested on applicability and 
development of spoiler theory in contemporary conflicts. Yet again findings should have 
ramifications on military efforts in peace support operations. 
 
Implementing the third proposition appears most challenging. Notwithstanding this, it is the 
most pertinent of these three propositions. It relates to policies on peace operations (i.e. crisis 
management) in the international system and especially within international organisations. 
The research interest is derived from the ‘timing dilemma’ that this research yet again 
highlights304. The dilemma is that interventions, peace support operations, are likely to be 
authorized only when violence is high; but then peacebuilding space is limited in all of its 
three dimensions. The dilemma is further exacerbated by a factor that belligerents may not 
have reached a ‘hurting stalemate’ or decisive victory over one or the other. They may not 
have sufficient incentives for a peace process. Political science research in general, and 
strategic studies in particular, should attempt to support policy development and practice by 
providing guidance on: when is the optimal time to intervene?  
                                            
304
 Another scholar has pointed to the same dilemma that remains uncovered. Fortna, VP: Scraps of 
paper? Agreements and the durability of peace, International Organization, vol 57, issue 2, p. 366, 
Spring 2003. Furthermore, this thread of new research could build on the conclusions presented by 
Peceny, Mark and Pickering, Jeffrey in Mason, TD et al. (2006), pp. 144-145. 
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First round of Delphi-questions  
 
INTRODUCTION AND INSTRUCTIONS 
 
This 1st round of delphi-questions will focus on the operating environment of a future military 
crisis management operation. In order to do so, the questionnaire is structured as follows:  
- 1st section covers the relevant drivers that may have an impact on the futures 
- 2nd section covers the possible futures which are founded on the drivers 
- 3rd section covers the future conflicts that may arise within each future 
- 4th section covers the potential sources of conflict 
- 5th section the risk conditions that may merit for a military crisis management operation (ie. 
peace support operation; peacekeeping or peace enforcement) 
The first four sections “set the scene” for all and serve as a background for the 5th section. The 5th 
section includes essential research hypothesis that are tested with this Delphi-panel. Thus, the 5th 
section is the most important part of the questionnaire.  
 
There are 10 questions and 5-6 pages of reference text supporting the questions. I would estimate 
that responding to this questionnaire requires about 1½ hours. Please respond directly on this MS 
word document; save the document named with your surname and email it to 
mikko.laakkonen@mil.fi by 21st of December 2010. My next thesis work session is after this date, 
and the availability of your responses is vital for proceeding. 
 
FOLLOW UP AND NEXT STEPS 
After receiving your responses, I will collate them and revert to you in case there is a need for 
clarifications. The panel will have the possibility of debating anonymously on your answers before 
the 2nd round of Delphi-questions. During spring 2011, the 2nd round will focus on the conceptual 
issue of consent and compliance in crisis management operations. 
 
Kind regards, Mikko Laakkonen 
Student officer, General Staff Officer Course 55, National Defence University, Finland 
+358-40-5808611, mikko.laakkonen@mil.fi 
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SECTION 1 – DRIVERS 
 
(READ) Key reference supporting the questions 
Alongside strategic trends one must identify drivers that may have an impact on possible futures. 
Friction, integration and asymmetry are structural drivers, which have been influential throughout 
history, and are assessed to remain so for centuries. Friction over the distribution of power is the 
degree of ease with which decisions are made at the international level, functions in essence as a 
relative power meter, ranging from cooperation to confrontation. Economic integration including 
globalisation is the degree to which national and regional economies trade, and their level of 
functional integration. States will continue to rely on globalisation for their prosperity. As 
globalisation requires cooperation, it will have a stabilising effect. However it also creates tensions 
and, in some cases, may be a driver of instability and conflict. Asymmetry of states and political 
entities is the relative discrepancy between states in terms of wealth and power, and influences 
international relations in terms of both development and security. Examining the interrelation of the 
structural drivers highlights six deterministic drivers. They are: (1) changing state capacity, (2) 
resources and their allocation, (3) climate change, (4) use of technology, (5) demographics, and (6) 
competing ideologies. It is assessed that these deterministic drivers will have the greatest impact on 
security in the coming decades.307 These drivers provide the foundation for the possible futures, 
thus it is pertinent to define them in more detail. 
 
Changing state capacity reflects the distribution and management of power at the state level. States 
that cannot adapt to the changing global context will risk collapse, and many such failures will be 
accompanied by substantial outbreaks of violence. The poor governance, economic deprivation and 
inequality that characterises failed and failing states is likely to spread to neighbouring states. 
Resources and their allocation encompass availability, affordability, access and competition for 
essential resources, including energy, water, food and other essential commodities. During the 
future decade it is expected that there is a considerable increase in demand for energy. Many 
countries will remain critically dependent upon energy imports and securing them will be vital. Any 
long-term significant change in the ‘average weather’, climate change, may have an impact on 
international relations and create instability, especially in those states that are already vulnerable to 
other pressures. Use of technology denotes the evolution and availability of technology up to 2030. 
The physical and virtual networks that support globalisation will have to be protected. 
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Demographics reflect domestic population trends related to birth, death, age, income, ethnicity, and 
the other characteristics of a state’s population. It includes migration, urbanisation, and other 
external factors. The world’s population is rising and this will lead to increased demands for 
resources. Some states will regard the security of their food and water supplies as issues of national 
survival and will act accordingly. Within EU countries, a changing demographic balance towards a 
more multi-ethnic society means that some conflicts may create risks, including extremism, within 
EU communities. Competing ideologies and worldviews deal with alienation and confrontation 
based on different values, religions, identities and historic geopolitical perspectives. Ideologies and 
world views will remain significant factors and people will continue to fight for their beliefs. 
Neither ideologies nor world views will be geographically bounded.308 The trends and drivers 
described above are the building blocks for the futures that follow. Plausible futures stem from the 
interaction and interdependecy of these drivers. 
 
(RESPOND) Questions 
1. Do you agree that these are the relevant drivers affecting the future decade? 
……… (Your text begins here, do not worry about page numbering or text fonts) 
 
2. Do you have any objections or additions on the structural drivers? 
……… 
 
3. Which deterministic driver is a so called ‘primus in pares’ the most important one?  
 Attempt to base your assessment on the driver’s combined likelihood and impact as 
well as its interdependency on the other drivers. 
……… 
                                                                                                                                                 
307
 NATO Multiple Futures Project (2009), pp. 13-16 and UK MoD Future Character of Conflict, pp. 4-5. 
308
 Multiple Futures Project, pp. 15-16.and Future Character of Conflict, pp. 2-14. 
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SECTION 2 - FUTURES 
 
 (READ) Key reference supporting the questions 
The relevant drivers in Future One “Dark Side of Exclusivity” are climate change, resource 
allocation, economic integration, and competing ideologies and worldviews. The Dark Side of 
Exclusivity describes how globalisation, climate change, and the misallocation of resources 
significantly affect the capacity of states to maintain sovereignty. Weak and failed states generate 
instability in areas of interest, and present the states of the developed world with strategic choices 
regarding how to react. This future concentrates on the friction between the developed or “market” 
states and the developing states. The future is complicated by nationalism, the misallocation of 
resources, poverty, frustration, demographic pressure, and deteriorating environmental 
conditions.309 
 
The relevant drivers for Future Two “Deceptive Stability” are asymmetry, demographics, resource 
allocation, and competing ideologies and worldviews. Deceptive Stability highlights the 
requirement to manage the demographic shift resulting from aging populations and young migrants. 
Additionally, resource allocation is both effective and efficient as the resource-rich parts of the 
world become part of the dominant system. However, a wide range of problems still persist in the 
less developed regions of the world that are resource-poor. This dichotomy is further exacerbated by 
the lack of intervention by liberal democracies absorbed with domestic priorities. Ensuing tensions 
and poor economic and cultural integration worsen pre-existing domestic and transnational security 
issues such as crime and terrorism. The overarching theme of this future is preoccupation with 
domestic concerns in the developed states, which leaves them less able to react to instability and 
geopolitical risk.310 
 
The relevant drivers in Future Three “Clash of Modernities” are competing ideologies and 
worldviews, demographics, and the use of technology. Clash of Modernities sketches a world where 
a strong belief in rationalism coupled with technological innovation has enabled advanced-network 
societies to connect virtually across the globe. Continued globalisation and technological advances 
have helped drive urban centres in the developed world to become mega-hubs of wealth and culture. 
The governance of this developed sector is diffuse, multi-layered, and network-centric where 
                                            
309
 Multiple Futures Project, pp. 19-20. 
310
 Multiple Futures Project, p. 20. 
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problems are solved, and created, by virtual networks in real time. The disconnected, segregated, 
and disassociated frontier areas suffer the greatest tension. Further destabilising these regions are 
organised criminal elements that engage in human and black-market trafficking, intellectual and 
technological piracy, and illegal arms trading. Authorities within developed states are focussed 
primarily on keeping these disruptive forces at bay by managing flows of trade, information, 
resources, and the recruitment of workers that traverse the borders between the urban cores and 
outlying areas.311 
 
The relevant drivers of Future Four “New Power Politics” are friction in international decision-
making; competing ideologies and worldviews; conflict over resource allocation; and a lack of 
economic integration. New Power Politics describes a growing absolute wealth, accompanied by 
the widespread proliferation of WMD/E. This future is characterized by power politics, but in a truly 
multi-polar world that is dominated by competing regional powers. These powers have established a 
fragile balance in which globalisation and international rules and norms are challenged by 
competition for resources and influence. These states may not have a global reach, but regionally 
they play a significant role in shaping world politics by promoting their strategic interests and 
competitive advantage. Competition and demand for resources, particularly in ungoverned spaces, 
continues unabated as the most powerful states continuously strive to improve their economies and 
protect their populations.312  
 
(RESPOND) Questions 
4. In your view, are all the described futures plausible?  
 Are they coherent with the strucural and deterministic drivers presented? 
……… 
 
5. In your view, which of the futures is the least likely? 
……… 
 
6. In your view, which of the futures is the most likely? 
……… 
                                            
311
 Multiple Futures Project, p. 21. 
312
 Multiple Futures Project, p. 22. 
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SECTION 3 – FUTURE CONFLICTS 
 
(READ) Key reference supporting the questions 
In the “Dark Side of Exclusivity” future the prospect of failed governance and challenges to state 
authority are key risks. Previously stable goverments may be destabilised, and an increase of 
potentially hostile states is possible. Proliferation of WMD continues. This development 
undermines national and international law. The friction between developed and developing states is 
likely to cause uncontrolled migration, illegal immigration and human exploitation. Violations of 
territorial integrity are possible as well as population unrest. Overall these developments may lead 
to vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and thus affect free flow of resources. The spread of radical 
ideologies alongside the prospect of ethnic, religious or ideological conflicts and spill-over are 
likely.313 Failed states, uncontrolled migration, ideological conflict, endangered rule of law and 
threats to resource allocation portray the conflicts of this future. 
 
Whilst uncontrolled migration and ethnic, religious or ideological conflicts remain risks; an 
additional important risk in future two “Deceptive Stability” is transnational organized crime. 
Alongside crime a key risk in this future is related to the demographic shifts.314  Uncontrolled 
migration, ideological conflicts and organised crime are the likely portrait of conflict in this future.  
 
The conflicts of future three “Clash of Modernities” might have a slightly different emphasis. In 
this future extremism of marginalised groups, conflicts between incompatible belief systems and 
ideological conflicts are highlighted. Criminal or rogue elements may exploit techology and thus 
disrupt vital interdependent computer networks315. This future’s conflict landscape includes 
extremism, ideological conflict and technological network crime. Competition for ideological 
supremacy and resources that may lead or include interstate rivalry are the dominant features of 
conflict in the fourth future “New Power Politics” 316. 
 
(RESPOND) Questions 
7. In your view, are these conflicts logical deductions from the futures described? 
 NB.: These risk conditions will be further debated in section 5 
                                            
313
 Multiple Futures Project, pp. 17-22, 28-32; NATO 2020, pp. 13-17. 
314
 Multiple Futures Project, pp. 17-22, 28-32; NATO 2020, pp. 13-17. 
315
 Multiple Futures Project, pp. 17-22, 28-32; NATO 2020, pp. 13-17. 
316
 Multiple Futures Project, pp. 17-22, 28-32; NATO 2020, pp. 13-17. 
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……… 
SECTION 4 – FUTURE CONFLICT SOURCES 
 
(READ) Key reference supporting the questions 
There are some potential sources of threat: individuals, criminal organisations, non-state actors, 
specific states and nature. Super-empowered individuals who have overcome constraints and rules 
may wield unique political, economic, intellectual, or cultural influence over people and events. 
Another threat is organised crime with the aim of committing serious crimes or offenses in order to 
obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. Non-sovereign entities (non-state 
actors) expressing extremist values and ideas may exercise significant economic, political, or social 
power and influence at a national, and in some cases international, level. Rogue states may act 
without respect for other states or global norms. Confrontational powers resort to force or threaten 
the use of force disproportionately to what is at stake. Last but not least, nature may also pose a 
threat. The physical world exists and changes on its own accord.317 
 
(RESPOND) Questions 
8. Do you concur with these sources, and do you have any additional sources one may think 
of? 
……… 
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 Multiple Futures Project, pp. 28-29. 
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SECTION 5 – FUTURE CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS 
 
(READ) Key reference supporting the questions 
In the table below (next page) there is a listing of risk conditions that are related to each of the 
futures. Risk conditions refer to vulnerabilities and characteristics that endanger people, territorial 
integrity, and - or values and ideas. I have evaluated these risk conditions, and formulated a research 
hypothesis of the conditions that could merit for a peace support operation. Such an operation would 
be an international military intervention (either peacekeeping or peace enforcement) conducted 
under the auspices of a legitimate international organization and abiding to international law. Three 
risk conditions were particularly challenging to evaluate. Thus I wish that you would pay special 
attention to: 1) transnational crime, 2) uncontrolled migration and 3) ungoverned spaces. 
 
(RESPOND) Questions 
9. Do you have any additions to the listing of risk conditions? 
……… 
 
10. (IMPORTANT)Do you agree that the risk conditions listed would merit for a military 
crisis management operation (ie. peace support operation including peacekeeping or 
peace enforcement)? 
 Any comments or supporting argumentation should be added after the table (question 
11). 
……… 
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Risk conditions related to future:  Research 
hypothesis: risk 
condition is a likely 
trigger for a peace 
support operation 
Agree 
(YES) 
Do not 
agree 
(NO) 
“Dark Side of Exclusivity” 
1. Failed Governance PSO   
2. Proliferation of Radical Ideologies    
3. Potential spill-over of ethnic, 
religious, ideological conflict 
PSO   
4. Vulnerability of strategic 
chokepoints and infrastructures in 
ungoverned spaces 
PSO   
5. Potential disputes over previously 
uninhabited and resource-rich 
territories 
PSO not likely. 
Mediation and 
diplomacy 
 
  
6. Consequences from environmental 
catastrophes/changes 
PSO not likely. 
Mediation and 
diplomacy 
  
7. Proliferation of WMD/WME PSO not likely. 
Mediation and 
diplomacy 
  
8. Spread of radical ideologies    
9. Challenges to state authority    
10. Uncontrolled migration PSO   
11. Shifts in population mix    
“Deceptive Stability” 
12. Inability to anticipate, sense, and 
shape external security 
environment 
   
13. Transnational criminal movements PSO, policing, 
military support to 
state security 
authorities. 
  
14. Strategic inattention (by nation-
states and international 
organizations) 
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15. Potential spill-over of ethnic, 
religious, and ideological conflict 
PSO 
 
  
16. Systemic inability to respond 
quickly to external effects 
   
17. Uncontrolled migration PSO   
“Clash of Modernities” 
18. Complex interdependent computer 
networks 
PSO not 
likely.Network 
policing likely. 
 
  
19. Internal tension between 
technocratic efficiency and civil 
liberties 
   
20. High dependency on constant flow 
of vital resources 
   
21. Extremism of marginalised groups PSO   
22. Territorial and extra-territorial 
border disputes 
PSO, mediation, 
diplomacy 
 
  
23. Technological exploitation by 
criminal/rogue elements 
PSO not 
likely.Network 
policing likely. 
 
  
24. Vulnerability of complex 
interdependent systems and 
infrastructures 
   
25. Conflict between incompatible 
belief systems 
   
26. Shifting loyalties (state vs. non-
state actors) 
   
27. Alliances of authoritarian states    
28. Potential spill-over of ethnic, 
religious, and ideological conflict 
PSO 
 
  
“New Power Politics” 
29. Shifting spheres of influence    
30. Competition for ideological 
supremacy 
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31. Competition for resources    
32. Proliferation of nuclear and other 
WME capabilities 
   
33. Ungoverned spaces    
34. Interstate rivalry PSO   
35. Inability of the international 
system to handle large power 
fluctuations 
   
36. Shifting state alliances    
 
(RESPOND) Comments 
 
11. (IMPORTANT) Your comments and argumentation on the above table of risk conditions 
and research hypothesis: 
……… 
 
12. (OPTIONAL) Comments, reflections, argumentation on the questionnaire318: 
 ……… 
 
                                            
318
 Thank You for your efforts! 
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Responses and feedback on 1st round of delphi-questions  
 
The Delphi-questionnaire was sent to seven (7) respondents in November 2010. By May 2011 five 
(5) respondents had replied319. The responses are collated below, and researcher’s comments 
added.In order to enhance visualisation the following colous are used: 
- Original questions are in black font  
- Respondents’ responses in blue font  
- Researchers comments in red font 
 
SECTION 1 – DRIVERS 
 
11. Do you agree that these are the relevant drivers affecting the future decade? 
 
Respondent 1: 
Yes, principally so. Although these drivers are identified from an etatist approach rather than 
from a comprehensive one 
 
 Researcher’s comment (1): One may argue that the structural drivers apply 
regardless of which entities are being analysed: states, societies, organisations 
or inter-personal relations. The comprehensive viewpoint is constituted by the 
deterministic drivers, which cover all the dimensions of a PESTE–analysis. 
PESTE-analysis includes political (P), economical (E), society (S), technological 
(T) and ecological (E) dimensions. 
 
Respondent 2: 
 I am unsure why you address the first driver as “changing state capacity” vice simply 
“State Capacity”.  With the available ‘state’ capacity or what a State goes on to create to 
address issues (here it depends on how you use this word vice ‘capability’ that would fit 
more with the way NATO uses it), each State would need to be flexible to adapt, as you 
correctly mention, to the situation with which it is confronted and also to look beyond the 
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current timeframe. As we are all aware the US activated the Dept of Homeland Security 
soon after the 9/11 attacks and the Bush doctrine of preventive measures against potential 
threats was firmly instituted (vice pre-emptive measures against imminent threats, as is 
generally accepted by most all States). However, the US had both capacity and capability to 
do that; how many other States would be able to flex muscles in similar ways or ‘adapt’. Of 
note, all well managed States would do so within means, but that is my assumption. 
 Resources.  Indeed, and in many ways here’s where the world bodies such as the UN also 
come into play. I.e. with all the good work that the Agencies/funds/programmes could do to 
maintain a semblance of balance in an imperfect world.  
 Climate Change.  Agree but here too it would be for the world at large (international 
bodies) to ensure that the have-nots or those states that are subjected to natural disasters, 
the burdens of climate change etc. do not suffer unduly but also to ensure that the super 
powers or more endowed States come to realise that their ways should not subject others to 
the burdens of pollution, global warming etc.  
 Use of technology.  Why not a more general term such as innovation. In sum, more than 
simply technology and the almost automatic association to ‘networks’.    
 Demographics. 
 Competing ideologies.  Debatable whether they indeed compete. It is more I think a case of 
different ideologies that would have to be countered with respect for diversity. 
 
 Researcher’s comment (2): As it is implied that something needs to be countered, 
then the phenomenas actually do compete – here one should not confuse original 
phenomenon with desired action. 
 
 Researcher’s comment (3): Agree that most important to distinguish difference 
between preventive and pre-emptive. Relate to potential threats and imminent 
threats accordingly. Michael Doyle covers this matter in his book “Strike First” 
and presents the yardstick of legality, legitimacy, likelyhood and lethality when a 
nation considers preventive and pre-emptive measures. Secondly, this 
differentation has relevance in the 2nd Delphi-round, where peace enforcement is 
differentiated in three categories. 
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 In addition to these five, one of the respondents (no. 3) concurs with the findings of the 1st round, although 
this respondent did not respond to the initial questionnaire. 
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Respondent 7: 
Climate change is certainly a credible driver for conflict and insecurity, but it is also trendy. 
That does not discredit it but, as an example, conflicts over water supplies (resource allocation 
affected by climate change) have long been offered as a likely driver for conflict, but no water 
access driven wars are on recent record. I’m sure all the listed drivers are relevant. Some 
nevertheless tend to receive attention due to novelty as much as threat. Cyber-issues are a case 
in point. They are very important, but more instruments than drivers.    
 
12. Do you have any objections or additions on the structural drivers? 
 
Respondent 1: 
Friction and integration are real structural drivers. Asymmetry is not a driver but a 
consequence of the simultaneous effects of the two previous one. 
 
 Researcher’s comment (4): Initially I thought the same, but referring to 
discussions on the GSO-course related to Finnish Defence Force Development 
exercise – I came to realise that these three are independent and well identified 
drivers. To make the case – if asymmetry exists in a system then integration should 
decrease it. Asymmetry alone does not lead to friction – or vice versa. 
 
Respondent 2: 
No.  However, you might wish to consider the role of the bigger and more powerful States; I 
believe, there is a case to make for, as an example, the role of the USA, and then too the UN and 
perhaps the European block.  In sum, Superpowers and World Governing Bodies (AU, UN, EU, 
NATO {on its last legs?}, ASEAN, etc.) more than just States. 
 
 Researcher’s comment (5): A point with merit that structural drives should 
include major states and IOs. Their actions do shape the international system. 
Though the point is valid - for the benefit of this research, which does not aim to 
elaborate further on possible futures, this critique on drivers is noted and that 
itself remains sufficient.. 
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Respondent 7: 
No 
 
13. Which deterministic driver is a so called ‘primus in pares’ the most important one?  
 Attempt to base your assessment on the driver’s combined likelihood and impact as 
well as its interdependency on the other drivers. 
 
Respondent 1: 
Demography is the prime driver, because its changes affect all the other drivers. Clear 
consequences might be drawn from demographical trends - positively or negatively to the 
state’s role, the allocation of resources, the climate change, the use of technologies (the ‘use’ is 
an important distinction here) and the competing ideologies. 
 
Respondent 2: 
 My vote goes to State Capacity.  The others are very much ‘givens’! If State capacity is 
addressed optimally then in the future all should be well or (many) attempts will be 
undertaken to keep it well. Leaders determine what the right things are (to do), it’s up to the 
lower echelons to do things right.  
 The State(s) influences all the other drivers, perhaps not always directly, but through 
its handling of affairs definitely does. 
 
SECTION 2 - FUTURES 
 
14. In your view, are all the described futures plausible?  
 Are they coherent with the strucural and deterministic drivers presented? 
 
Respondent 1: 
Yes, they are, although Future Three is somewhat fiction to me. But they all respond to one or 
more possible combination of the trends of the drivers. 
 
Respondent 2: 
They are plausible but some of the underpinning descriptions are debatable. Here are some of 
the questions that I raise in regard the reasoning. 
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• (1) Whose “areas of interest”: all “developed” States? (2) The implied perception is 
“developed states” are on the right track; I’d suggest that this is not necessarily true given 
what we saw with the Bush doctrine of 2002 and beyond. (3) What of the role that 
international bodies could play, they don’t seem to factor in any of the underpinning 
reasoning. (4) If the world (or rather developed states) takes on a more balanced role in 
addressing the ‘haves’ and have-nots’ then there does not necessarily need to be friction 
between the two. Leaders will be determinants, especially in poorer states. Consider the 
(highest globally) per capita contributions that the Nordic and North-western European 
nations make to poverty, developing states, do-good projects, etc.   Also, I caution on the 
issue of being “resource-poor” and being “less developed” and the conclusion that there 
will be a “wide range of problems” to address.  Consider Congo, Nigeria, and many other 
poorly managed ‘states’ and especially the resources at each of these states disposal.  Had 
they been better managed they would have been (all relative) richer, I believe, than many 
European states. (5) What are the remaining “ungoverned spaces” and how do you consider 
a key aspect of protecting populations in a global melting pot?  
 Researcher’s comment (6): Agree that underpinning descriptions are 
debatable. This is not surprising since, the future scenarios are products of 
a collective security organisation (NATO) of primarily developed world 
nation states. The collective and compromised viewpoint of the 
organisation is clearly visible. 
Respondent 7: 
I have some difficulty with the “Dark side”, as I don’t see friction between developing countries 
and the global market as a given.  Latin America offers a variety of examples. Of course, 
conflict and diminished capacity for everything are exacerbated in failed states and outside the 
global political economy. 
 
Deceptive stability can have as much to do with bad governance as with allocation of resources, 
as the case of Tunisia illustrates. At the same time is was indeed an excellent example of 
Europe’s preoccupation with stability.  
 Researcher’s comment (7): Excellent point and most relevant when one 
looks at what is happening in North Africa and the Middle East. 
The significance of ideology and borderlands as a future is at the moment diminished. New 
Power Politics is a primary concern in South and Central  Asia. 
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15. In your view, which of the futures is the least likely? 
 
Respondent 1: 
Future Three (i.e Clash of Modernities (ed.)), because it implies the possibility of satisfying a 
virtually endless demand of energy and resources 
 
Respondent 2: 
Dark side of exclusivity.  
 
Respondent 7: 
 None are likely alone 
 
16. In your view, which of the futures is the most likely? 
 
Respondent 1: 
Future Four (i.e New Power Politics (ed.)), because it follows logically the integration pattern 
of the mankind and does not nurture illusions about the change of the human nature related to 
power. 
 
Respondent 2: 
Deceptive stability 
 
Respondent 7: 
All are possible as partial factors 
 
SECTION 3 – FUTURE CONFLICTS 
 
17. In your view, are these conflicts logical deductions from the futures described? 
 NB.: These risk conditions will be further debated in section 5 
 
Respondent 1: 
Apparently, yes. 
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Respondent 2: 
As presented there is logic in the conflict scenarios. On future-one, I am not sure on “threats to 
resource allocation”. Who or which state is allocating resources and what are the associated 
threats? Also, with power politics, innovation will be key, most certainly in the next decade. 
 
Respondent 7: 
The logic is fine, although I find organized crime a little overrated and effective offensive cyber-
weapons more likely to be developed by states than by terrorists or other rogue groups. 
 
 
SECTION 4 – FUTURE CONFLICT SOURCES 
 
18. Do you concur with these sources, and do you have any additional sources one may think 
of? 
 
Respondent 1: 
Yes, in addition: the potential of an incursion by an extraterrestrial life-form (pandemic or 
cognisant). But it may also be classified as part of the nature (in very wider sense). Also, in 
addition: functionally overpowered oligarchic international organisations (like the FIFA, 
nowadays). 
 
Respondent 2: 
Perhaps outrageously, the breakdown of accepted international organisations and/or non-
acceptance of their rulings. Recall the demise of the League of Nations.  
 
And when you refer to ‘confrontational powers’ I trust you are actually referring to powerful 
states. 
 
Respondent 7: 
All are relevant, but again in a traditionalist vein I would not underestimate states as a source 
of conflict. They don’t have to be failed or rogue 
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SECTION 5 – FUTURE CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS 
 
19. Do you have any additions to the listing of risk conditions? 
Respondent 1: NIL ; Respondent 2  NIL ; Respondent 7:  NIL 
 
20. (IMPORTANT)Do you agree that the risk conditions listed would merit for a military 
crisis management operation (ie. peace support operation including peacekeeping or 
peace enforcement)? 
 
Researcher’s comment (8.1): Most importantly the delphi-panel suggests that the following 12 risk 
conditions would merit for a peace support operation including peace enforcement and 
peacekeeping activities. These nine risk conditions arose from the 33 risk conditions in four 
different futures. The risk conditions listed below are arranged in descending order according to 
support received: 
1. Interstate rivalry  
2. Failed Governance 
3. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict 
4. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces 
5. Uncontrolled migration  
6. Transnational criminal movements 
7. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories 
8. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes 
9. Extremism of marginalised groups 
10. Proliferation of WMD/WME 
11. Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes 
12. Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements 
The table below shows the number of respondents in favour or against the idea that a risk condition 
would merit for a PSO.  
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Respondents: Risk condition that merits for a PSO 
Aye Nay (?)* 
13. Interstate rivalry  5   
14. Failed Governance 5   
15. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict 5   
16. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces 4 1  
17. Uncontrolled migration  4 1  
18. Transnational criminal movements  3 2  
19. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories 3 2  
20. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes 3 2  
21. Extremism of marginalised groups 3 1 1 
22. Proliferation of WMD/WME 3 1 1 
23. Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes  3 1 1 
24. Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements 1 3 1 
Uncertain: “Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties” - I faced 
difficulties interpreting responses to this risk condition. Pllease, all respondents state 
clearly if you are in favour of a PSO or against it in this risk condition. 
   
Table 1: Risk conditions that merit for a PSO showing number of respondents in favour or against. 
* (?) = undecided responses 
These risk conditions pertain to specific futures, which have an impact on the overall 
strategic setting where within the PSO functions - thus it is pertinent to make this 
differentation.  The table below depicts these relationships. 
Future 1:  
“Dark Side of Exclusivity” 
Future 2: 
“Deceptive Stability” 
Future 3: 
“Clash of Modernities” 
Future 4: 
“New Power 
Politics” 
8. Failed governance 
9. Potential spill-over of ethnic, 
religious, ideological conflict 
10. Vulnerability of strategic 
chokepoints and infrastructures 
in ungoverned spaces 
11. Uncontrolled migration. 
12. Potential disputes over 
previously uninhabited and 
resource-rich territories 
13. Proliferation of WMD/WME 
14. Consequences from 
4. Transnational 
criminal 
movements  
5. Potential spill-over 
of ethnic, religious, 
and ideological 
conflict 
6. Uncontrolled 
migration.  
 
5. Extremism of marginalised 
groups 
6. Territorial and extra-
territorial border disputes 
7. Technological exploitation 
by criminal/rogue 
elements 
8. Potential spill-over of 
ethnic, religious, and 
ideological conflict 
1. Interstate 
rivalry 
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environmental 
catastrophes/changes  
 
Table 2: Risk conditions that merit for a PSO related to a specific future scenario. 
 
Researcher’s comment (8.2): Out of the 33 risk conditions, the ones that would NOT merit for a 
peace support operation were: 
1. Proliferation of Radical Ideologies 
2. Spread of radical ideologies 
3. Challenges to state authority 
4. Shifts in population mix 
5. Inability to anticipate, sense, and shape external security environment 
6. Strategic inattention (by nation-states and international organizations) 
7. Systemic inability to respond quickly to external effects 
8. Complex interdependent computer networks 
9. High dependency on constant flow of vital resources 
10. Vulnerability of complex interdependent systems and infrastructures 
11. Conflict between incompatible belief systems 
12. Shifting loyalties (state vs. non-state actors) 
13. Alliances of authoritarian states 
14. Shifting spheres of influence 
15. Competition for ideological supremacy 
16. Competition for resources 
17. Proliferation of nuclear and other WME capabilities 
18. Ungoverned spaces 
19. Inability of the international system to handle large power fluctuations 
20. Shifting state alliances 
 
13. (IMPORTANT) Your comments and argumentation on the above table of risk conditions 
and research hypothesis: 
 
Respondent 2 : 
 Of note, PSOs in today’s political climate could also be used to bring about Stabilisation 
and capacity building in the States in question. And in some of the delineated risks, there is 
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always the potential for a very different type of intervention, such as Humanitarian 
assistance, Disaster relief, etc. The UN has proved its worth in those fields. 
 Researcher’s comment (9): Agreed, this is the case – and good that it is. 
However I need to focus on the applicability on the use of force (military 
means) and evaluate it with the concept of consent (political), which 
remains the toughest conceptual challenge of peace operations. 
 
 Moreover, with the evolution of world affairs and development, PSO in its very present 
nature could change by the next decade.  In sum, by referring to PSO as we know it today, 
we could be on the wrong track? For example, an expanded role is very likely. 
Conceptually, PSOs have moved on from classic peacekeeping to more “robust” 
peacekeeping. But will the world’s bodies be able to generate the means to conduct PSOs as 
we would want.   
 Researcher’s comment (10): The last question captures the “big picture” 
in reletation to intervention optimism vs intervention pessimism. 
Respondent 4 :   
 Mediation and diplomatic efforts should not be presented in the selective manner (as 
presented in the table). This is due to the fact that economic intergration, cooperation and 
trade; sanctions; development aid; would all be relevant to consider in all cases – and their 
applicability should be evaluated on a case by case basis. 
 Researcher’s comment (11): Agreed; multidimensional efforts are all 
always pertinent. 
 Spill over of ethnic etc. conflict is a very general description, but I have attempted to 
understand it in a context, where it could cause more widescale violent spill over effects 
across state boundaries 
 I would rather use the term of utilisation of military and civilian crisis management 
capabilities – rather than peace support operations (PSO). 
 
Respondent 5: 
Respondent views that these risk conditions would constitute for peace support operation: (1) 
interstate rivalry, (2) failed governance, (3) potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological 
conflict, (4) territorial and extra-territorial border disputes, (5) extremism of marginalised 
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groups, (6) proliferation of WMD/WME and (7) consequences from environmental 
catastrophes/changes. 
 
Furthermore, some risk conditions would require specific preconditions to be met, for them to 
merit a peace support operation (PSO). Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and 
infrastructures in ungoverned spaces should be extremely serious, for it to merit for PSO. The 
precondition extreme seriousity applies to transnational criminal movements. Uncontrolled 
migration is also problematic as a PSO scenario. However it would merit for frontier guard and 
border control type measures. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich 
territories, would require coalition or interests to be threatened, for it to merit for military 
interventions. Respondent does not see that technological exploitation by criminal/rogue 
elements would merit for a PSO.  However, a single nation may take action, but this cannot be 
regarded as a PSO. 
 
Respondent 7:  
Referring to question: I would change WOULD merit to COULD merit. it is always political. 
 
Respondent 7: 
I’m not aware of mediation after natural disasters, except of course in the case of post-tsunami 
Ache, where the mediation was about preceding political violence. 
 
14.  (OPTIONAL) Comments, reflections, argumentation on the questionnaire: 
 
NIL 
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Second round of delfi-questions for diploma thesis: “Military crisis management in the next decade (2020-2030)” 
 
AIM OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND INSTRUCTIONS 
The aim of the 2nd round of delfi questions is to identify the relevant spoiler types and appropriate spoiler management strategies in the 
risk conditions identified in the 1st round of delfi questions. The specific focus is on preconditions that would merit for coercive spoiler 
management measures. Therefore in the table below the preconditions that would merit for coercive measures are highlighted in red. 
 
The table is a summary of hypotheses that have been made against the frameworks of: (1) peacebuilding space (i.e includes international 
capacity, local capacity and level of hostility), (2) the ecology of authority (i.e. factions are few or many, reconciled or hostile, coherent or 
incoherent) and (3) spoiler typology attempting to identify the most significant (i.e. dominant) spoiler type. The conditions that are assumed to 
merit for coercive measures are: total or greedy spoilers, high level of hostility, hostile factions. These are highlighted in the table. The table is 
followed by questions that include the description of deductions made from the risk condition and hypothesis based on that deduction. The 
respondent is requested to evaluate the validity and relevance of the hypothesis presented, and also provide comments on the matter.  
 
The questionnaire aims to provide views to the following questions: What are the preconditions and implications of attempting to induce consent 
vis-à-vis to relying on compliance? Under what circumstances is it advisable to attempt inducing consent? Under what circumstances it is of 
decisive importance to seek and nurture the compliance of the parties? 
 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF SPOILER THEORY 
The 2nd round of delfi-questions builds on spoiler theory, thus it is pertinent to provide a brief description of the theory - which was initially 
presented by Stephen Stedman in 1997.  
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Spoilers do not exist in wars, but are created within peace processes. Spoilers exist only when there is a process to undermine. Such a peace 
process begins when at least two warring parties have committed themselves to a peace agreement. A peace process creates spoilers because it is 
rare in conflicts for all leaders and factions to see peace as beneficial. Even if parties come to value peace, they rarely do so simultaneously, and 
they often disagree over the terms of an acceptable peace. A compromise in the form of a negotiated peace usually has losers: some who do not 
achieve their war aims. A compromise by definition requires the parties to accept that some of their demands are not met.320 
 
Stedman claims that spoilers vary by type by being limited, total or greedy. These types differ primarily on the aims of the spoiler, and 
secondarily on the commitment to achieving those aims. Limited spoilers have limited goals (e.g. a share of power, basic security for followers 
etc.). Limited goals do not imply limited commitment – goals can be non-negotiable. At the other end of the spectrum are total spoilers. They 
pursue total power and exclusive recognition of authority whilst holding immutable preferences: i.e. their goals are not subject to change. 
Pragmatism required for compromised settlements is rare. Total spoilers often advocate radical ideologies, for them total power is the means for 
radical transformation of society. Between the limited and total spoiler lies the greedy spoiler, that holds goals that expand or contract based on 
calculations of cost and risk. When faced with low costs and risks the greedy spoiler may expand its limited goals. And vice versa, when faced 
with high costs and risks the total goals may contract.321 
 
International actors that have overseen the implementation of peace agreements, custodians of peace processess, have pursued three general 
conceptual strategies in managing spoilers. The first of them is inducement, which is giving the spoiler what it wants.  It entails taking 
positive measures to adress the grievances of factions who obstruct the peace process. The other is socialization, which means changing the 
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has been a professor of political science and senior fellow at Stanford University since 2002, and provided the first systematic analysis of the spoiler problem in 
1997; see Doyle et al. (2006), p. 58. Stedman remains valid hitherto, as the original distinction between total, greedy and limited spoilers has not been furtherr 
elaborated in research literature; see Berdal, Mats: Building Peace After War, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, Oxon, 2009, pp. 
101,200. 
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behaviour of the spoiler; so that it adheres to a set of established norms. The third is coercion, or punishing the spoiler behaviour or reducing the 
capacity of the spoiler to destroy the peace process.322 
 
According to Stedman total spoilers cannot be appeased through inducements, nor can they be socialized. Coercive diplomacy may also be 
dangerously counterproductive; if custodians fail to carry through threats, a spoiler’s position may be strengthened. However, appropriate 
strategies for managing total spoilers are: the use of force or the departing train strategy. Stedman claims that few custodians are willing to 
use force, thus they should strengthen the parties of peace so they could defend themselves. The departing train strategy combines a judgment that 
the peace process will go irrevocably forward, regardless of whether the spoiler joins or not. The departing train strategy would legitimize the 
parties of peace and deligitimize the spoiler.  
 
As the greedy spoiler is not a total spoiler, there are at least prospects of bringing it into a peace process. Socialization is the appropriate 
long-term strategy towards a greedy spoiler. In the short term, this spoiler presents a serious dilemma. As inducements alone will only 
whet the appetite of the greedy spoiler; the legitimacy and illegitimacy of its demands must be clearly distinguished. In addition, depending on the 
risk-taking and cost insensitivity of the spoiler, the use of coercive measures may be required to impose costs and create limits to the 
spoiler’s demands. However a relying solely on a coercive strategy ignores that even greedy spoilers have legitimate security goals that can only 
be accomodated by inducements.323 
 
Inducement is an appropriate strategy for managing limited spoilers, but it depends on the bargaining range established by the other parties 
who have already committed to peace. If the demands of a limited spoiler cannot be accomodated, then the remaining strategies are socialization 
and coercion. Obviously the threat or the use of force may prompt a counterescalation of violence by - so far - a limited spoiler.324 
Kind regards, Mikko Laakkonen, Student officer, General Staff Officer Course 55, National Defence University, Finland 
+358-40-5808611, mikko.laakkonen@mil.fi
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risk condition peacebuilding space  
(i.e. peacebuilding triangle; Doyle and Sambanis, 2001) 
ecology of authority 
(Doyle et al. 2006) 
spoiler typology  
(Stedman 1997) 
future with related risk conditions international capacity local capacity level of hostility factions 
-few/many 
-reconciled/hostile 
-coherent/incoherent 
significant spoiler 
-total 
-greedy 
-limited 
other spoilers 
“Dark Side of Exclusivity” (DsE)       
Failed Governance 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
LOW LOW INCOHERENT GREEDY;  
failed states and their 
leadership 
LIMITED (1); state 
leadership with 
legitimate pleas  
LIMITED (2); local 
population with 
legitimate pleas 
Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, 
ideological conflict 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
N/A; 
both low and high 
possible 
HIGH; potentially and 
highly significant325  
COHERENT; 
ethnicity, religion or 
ideology unites 
TOTAL;  
in worst case 
LIMITED; 
moderates within 
factions 
Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints 
and infrastructures in ungoverned 
spaces 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
LOW;  
as pertaining to 
overall future 
LOW N/A; can be all 
combinations 
GREEDY TOTAL; potentially 
Uncontrolled migration 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
LOW; at departure 
areas. But HIGH at 
arrival areas; in worst 
case LOW also in 
arrival area. 
HIGH;  
potentially towards 
developed states 
MANY, 
RECONCILED, 
INCOHERENT (no 
leadership) 
LIMITED;  
migrants likely to 
plead for legitimate 
protection 
N/A 
Potential disputes over previously 
uninhabited and resource-rich 
territories 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
N/A; 
both low and high 
possible 
HIGH; potentially 
between parties of 
dispute and towards 
external intervenors 
FEW, HOSTILE, 
COHERENT 
LIMITED GREEDY 
 
Proliferation of WMD/WME 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
N/A; 
both low and high 
possible 
HIGH; potentially 
towards external 
intervenors 
FEW, HOSTILE, 
COHERENT 
GREEDY  TOTAL; potentially 
Consequences from environmental 
catastrophes/changes 
HIGH;   
within developed 
states 
N/A; 
both low and high 
possible 
LOW RECONCILED, 
COHERENT 
LIMITED  
“Deceptive Stability” (DS)       
Transnational criminal movements 
LOW;  
within developed 
states that focus on 
LOW; 
overall criminal 
elements capacity low 
LOW  
 
FEW, HOSTILE, 
COHERENT 
GREEDY N/A 
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domestic issues as compared to 
developed states 
Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, 
and ideological conflict 
LOW;  
within developed 
states that focus on 
domestic issues 
N/A; 
both low and high 
possible 
HIGH; potentially and 
highly significant326 
COHERENT; 
ethnicity, religion or 
ideology unites 
TOTAL; in worst case LIMITED; 
moderates within 
factions 
Uncontrolled migration 
LOW;  
within developed 
states that focus on 
domestic issues 
LOW; at departure 
areas. But HIGH at 
arrival areas; in worst 
case LOW also in 
arrival area. 
HIGH;  
potentially towards 
developed states 
MANY, 
RECONCILED, 
INCOHERENT (no 
leadership) 
LIMITED;  
migrants likely to 
plead for legitimate 
protection 
GREEDY;  
higher potential for 
criminal elements 
than in DsE. 
“Clash of Modernities” (CoM)       
Internal tension between technocratic 
efficiency and civil liberties 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
HIGH; within 
developed states 
LOW MANY, 
RECONCILED, 
INCOHERENT (no 
central leadership) 
LIMITED;  
civil liberties 
adovcates likely to 
plead for legitimate 
demands 
N/A 
Extremism of marginalised groups 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
LOW HIGH; towards 
developed states (or 
societies) 
FEW, HOSTILE, 
COHERENT 
TOTAL N/A; likely that 
amount of LIMITED 
spoilers (moderates) 
not significant 
Territorial and extra-territorial border 
disputes 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
LOW; 
on marginalised 
(deprived) side and 
HIGH on developed 
side;  which is the 
propable setting 
HIGH;  
potentially towards 
developed states 
FEW, HOSTILE, 
COHERENT 
LIMITED GREEDY; 
potentially 
Technological exploitation by 
criminal/rogue elements 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
LOW; 
overall criminal 
elements capacity low 
as compared to 
developed states; but 
potential for HIGH 
destructive capacities 
LOW;  
 
FEW, HOSTILE, 
COHERENT 
GREEDY N/A 
Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, 
and ideological conflict 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
N/A; 
both low and high 
possible 
HIGH  HOSTILE, 
COHERENT; 
ethnicity, religion or 
ideology unites 
TOTAL;  
in worst case 
LIMITED; 
moderates within 
factions 
“New Power Politics” (NPP)       
Interstate rivalry 
HIGH HIGH LOW, but potential 
for HIGH 
FEW, potentially 
HOSTILE, 
GREEDY;  
states compete 
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COHERENT 
(RESPOND) Questions 
 
risk condition international 
capacity 
local capacity level of hostility factions 
-few/many 
-reconciled/hostile 
-coherent/incoherent 
dominant spoiler 
-total 
-greedy 
-limited 
other spoilers 
Failed Governance 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
LOW LOW INCOHERENT GREEDY;  
failed states and their 
leadership 
LIMITED (1); state 
leadership with 
legitimate pleas  
LIMITED (2); local 
population with 
legitimate pleas 
 
1. QUESTION 
RISK CONDITION:   
Failed Governance 
DESCRIPTION:  
In the risk condition of “Failed Governance” local capacity by the definition is LOW. Plainly due to the fact of failed governance local hostility level is not necessarily high 
– thus it is assumed LOW. Obviously hostility can rise over time due to other intertwined risk conditions. By definition the ecology is INCOHERENT. The significant spoiler 
type is assumed to be GREEDY, which could be the failed state’s leadership regime. Alongside greedy spoilers LIMITED spoilers are likely. They could be both the failed 
state’s leadership regime and the local population. 
HYPOTHESIS 1:  
It is likely that in such a risk condition GREEDY spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures. 
 
  
RESPONDENT’S COMMENTS: 
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risk condition international 
capacity 
local capacity level of hostility factions 
-few/many 
-reconciled/hostile 
-coherent/incoherent 
significant spoiler 
-total 
-greedy 
-limited 
other spoilers 
Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, 
ideological conflict 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
N/A; 
both low and high 
possible 
HIGH; potentially and 
highly significant327  
COHERENT; 
ethnicity, religion or 
ideology unites 
TOTAL;  
in worst case 
LIMITED; 
moderates within 
factions 
 
2. QUESTION 
RISK CONDITION:  
Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict 
DESCRIPTION:  
In this case the level of local hostility is potentially HIGH and also very significant. The factions are assumed to be COHERENT as ethnicity, religion or ideology unites them. 
In the worst case the significant spoiler type is TOTAL alongside LIMITED spoilers, which are moderates within the factions. 
HYPOTHESIS 2:  
It is likely that in such a risk condition TOTAL spoilers exist, and this justifies for coercive spoiler management strategies including the use of 
military force (i.e. peace enforcement measures). 
 
  
HYPOTHESIS 3:  
It is likely that in such a risk condition the levels of local (i.e. within in mission area of operations) hostility are HIGH, thus military capabilities are 
necessary to protect any political peace process. 
 
  
RESPONDENT’S COMMENTS: 
 
 
NB. this risk conditions appears in three futures; elaboration of significant differences, if any. 
                                            
327
 Doyle et al. (2000), p. 787. 
LTSG (N) MIKKO LAAKKONEN, DIPLOMA THESIS, APPENDIX 5 8(18) 
 
risk condition international 
capacity 
local capacity level of hostility factions 
-few/many 
-reconciled/hostile 
-coherent/incoherent 
significant spoiler 
-total 
-greedy 
-limited 
other spoilers 
Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and 
infrastructures in ungoverned spaces 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
LOW;  
as pertaining to 
overall future 
LOW N/A; can be all 
combinations 
GREEDY TOTAL; potentially 
 
 
3. QUESTION 
RISK CONDITION:  
Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces 
DESCRIPTION:  
In this case the levels of local capacity are LOW, which is due to the overall setting that this specific future implies. Local level of hostility is not a significant feature – thus it 
is assumed LOW. The ecology of conflict may be any combination. The significant factor is that the significant spoiler type is likely to be GREEDY, with the potential for 
TOTAL spoilers. 
HYPOTHESIS 4:  
It is likely that in such a risk condition GREEDY spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures. 
 
  
RESPONDENT’S COMMENTS: 
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risk condition international 
capacity 
local capacity level of hostility factions 
-few/many 
-reconciled/hostile 
-coherent/incoherent 
significant spoiler 
-total 
-greedy 
-limited 
other spoilers 
Uncontrolled migration 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
LOW; at departure 
areas. But HIGH at 
arrival areas; in worst 
case LOW also in 
arrival area. 
HIGH;  
potentially towards 
developed states 
MANY, 
RECONCILED, 
INCOHERENT (no 
leadership) 
LIMITED;  
migrants likely to 
plead for legitimate 
protection 
N/A 
 
4. QUESTION 
RISK CONDITION: Uncontrolled migration 
DESCRIPTION:  
It is likely that local capacity is LOW at migration’s areas of origin, but local capacity may be either HIGH or LOW at receiving areas where migration directs itself. The local 
level of hostility towards developed states has the potential to be HIGH, which is consistent with the overall setting of the future scenario. The significant spoiler type is 
LIMITED.328 It is likely that there are many factions, which are generally reconciled and incoherent, due to the lack of organized leadership 
HYPOTHESIS 5:  
It is likely that in such a risk condition LIMITED spoilers are significant, which necessitates the use of military capabilities  
to protect any humanitarian aid operation. 
  
HYPOTHESIS 6:  
It is likely that international and national legitimacy and legality considerations RESTRAIN FROM the use of any military force at arrival areas, to 
prevent migration directing itself to those areas. 
  
RESPONDENT’S COMMENTS: 
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 Bali, Sita: Population Movements, in Williams, Paul D. (ed.): Security Studies: An Introduction, Routledge, London, 2008, pp. 468 -475, 480 – 481. 
According to Bali, migration can be categorized into: (1) involuntary or forced (i.e. refugee movements) and (2) voluntary of free (i.e. economic migration), 
based on the motivation behind the migration. Economic migration can be further subdivided into: legal permanent, legal temporary and illegal migration. Bali 
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NB. this risk conditions appears in two futures; elaboration of significant differences, if any. 
 
risk condition international 
capacity 
local capacity level of hostility factions 
-few/many 
-reconciled/hostile 
-coherent/incoherent 
significant spoiler 
-total 
-greedy 
-limited 
other spoilers 
Potential disputes over previously 
uninhabited and resource-rich territories 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
N/A; 
both low and high 
possible 
HIGH; potentially 
between parties of 
dispute and towards 
external intervenors 
FEW, HOSTILE, 
COHERENT 
LIMITED GREEDY 
 
 
5. QUESTION 
RISK CONDITION: Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories 
DESCRIPTION:  
It is likely that levels of hostility, between parties of any dispute and towards any external intervenors, are HIGH. The ecology of conflict is likely to involve FEW factions 
that are COHERENT, as the disputed issues unite the factions. The factions are HOSTILE towards each other and parties that are external to the dispute. The significant 
spoiler type is LIMITED, which have both legitimate and illegitimate claims to previously uninhabited territories. Alongside this GREEDY spoilers are likely to be involved 
and emerge. 
HYPOTHESIS 7:  
It is likely that LIMITED spoilers with both legitimate and illegitimate demands are involved, which necessitates the use of military capabilities  
to protect any political mediation process as well as coerce LIMITED spoilers on their illegitimate demands. 
  
HYPOTHESIS 8:  
There is an evident potential for the emergence of GREEDY spoilers, which justifies for peace enforcement measures. 
 
  
RESPONDENT’S COMMENTS: 
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risk condition international 
capacity 
local capacity level of hostility factions 
-few/many 
-reconciled/hostile 
-coherent/incoherent 
significant spoiler 
-total 
-greedy 
-limited 
other spoilers 
Proliferation of WMD/WME 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
N/A; 
both low and high 
possible 
HIGH; potentially 
towards external 
intervenors 
FEW, HOSTILE, 
COHERENT 
GREEDY  TOTAL; potentially 
 
6. QUESTION 
RISK CONDITION: Proliferation of WMD/WME 
DESCRIPTION:  
It is not possible to estimate the levels of local capacity – both high and low are plausible. However, the levels of hostility towards any external intervenor are potentially 
HIGH, thus the ecology is HOSTILE. Factions are likely to be few and coherent. The significant spoiler type, be it a statelike organisation or non-state actor, is likely to be 
GREEDY. The aim of such a spoiler is to gain as much power and influence as possible. Alongside this there is the potential for TOTAL spoilers. 
HYPOTHESIS 9:  
It is likely that both GREEDY and TOTAL spoilers pertain to these cases, which justifies for peace enforcement measures (pre-emptive measures) in 
support of any political peace and mediation process. 
  
RESPONDENT’S COMMENTS: 
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risk condition international 
capacity 
local capacity level of hostility factions 
-few/many 
-reconciled/hostile 
-coherent/incoherent 
significant spoiler 
-total 
-greedy 
-limited 
other spoilers 
Consequences from environmental 
catastrophes/changes 
HIGH;   
within developed 
states 
N/A; 
both low and high 
possible 
LOW RECONCILED, 
COHERENT 
LIMITED  
 
7. QUESTION 
RISK CONDITION: Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes 
DESCRIPTION:  
In this case the levels of local capacity may be either high or low. There is no evident reason for the level of hostility to be high, thus it is assumed as LOW. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that populations that are affected remain reconciled and coherent at least initially.  If any spoilers arise, they are likely to be LIMITED, with legitimate and possible 
illegitimate demands. 
HYPOTHESIS 10:  
It is likely that in such a risk condition, only LIMITED spoilers are initially plausible. This necessitates the use of military capabilities  
to protect any humanitarian aid operation. 
  
RESPONDENT’S COMMENTS: 
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risk condition international 
capacity 
local capacity level of hostility factions 
-few/many 
-reconciled/hostile 
-coherent/incoherent 
significant spoiler 
-total 
-greedy 
-limited 
other spoilers 
Transnational criminal movements 
LOW;  
within developed 
states that focus on 
domestic issues 
LOW; 
overall criminal 
elements capacity low 
as compared to 
developed states 
LOW;  
 
FEW, HOSTILE, 
COHERENT 
GREEDY N/A 
 
 
8. QUESTION 
RISK CONDITION: Transnational criminal movements 
DESCRIPTION:  
In this case the ecology of conflict is hostile as criminal elements oppose those safeguarding legality. The significant spoiler type is GREEDY. 
HYPOTHESIS 11:  
It is likely that in such a risk condition GREEDY spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures.   
RESPONDENT’S COMMENTS: 
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risk condition international 
capacity 
local capacity level of hostility factions 
-few/many 
-reconciled/hostile 
-coherent/incoherent 
significant spoiler 
-total 
-greedy 
-limited 
other spoilers 
Internal tension between technocratic 
efficiency and civil liberties 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
HIGH; within 
developed states 
LOW MANY, 
RECONCILED, 
INCOHERENT (no 
central leadership) 
LIMITED;  
civil liberties 
advocates likely to 
plead for legitimate 
demands 
N/A 
 
 
9. QUESTION 
RISK CONDITION: Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties 
DESCRIPTION:  
In this case it is reasonable to assume that the significant spoiler type is LIMITED, which have both legitimate and possible illegitimate demands. 
HYPOTHESIS 12:  
It is likely that in such a risk condition LIMITED spoilers are significant, which necessitates the use of military capabilities  
to protect any political peace and mediation processes. 
  
RESPONDENT’S COMMENTS: 
 
 
 
NB. this risk conditions was not agreed on the delfi-panel in the 1st round of questions. 
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risk condition international 
capacity 
local capacity level of hostility factions 
-few/many 
-reconciled/hostile 
-coherent/incoherent 
significant spoiler 
-total 
-greedy 
-limited 
other spoilers 
Extremism of marginalised groups 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
LOW HIGH; towards 
developed states 
(societies?) 
FEW, HOSTILE, 
COHERENT 
TOTAL N/A; likely that 
amount of LIMITED 
spoilers (moderates) 
not significant 
 
 
10. QUESTION 
RISK CONDITION: Extremism of marginalised groups 
DESCRIPTION:  
In this case the local capacity level is likely to be low, which is usually related to marginalisation and eventual extremism of different groups. The local level of hostility is 
likely to be HIGH towards external parties and especially towards developed nation-states. The ecology of the conflict is HOSTILE with few factions. These factions are more 
coherent than incoherent, as the extremist groups usually feature internal cohesion. The significant spoiler type is TOTAL. Alongside total spoilers, LIMITED spoilers may 
appear. Limited spoilers would be the moderates of these factions, but extremism implies that the amount of moderates is not significant.  
HYPOTHESIS 13:  
It is likely that in such a risk condition TOTAL spoilers exist, and this justifies for and this justifies for coercive spoiler management strategies 
including the use of military force (i.e. peace enforcement measures). 
  
RESPONDENT’S COMMENTS: 
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risk condition international 
capacity 
local capacity level of hostility factions 
-few/many 
-reconciled/hostile 
-coherent/incoherent 
significant spoiler 
-total 
-greedy 
-limited 
other spoilers 
Territorial and extra-territorial border 
disputes 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
LOW; 
on marginalised 
(deprived) side and 
HIGH on developed 
side;  which is the 
propable setting 
HIGH;  
potentially towards 
developed states 
FEW, HOSTILE, 
COHERENT 
LIMITED GREEDY; 
potentially 
 
 
11. QUESTION 
RISK CONDITION: Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes 
DESCRIPTION:  
In this case the local capacities may be varied: both HIGH against HIGH and HIGH against LOW are possible. The local level of hostility towards external parties and 
developed states is potentially HIGH; thus the ecology of the conflict is HOSTILE. However, the significant spoiler type is LIMITED, with both legitimate and illegitimate 
claims. GREEDY spoilers may appear and emerge alongside limited spoilers.  
HYPOTHESIS 14:  
It is likely that in such a risk condition LIMITED spoilers are significant, which necessitates the use of military capabilities  
to protect any political peace and mediation processes. 
  
HYPOTHESIS 15:  
It is likely that GREEDY spoilers appear alongside limited spoilers, which would necessitate peace enforcement measures. 
  
RESPONDENT’S COMMENTS: 
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risk condition international 
capacity 
local capacity level of hostility factions 
-few/many 
-reconciled/hostile 
-coherent/incoherent 
significant spoiler 
-total 
-greedy 
-limited 
other spoilers 
Technological exploitation by 
criminal/rogue elements 
HIGH;  
within developed 
states 
LOW; 
overall criminal 
elements capacity low 
as compared to 
developed states; but 
potential for HIGH 
destructive capacities 
LOW;  
 
FEW, HOSTILE, 
COHERENT 
GREEDY N/A 
 
12. QUESTION 
RISK CONDITION: Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements 
DESCRIPTION:  
In this case the ecology of conflict is HOSTILE as criminal elements oppose those safeguarding legality. The significant spoiler type is GREEDY. 
HYPOTHESIS 16:  
It is likely that in such a risk condition GREEDY spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures.   
RESPONDENT’S COMMENTS: 
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risk condition international 
capacity 
local capacity level of hostility factions 
-few/many 
-reconciled/hostile 
-coherent/incoherent 
significant spoiler 
-total 
-greedy 
-limited 
other spoilers 
Interstate rivalry 
HIGH HIGH LOW, but potential 
for HIGH 
FEW, potentially 
HOSTILE, 
COHERENT 
GREEDY;  
states compete 
 
 
 
13. QUESTION 
RISK CONDITION: Interstate rivalry 
DESCRIPTION:  
In this case local capacities are assumed to be HIGH (relative to opposing force) as they are used to challenge external.states. Initially the level of local hostility is low, but as 
rivalry develops it has the potential to be HIGH. Therefore the overall ecology involved few parties that are likely to be coherent in a HOSTILE setting. As states compete the 
significant spoiler type is GREEDY 
HYPOTHESIS 17:  
It is likely that in such a risk condition GREEDY spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures.   
RESPONDENT’S COMMENTS: 
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RESPONSES TO 2ND ROUND OF DELPHI-QUESTIONS 
 
INTERVIEW RESPONSES – RESPONDENT 1 
 
1. Failed Governance: 
 
Preconditions 
 
(1) International acceptance: here Libya serves as an example, and all the problems related to the case in 
gaining acceptance for an international intervention. 
(2) Local acceptance also important, although it may be that representatives of that acceptance are not given 
(i.e. available). E.g. gaining consensual agreement from the forces opposing Gaddafi was difficult to 
obtain. 
(3) Local acceptance also important from a wider point of view: e.g. the acceptance of the Arab League was 
important. 
(4) The third aspect is difficult to quantify. The presence of a clear interest and therefore of clear will to 
intervene (e.g. EU’s interventions). EU stepping up is based on regional or national interests. The 
decision to take action is an amalgam. For instance these considerations work against Germany in the 
current Libya case. There is a clear economic interest not to intervene and internal political 
considerations (e.g. impact of elections). 
(5) Fourthly there should be a set of guiding principles, which do not exist at the moment. There are 
numerous conflicts related to failed states, e.g. Zimbabwe, where intervention is not happening, due to 
the fact of lack of sufficient interest. If no interest the no will; e.g. in the international community should 
do interventions in Congo every year329. 
(6) Regarding greedy spoilers: one has to realise that alongside greedy local spoilers greedy international 
spoilers may also appear. E.g. OCHA, ECO etc. act on their interests – they woud like to “frame” the 
situation to fit their case, that is to fit the appreciation of the situation to fit their “modus operandi”. 
 
Implications 
                                            
329
 Researcher’s comment: It is always case by case and planners should not fight this, but provide the appreciation of the 
existing preconditions, plausible ways and means, as well as the implications of intervening and not intervening. An 
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(1) Implications are related to preconditions – because the standpoints are not rigid. There is a dynamic in a 
crisis influencing the preconditions – this means that an “evolution” of the preconditions begins, and 
this involves the nation states and international organisations. E.g. the actions of Russia, China and 
NATO towards Libya after the UNSCR 1973 reflect this dynamic. Furthermore this has consequences 
for e.g. the EU – UN – OCHA relations; OCHA has been instructed by the UN by its member states not 
to request for EU military assistance due to challenges related to impartiality. 
Hypothesis 1 cannot be denied (i..e. accepted); respondents note: “Greedy spoiler is not framing the 
conflict, but being framed by it”. 
 
2. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict 
 
Preconditions 
 
Alongside the generic preconditions mentioned in the first question the following preconditions arise: 
(1) It is important to highlight ideological reconciliation. This is an “illogical” type of conflict as versus a 
“logical” type of conflict, of which conflicts with root cause in economy being an example. 
Furthermore international terrorism not following logical type of conflict. However even in an illogical 
type of conflict effect based approach to operations (EBAO) remains a valid way of thinking. 
(2) The second precondition is the need for robust comprehensive capabilities not necessarily military 
capabilities. E.g. Bosnia facing the highest danger potential since the Dayton agreement; but it is more a 
political challenge with the military having no role at the moment. 
 
Implications 
 
(1) Yes, intervening would have implications. The problem is that certain conflicts have roots that go back 
to almost prehistoric times; thus it is expected that these conflicts have a long “after history”. E.g. the 
Thirty Years war as an inter-European war portrays this. One may say that the Christian and Islamic 
worlds are in constant “skirmish”. The UN operations that have gone on for a long time follow the 
borderlines of cultural belief systems330. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
military-strategic options paper should look into the implications of intervening versus not intervening. Considerations 
should focus on the “timing of intervention” - not too early not too late. 
330
 Researcher’s comment: to accept this statement, historical and quantifiable empirical data should be analysed. 
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(2) As argued in the first round of delfi, the primus inter pares driver is demography, which is behind many 
conflicts. Once demographic challenges are solved then the conflict is also solved. 
Hypothesis 2 accepted. 
Hypothesis 3 accepted. 
 
3. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces  
 
Preconditions 
 
(1) There is a clear relation to economic interests. This is a logical type of conflict, where the players are 
more predictable and their interests are easier to find out – and thus a much clearer concept of operating 
is possible. 
(2) However this does not have relevance to the anti-piracy operations of the Horn of Africa, where the only 
weakness is the legal constraints – the coercive measures are not strong enough. The vulnerability of 
strategic chokepoints is a more grand interstater level conflict scenario. E.g. the situation on the Persian 
Gulf (Strait of Hormuz) – thus it is no coincidence that Iran does not dare to threaten that strait, as it 
would be an immediate case for war by the USA side. 
(3) The priorities of preconditions change here. The political will to intervene is paramount, whilst the local 
acceptance is not considered. 
 
Implications 
 
(1) The conflict must be compartmentalized to a specific area in order for it not to have an effect in a wider 
sphere. 
(2) Conducting a crisis management operation with military capabilities is a balancing act – there may be 
phases that require crisis management operations, which may have preventive role.331 
Hypothesis 4 partly accepted. Reservations: crisis management used only in different phases of a conflict, 
if truly a strategic chokepoint is threatened then it is no longer managed by CMO. 
4. Interstate rivalry  
 
Preconditions 
                                            
331
 Researcher’s comment: Note that crisis management operation can be utilised as preventive (i.e. conflict prevention). tf 
really strategic chokepoints are threatened then it is a reason for war. 
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(1) The number one precondition is local acceptance, one cannot wage war without the consent of the 
parties to an interstate rivalry. 
(2) International acceptance is not necessarily required as “full” acceptance, but the intervention must abide 
to international law.332 
 
Implications 
 
(1) The challenge is that impartiality should remain. E.g. in Libya, how can the EU be impartial if its 
member states have bombed under NATO framework? Thus members telling OCHA not to ask for EU 
assistance 
 
Hypothesis 17 NOT ACCEPTED. Reservations: must have the consent of the rivalries – thus not a peace 
enforcement mode of operating.333 
                                            
332
 Researcher’s comment: Both points show that consent, local and international, are preconditions. 
333
 Researcher’s general comment not related to interview: The tools for planning are available. The skill required is to ask 
the right questions at the right time. Planning begins with the proper appreciation of the strategic scenario (e.g. 9 
questions, drivers for a scenario), then the scenario of the conflict (e.g. intertwined risk conditions). 
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INTERVIEW RESPONSES – RESPONDENT 2 
 
1. Failed Governance 
 
Respondent fully accepts the hypothesis presented including the description (ref. questionnaire).  
 
Preconditions 
 
The preconditions that should be met from a military perspective are: definition of desired end-state for logic 
sequence of planning with an exit strategy.334 From a political perspective the preconditions can be more 
diffused. In today’s world even the vague set of conditions and pulls to different directions should finally 
translate to mandate documents. 
 
Implications 
 
Regarding implications; using peace enforcement in failed governance situations has both advantages and 
disadvantages. Advantages are that it brings order to states and assists states in stabilizing security situations. 
The disadvantages are that peace enforcement may cause serious local factionalisation – e.g. as may happen in 
the Ivory Coast, where displacing the former leader may be successful, but the leader’s followers may not back 
down as easily. 
 
Hypothesis accepted. Reservations: follow on effects must be considered.335 
 
2. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious or ideological conflict 
 
What happens is the total spoiler is the governing power bloc? What to do then? Must combat the spoiler, but 
politics dictate. Political approaches must have clarity and be solid. These need to translate into clear cut 
concepts for the military. However this kind of comprehensive approach is NOT there. For example the LRA is 
a complete spoiler. Fighting against the Taliban is considered war on terrorism, but this does not apply to Africa 
                                            
334
 Nota bene: For the respondent these are the classic tenets of planning that are generic to all risk conditions. 
335
 Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITION: end-state for military, polical diffusion must translate to clear mandate. 
IMPLICATION: peace enforcement needed for safe and secure environment. IMPLICATION: peace enforcement may be 
used to target specific spoilers. DEDUCTION: must appreciate, understand and mitigate against consequences of peace 
enforcement actions. 
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and e.g. LRA. Furthermore the war on terrorism does not apply to developed states as it applies to developing 
states. 
 
Preconditions 
 
Preconditions that should exist are as follows. There must be a ‘way to success’ and a ‘way out’. The political 
“backbone” is the overarching matter here: there must consensus on the legitimacy of any intervention – which 
requires that intervenors rally for support. 
 
Implications 
 
There are a variety of implications that interventions may cause. Depending on the case intervention may cause 
complete breakup of socio-economic structure – and thus cause a ‘vacuum’. Planners at all levels need to look 
at all implications – they need to be drawn out. A concern is what impact does intervention have on stability – 
does it disrupt or support stability? 
 
Hypothesis 2 and 3 accepted. Reservations: follow on effects must be considered.336 
 
3. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces 
 
Preconditions 
 
For preconditions, again classic tenets of planning apply. However the ‘timeline’ is more of a question – cannot 
be open ended. For example operations of the coast of Somalia – should not be open ended – maybe should start 
from the land. This risk condition applies to smaller scale areas as well (e.g oil-rich area of Abyei region in 
Sudan, where the situation remains unresolved). Regarding the timeline in general, although international 
capacity maybe high – how long can one sustain operations. 
 
                                            
336
 Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITION: way to success and way out, legitimacy; IMPLICATION: impacts on social 
structure to be determined. 
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Implications 
 
Regarding implications: there should be way out – must offer some closure for those threatening chokepoints. 
Must get actors to sit down and negotiate – offer a course out towards an end state. 
 
Another note, there is also cultural perspective: “respect for life”. For instance UN country teams get “wrapped 
around axels” with loss of life. In some countries life loss of over 100 people may result in swiftly “marching 
on”. For UNCT a loss of 1 of own escalates the situation “100 fold”. Maybe limited casualties should be 
accepted to reach overarching goal. 
 
Hypothesis 4 accepted.337 
 
4. Uncontrolled migration 
 
Peace enforcement not likely. Here one sees the “western school of thought” – the other view is that people are 
likely to move. In today’s world there are migratory tribes that are armed to the teeth (e.g. the Misseriya tribe in 
and around the Abyei region – when they move south it is “free for all”). Military capabilities could be used as a 
deterrent. There are also different points of view on protection: how to protect; when to protect; “pocket of 
people” versus entire nation’s interests; borders are meaningless to some of these tribes. Using Libya as an 
example, the involvement of military capabilities is not due to migration, although the conflict causes 
migration. Involvement is due to actual crisis overall. In generic terms the needs of the periphery must be 
factored in, whilst appreciating that migration will be there in the future. 
 
Preconditions 
 
The classic generic tenets remain, however the protection of civilians principle arises. (E.g. in Darfur AMIS and 
then UNAMID has been there for years – but no peace agreement, and people moving all over. The PKO there 
is a deterrent and committed to protection of civilians. Interesting that even without a peace agreement troops 
are there. However political preconditions are different338. For example there is willingness to conduct PSO in 
Sudan but not in Zimbabwe. 
 
                                            
337
 Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITION: timeline is emphasised. 
338
 Respondent made reference to this earlier on: political preconditions are more diffuse (see 1st question). 
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Implications 
 
There is always a potential for skirmishes – and the question is how to step in, and remain impartial? As an 
example in UNAMID the Rwandan battalion has stepped in with rigour, and had to pay for it. In an incident 
Rwandan soldiers were ambushed and shot by men dressed in civilian clothing whilst helping out in water 
delivery.  
 
Future 
 
Current trends continue to sustain migration. Migration will be there – either diffuse or forced. As migration is 
bound to continue the UN is taking serioud dedicated measures towards the issue. 
 
Hypothesis 5: reservations on this. 
Hypothesis 6 accepted.339 
 
 
5. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories 
 
This is more likely to occur within states and more likely to occur intrastate. Not so likely in uninhabited 
areas340. The risk condition needs to assessed is it “uninhabited and resource-rich” or “unihabited or resource-
rich”. This risk condition involves not only the states involved but also external stakeholders.  
 
Preconditions 
 
As a precondition, one has to assess what is the influence of e.g. USA, China, Russia or India in such a risk 
condition? Although there is no imbalance yet – there is imbalance developing. China and India need the 
resources (e.g. oil etc.). There is high potential that PSO in this scenario would be mandated – however, the 
mandate could be either weak or strong. Generic preconditions still apply.  
                                            
339
 Researcher’s comment: CONSIDERATIONS: Migration is a part of lifestyle – question is when is uncontrolled or has 
undesired effects? Meaning of state borders in the first place? Responsibility to protect principleAMIS&UNAMID make the 
case – troops there even no agreement DEDUCTION: No PSO with migration as the sole incentive. Intervening even in 
this scenario poses life threatening risks for intervening force. 
340
 Researcher’s comment: the risk condition’s definition ”uninhabited” may be there because of political considerations 
and potentila ramifications – as it is a NATO public document it could avoid pointing out inter- or intrastate disputes in 
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Implications 
 
Regarding implications, one must prepare for contingencies to avoid flare up, and seek agreement on resolution 
over disputes. Pertaining to the future, these disputers are likely not to be so severe that they necessarily lead to 
fighting – thus the settlements are likely to be reached in cabinet politics. Today’s techonology, estimates on 
availability and consumption of resources provide better ‘forecasts’ on potential problems, and provide 
possibility to mitigate potential disputes early on. As a ‘joker’, what would the impact of wholly new types of 
energy resources be if found in previously unexpected areas? 
 
Hypothesis 7 accepted. Reservations: see below quote. 
Hypothesis 8 accepted. Reservations: see below quote.341 
“These are the two on which we did have some discussion.  Given they have been grouped together, I agree. If 
you were to have to sit through a panel session on these, the discussion and challenges could get interesting 
and challenging. There's always a case to make that in some instances, even total spoilers could be the 
dominant force.” 
 
6. Proliferation of WMD/WME 
 
Situation makes respondent completely uncertain. This is such a dangerous thing. It negates on world bodies 
(i.e. UN), but superpowers may step in (e.g. case Iraq). The scenario has links to rogue organisations. The 
military preconditions are less generic here – there is more ‘free hand’ here. It is tantamount, that misuse is not 
only local concern, but leads to larger areas – thus this as escalatory potential. The political preconditions come 
back to classics. However the organisations must be able to work 10 times faster than now – in a crisis situation. 
Current mode of operating for organisations is too protracted. Implications are numerous and could be grave. 
These include at least: spillover, accidents, and contingencies. Overall nothing should be left for chance here. 
 
Hypothesis 9 accepted. 
 
                                            
341
 Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITION: Should not allow external stakeholders influence. IMPLICATION: impact of 
total spoiler behaviour needs to be noted. DEDUCTION: Must understand that mandate alone is not enough. Planners 
must appreciate: are we seeking a weak or a strong mandate, and what is realistically, politically, expected? If resolving 
issues will primarily occur through “cabinets” - would there be a need for monitoring, observing and verifying type 
missions? 
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7. Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes 
 
This is an interesting scenario. E.g. earthquake close to Japan has severe follow on effects – spillover. Accept 
hypothesis – military capabilities might be needed to prevent looting, protect against gangs etc. Regarding 
preconditions; nothing besides the generic preconditions – this is more an “open tap” situation, i.e. disaster 
situation. However, regarding compliance – countries are not necessarily fully compliant. For example Pakistan 
displayed some reluctance – countries do have a constitutional right to decline from external help. 
Implications. Must understand the end-state – especially how to hand over responsibility to civilian elements. 
And how to hand over the responsibility in a 3rd world country. E.g. effects of tornados in USA are completely 
different from the impact they would have in a developing state. Future. Developed nations should focus their 
efforts, but at the same time the forces are being downsized, resulting in less facilitating military elements 
 
Hypothesis 10 accepted.  
 
8. Transnational criminal movements 
 
This is a difficult question and respondent is not necessarily in agreement with description or hypothesis. For 
instance the drug barons in the West Indies and proliferation of their activities are being countered by many 
naval forces of the world. Respondent sees that this risk condition does not constitute for a full blown peace 
enforcement operation, but rather peace enforcement in support of a law and order policing operation. A lot can 
be achieved by bilateral and multilateral actions. The hope is that transnational crime does not increase, but the 
indicators are not good. Developed nations have less capability for faraway operations whilst demand for them 
remains great. There are less capabilities (i.e. material and personnel) available. Willingness to participate is 
there if criminality has high impact, and thus is a major issue for external states. Overall the issue relates to 
culture and society build up. 
 
LTSG (N) MIKKO LAAKKONEN, DIPLOMA THESIS, APPENDIX 6 11(44) 
Preconditions 
 
The approach towards this risk condition should be low key and benign. A lot can be done by regional, bilateral 
or multilateral cooperation, 
 
Implications  
 
Considerations must cover penal code and right to arrest matters, e.g. on national as well as international waters. 
One must have an understanding about: “who are you countering?” After all, this is a criminality problem, 
where legal considerations become a priority. 
 
Hypothesis 11 not accepted with above argumentation. 
 
9. Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties 
 
Agree with description that limited spoilers exist, but does not fully accept hypothesis, though it might be 
necessary. Interventions are done only on a very selective basis. For instance no discussion of intervening in 
China or Russia has occurred in the past decades, although internal tensions have existed. In Libya’s case 
Gaddafi’s rule has been tolerated for decades. 
 
Hypothesis 12 not fully accepted, see reservations. 
 
10. Extremism of marginalised groups 
 
Agree with hypothesis, this is highly likely. 
 
Preconditions 
 
Classic tenets of planning apply. Intervening force must have the consent of the host state. Host states will 
invite, but will want to retain control. In Sudan the rebels have attacked the government, as they were becoming 
marginalised: this has led to large loss of life. Consideration is also needed on whom’s point of view justifies 
for peace enforcement. Overall it is essential that parties are brought to a negotiation table. 
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Implications 
 
Implications depend on levels of severity and extremism, as well as the presence of a cease-fire agreement, if 
extremism had led to armed conflict. One implication is physical segregation, which is against “gut” feeling. 
But one may establish zones of separation, as has been explored in the Darfur Peace Process. Such cantonments 
or demarcation lines must be an agreed effort, with external monitoring and verification of adherence. (e.g. 
UNAMID conducting monitoring and verification in Darfur). 
 
Hypothesis 13 accepted. This is highly likely.342 
 
11. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes 
 
Respondent accepts hypothesis 14 with certain assumptions. Hypothesis 15 is more acceptable, such a condition 
would merit for a “full blown” peace enforcement operation. The dispute over Kashmir area is a classic 
example. In the dispute between North and South Korea, the northern counterpart could be considered as a 
classic greedy spoiler.  Regarding preconditions; There is always room for negotiation, but one must reach 
agreement on a huge array of issues. The case of North Korea would require preventive measures as there is a 
potential for serious counter-reactions. On future perspectives; This is more likely to happen intrastate. There is 
a possibility that territorial integrity is tested in Africa and the Middle East by manipulative power bases. 
 
Hypothesis 14 accepted with reservations. 
Hypothesis 15 accepted. 
 
12. Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements 
 
Agree entirely with hypothesis. There is also significant potential for increase in this area. 
Regarding preconditions, the effects here may be very collateral. For example criminal activities on the 
internet, may not be physically tangible, but are still very significant. The same precondition exists as in 
countering transnational crime. It requires that a combination of police forces, security agencies and military 
services act in cooperation. 
 
Hypothesis 16 accepted. 
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13. Interstate rivalry  
 
Preconditions  
 
International consensus on intervention is important. However, situations do not necessarily play out as 
interventions – although international consensus is there the local (regional) consensus may not be given. This 
is especially the case in border acros border situations (e.g. ISAF, Iraq have witnessed this difficulty). How 
about Iran? There must be broad consensus – but there will never be total consensus. In generic terms 
organisations such as the NAM, AU or Arab League will test consensus. 
 
Regarding the potential for future  
 
There is a greater potential for large-scale spillover in the 2020s – Iraq may be a democracy, but Iran will not. 
Rivalries have the perspective of chemical weapons and other WME. If local or regional conflicts involve 
WMD/WME then the concern is international. The earthquake and tsunami in Japan that caused nuclear facility 
disaster demonstrates this  - effects of WMD/WME will spread beyond conflict area. 
 
Hypothesis 17: undecided. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
342
 Researcher’s comment: Note there are differences between panelists – some in favour others reserved. 
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INTERVIEW RESPONSES – RESPONDENT 3 
 
1. Failed Governance 
 
Starting point is: what is governance? Firstly, it is political inclusivity, accomodation and reconciliation. 
Secondly, it is the ability to provide security and stability. Thirdly, it is economy and development. On the first 
point: power gets invested in certain people, leaving others out – this is the basic grievance. Failed governance 
is also caused by the lack of political will to provide inclusiveness, reconciliation and to accommodate. Security 
and stability have linkage with the political point – it is the failure of addressing security and stability issues, 
which is a cross-cutting issue. If government is unable to provide security, popalation will start arming 
themselves.343 Pertaining to economy and development, the key point is that people are lacking basic needs. 
There are two core questions: what is failed governance and who is a spoiler? Spoilers are defined through the 
point of view. 
 
No clear answer on hypothesis 1. Reservation: defining spoilers is a point of view.344 
 
2. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict 
 
Agree in large: there are always hawks, moderates and doves. We are experiencing a dangerous turn in the 
world. Al-Qaida can be considered as a total spoiler as it opposes the modern way of living. However the 
current mode of operating against Al-Qaida is turning the “fencesitters” into Al-Qaida’s camp. E.g. US drone 
strikes in Pakistan – Pakistanis do not support Taliban, but drone strikes are moving fencesitters towards 
Taliban and Al-Qaida. Key question is: how to marginalise a total spoiler? 
 
Approaches towards this risk condition must be solid – and must appreciate that there are no quick fix solutions. 
In conventional conflict quick fix is there – capture the land or kill the enemy. But in subconventional conflict 
                                            
343
 Researcher’s comment: security dilemma. 
344
 Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITIONS: Must be cognizant of what governance is and what failed governance is! 
Must define PE accurately in this context? Defining spoilers is a point of view. Here one must appreciate that spoilers are 
defined from the peace process’ point of view (i.e. parties of a peace process and their external interlocutors). If this is the 
case, then a military prerequisite is that specific guidance is needed on directing actions against spoilers – i.e. they must 
be universally within the peace process be agreed as spoilers. IMPLICATION: If safe and secure environment (SASE); 
then no incentive for population to arm itself – thus provide SASE. Economy and development cannot be provided by 
military means – can merely protect such endeavours. DEDUCTION: If good governance is about political inclusivity, 
accomodation and reconciliation – then this does not support PE measures, but at the most supports PK measures to 
protect any such process. For security and stability there is a need for PE and PK measures. 
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there is no quick fix. When has conventional approach succeeded in subconventional conflict (e.g Iraq, 
Afganistan, now Libya?). Agree with spoiler distinctions in large, there are always hawks, moderates and doves. 
 
Hypothesis 2 is accepted with reservations. 
Reservations: spoilers are always defined through point of view. 
Hypothesis 3 no clear answer.345 
 
3. Interstate rivalry 
 
Very contextual – rivalries are there even in Europe. In Asia they relate e.g. to the rising powers China and 
India. Many countries of the world are beyond the “conflict mindset”, which is not the case in Africa. Factors 
that have an impact on rivalry are: (1) political inclusiveness (the lack of) – as rivalries would not escalate in 
democracies and (2) development. Development includes the level of democracy, which is significant as 
autocracies would go to conflict. Also in the developing world the stakes are relatively lower - a conflict would 
cause casualties, but not to the scale as in a conflict between developed nations. The stakes for developed states 
are relatively higher. 
No clear answer on hypothesis 17. The role of military force was not elaborated.346 
 
4. Responses to hypotheses on other risk conditions 
 
Hypothesis 5, 6 and 7 are accepted. 
Hypothesis 8 is partly accepted. Point of view in defining spoiler is stressed. 
Hypothesis 11 is accepted. All factors are intertwined, but criminality must be dealt with very firmly. 
Hypothesis 14 is accepted.  
Hypothesis 15 is partly accepted. This is very contextual; affected become part of the conflict and may evolve 
to becoming spoilers. 
                                            
345
 Researcher’s comments: IMPLICATION: Must consider the consequences of PE on e.g. moderates. Will forceful 
actions alienate them from any peace process – or will they be more inclined to support? 
PRECONDITION: No quick fix for subconventional conflict – must always consider seeing through the whole process. 
Subconventional conflicts cannot be resolved by conventional military means. 
DEDUCTION: How to marginalise a total spoiler? This is a key question. What is the role of military in marginalising a total 
spoiler? Provide SASE – show that total spoilers efforts are ineffective. Use information operations to raise support for 
own cause and marginalise opposing force (total spoilers). Make sure that own actions are coordinated so that 
“fencesitters” do not fall prey for total spoiler recruitment and support. If no quick fix – then time is not a crucial substance 
but in contrast patience is crucial 
346
 Researcher’s comments: PRECONDITION: Not likely to appear in the developed world, moreover a question of 
appearing in the developing world. IMPLICATION?: Military forces of the developed world will have sufficient capabilities to 
intervene – but will they be allowed to and will there be enough incentives to authorize such interventions? And what do 
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Other comments 
 
Referring to the 1st round of Delphi questions 
 
Respondent says “agree with deductions”. However, must appreciate regional dynamics aspect also. 
 
Failed governance causes migration. Important to understand that migration is internal within the region and 
continent (e.g. Africa), which is not the migration from Africa to e.g Europe. 
 
In Africa the conflict drivers are: inter-ethnic tensions, competition and rivalry over resources and failed 
governance. Failed governance is a condition where there is no democracy – the people in power do not 
represent the will of the population. Power is centralised. These are the conflict drivers in Africa. In Asia and 
elsewhere the drivers are likely to be different. Thus no standard template can be derived for conflict resolution. 
 
On risk conditions and their applicablity: proliferation of WMD not applicable in Africa - can occur in low 
lying areas of Asia. 
 
On spoiler theory  
 
Respondent says “agree in large”, but does not agree on concept of total spoiler in conflict resolution setting. It 
is more a question of aspirations, grievances and tools applied. Total spoilers come to being only by the way 
people “look”.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
they actually attempt to accomplish if they are authorized to intervene? DEDUCTION: Must seek conflict prevention 
mechanisms (e.g. J2 functions, JMAC, SITCEN, information sharing, early warning, mediation and negotiation etc.) 
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INTERVIEW RESPONSES – RESPONDENT 4 
 
1. Failed Governance 
 
Preconditions 
 
The generic preconditions are: (1) mission (i.e. for the operation), (2) interests (i.e the interests of different 
nation states and international organisations in the political, economical etc. dimensions), and (3) resources (i.e. 
will there be sufficient resources for the scope of the mission), which makes things relative. Regarding 
preconditions, in this risk condition the mission becomes a specific issue and problem. Defining the mission 
sufficiently becomes very challenging. 
 
Implications 
 
The implications are as follows. When there is failed governance – the problem that arises is ‘local ownership’ 
of the process. In the scenario of failed governance finding local ownership will be difficult. One can build a 
“façade” but true local ownership is still challenging to develop. In a situation of failed governance it implies 
failure in governance across the board, which implies that one cannot focus on one area alone. 
 
Hypothesis 
 
Pertaining to the hypothesis, Respondent rejects the hypothesis as a generic assumption. Could be that in 
individual and specific ‘failed governance’ situation this is the case. Can often be a greedy spoiler, but this can 
occur alongside other spoilers.347 
 
Hypothesis 1: not accepted as a generic assumption, see comments above.348 
 
 
                                            
347
 Researcher’s comment: Hypothesis allows for other spoilers – assumption relates to the significant spoiler. 
348
 Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITION: mission, interest, resources. IMPLICATION: local ownership. 
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2. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious or ideological conflict 
 
The scenario setting may be a “matrix”. That means that there can be “crossing” (i.e. intertwined) elements (i.e. 
Sunni versus Sunni disputes with ethnicity related dimensions which lead to dispute of region versus region). 
Respondent accepts high level of hostility, but underscores that it usually is a matrix portraying the complexity 
of the scenario.  
 
Preconditions 
 
The same three (3) generic preconditions exist. Pertaining to spoilers it would be utmost important to identify 
the total spoiler or spoilers. It is a balancing act between interests and mission – and it raises the question is 
plausible to define the mission specifically enough? In ethnical and religious conflicts the interests actuallly blur 
and defining the mission may be challenging, as tha case was in Rwanda. Pertaining to the protection of 
civilians: these types of conflict exist all over the world. What is the interest to intervene amidst tensions? If 
indications of genocide are evident, then international attention and interest arise. However, tensions as such are 
a constant state. 
 
Implications  
 
The specific challenge is the prospect of becoming a party to the conflict. This is because this is not the 
“classical” setting. For instance densely populated areas (i.e. cities and towns) are particularly challenging.349 
 
Hypothesis 2 and 3: undecided.350 
 
3. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces 
 
The respondent agrees with the hypothesis that greedy spoilers would exist and that justifies for peace 
enforcement measures.  
 
Preconditions 
                                            
349
 Researcher’s comment: Agree, terrain (villages or towns or cities) has significance. Make reference to “illogical” conflict 
350
 Researcher’s comment: Deduction from respondent’s response (identify total spoiler): The hypothesis gains evidence 
that is that total spoilers may exist in this scenario. Is the challenge of defining here related to the “matrix” setting? 
DEDUCTION: “tensions are constant” affirms FRICTION as a structural driver 
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Regarding preconditions, rhe key question is: which actor has a strategic interest in the issue? Alongside local 
actors, this can also be a state that is located faraway.  
 
Implications  
 
On implications, one cannot simply deploy, execute the tasks and leave. The solution must be a lasting and 
durable one. 
 
Hypothesis 4 accepted.351 
 
 
4. Uncontrolled migration 
 
The respondent agrees with the existence of limited spoilers in this scenario.  
 
Preconditions 
 
(1) Pertaining to preconditions, the interest viewpoint is emphasised in this case. The political pressure of 
European nations to participate is a precondition, as well as humanitarian and logistic pressures.  
(2) Regarding military capabilities, one cannot dismiss the possibility that military capabilities are used. In a 
failed state scenario military capabilities may be used, but not targeting the population. 
 
Hypothesis 5 accepted. 
Hypothesis 6 accepted – not targeting the population. 
 
                                            
351
 Researcher’s comment: DEDUCTION: A strategic chokepoint will have wider considerations: i.e. beyond the immediate 
area of operations. These considerations must be factored in when devising a strategy for a PSO that must have a 
durable end state. 
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5. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories 
 
Examples of disputes that pertain to uninhabited areas are few. The spoiler can be any of the three: limited, 
greedy or total.  
 
Preconditions 
 
(1) Pertaining to preconditions, if the spoiler type is greedy, then it emphasises the importance of identifying 
the local counterpart.  
(2) Furthermore, a solid answer on the question of local ownership is a precondition.  
(3) Identifying interests is also a precondition especially if the significant spoiler type is greedy. 
 
Hypothesis 7 and 8: The respondent supports the view that both limited and greedy spoilers exist. 
 
6. Proliferation of WMD/WME 
 
The respondent sees that matching a crisis management strategy to this scenario is extremely difficult, thus this 
scenario was not explored further. 
 
7. Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes 
 
The hypothesis is accepted. If conflict components appear in this scenario, then that would obviously change the 
situation. It may be that there is a conflict that had not merited a crisis management operation, but then an 
environmental catastrophe occurs which merits a crisis management operation. 
 
Hypothesis 10 accepted 
 
8. Transnational criminal movements 
 
Peace enforcement is plausible in this scenario but only with specific restrictions. Criminal movements with 
elements of terrorism, drug trade or human trafficking could merit for peace enforcement type measures. These 
movements are likely to be connected to failed governance type scenarios. Enforcement should be precise 
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Preconditions 
 
(1) In this case, a crisis management operation will not be conducted without an UNSC resolution. To pass 
a resolution the risk condition needs to have a clear linkage to security and stability. 
 
Implication 
 
(1) Implications are related to international legitimacy. For instance in the case of piracy, there must be a 
definition between the problems of crimine and the problems related to unhindered sea lines of 
connection.  
(2) This type of crisis management is likely to be policing operations with the aim of supporting the 
population. 
 
Future 
 
(1) These types of scenarios as well as international police cooperation are likely to increase. 
 
Hypothesis 11 accepted with reservations. 
 
9. Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties 
 
Where is the point that actually sparks the international community to take action? This would encompass a 
series of actions including sanctions, arms embargo and movement restrictions (e.g. no fly zones). If 
intervention is conducted it happens on a case by case basis. 
 
Preconditions 
 
(1) One must be able to define the mission. 
(2) There must be sufficient resources. 
(3) Furthermore there must be an interest to intervene. 
 
Implications 
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(1) There are examples where this type of intervention has occurred, and the implication has been the 
change of the ruling regime. 
(2) This implies that the local ownership has to have been planned beforehand. 
 
Future 
 
It is possible that these types of scenarios and interventions occur, especially as the media draws attention to 
them. 
 
Hypothesis 12 accepted with above remarks. 
 
10. Extremism of marginalised groups 
 
This risk condition is always present in a crisis management scenario. It is related to the setting where there are 
multiple actors present. 
 
Preconditions 
 
(1) The support of the host nation is a precondtion. 
(2) Intervention must have international legitimacy. 
(3) Extremism is only a sub-factor of wider challenges. 
 
Implications 
 
(1) One must consider how different components of the population are treated. 
(2) A group may cease to exist or endanger the security situation, but another one may appear. 
(3) This is related to the ‘breading ground’ of these movements. Pertaining to repercussions, it is possible 
that such movements attempt to take revenge on intervenors at their home fronts. 
 
Future 
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This is also difficult to evaluate. There is no generic answer as compared to the Cold War, when there was a 
wholly different setting. It is likely that the overall scenario is more fragmented. 
 
Hypothesis 13: respondent has reservations on this, as this is difficult to evaluate. There is an emphasis 
on the requirement of a political process. 
 
11. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes 
 
Preconditions 
 
(1) The hypothesis no. 14 is a precondition itself. 
(2) Pertaining to peace enforcement: mission needs to be balanced with available resources. 
 
Implications 
 
(1) A peace agreement itself is an implication. An agreement is the objective towards which all efforts are 
aimed at. 
 
Hypothesis 14 accepted; this is a usual situation. 
Hypothesis 15 requires more judgement where mission needs to be balanced with available resources. 
 
 
12. Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements 
 
Crimes that occur in cyberspace are related to this risk condition. Military crisis management has limited roles 
in these scenarios. Military means are likely to be limited to intelligence gathering and logistical support. It is 
not possible to counter this risk condition with military 
 
Future 
These types of exploitations are likely to increase and challenge societies, which calls for pre-emptive and 
preventive approaches to counter these challenges. 
Hypothesis 16 not accepted 
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13. Interstate rivalry  
 
Interstate rivalry is more a classical reason regional power struggle related scenario. However as an example the 
economical penetration of China to Africa is different from a regional interstate rivalry. 
 
Preconditions 
 
In the case of China’s increasing influence in Africa there is little room for preconditions that would allow for 
intervening. However the three (3) generic preconditions are plausible in “classic” interstate rivarly. A 
fundamental precondition is the existence of some kind of peace agreement or at a minimum an armistice 
(ceasefire). Without a credible negotiation contact, agreement or armistice acceptance; then intervening in peace 
enforcement mode is not plausible. 
 
Implications. 
 
The operation must support and build a sustainable peaceful solution. 
 
Future 
 
It is possible that such scenarios would merit for peace support operations in the future. The humanitarian 
element is strong in the future – it is a prerequisite. 
 
Hypothesis 17 accepted, reservations hypothesis acceptable is relates to a regional conflict specifically 
between neighbour states. 
 
In general the respondent has reservations about PSO as a concept. For instance the EU acts in support of 
humanitarian aid in Libya. In Chad the issues are the IDPs and provision of humanitarian aid. In Congo the 
issue is stability.  
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INTERVIEW RESPONSES – RESPONDENT 5 
 
Respondent’s comments on the first Delphi round findings: 
 
Respondent sees that these risk conditions would constitute for peace support operation: (1) interstate rivalry, 
(2) failed governance, (3) potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict, (4) territorial and extra-
territorial border disputes, (5) extremism of marginalised groups, (6) proliferation of WMD/WME and (7) 
consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes. 
 
Furthermore, some risk conditions would require specific preconditions to be met, for them to merit a peace 
support operation (PSO). Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces 
should be extremely serious, for it to merit for PSO. The precondition extreme seriousity applies to 
transnational criminal movements. Uncontrolled migration is also problematic as a PSO scenario. However it 
would merit for frontier guard and border control type measures. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited 
and resource-rich territories, would require coalition or interests to be threatened, for it to merit for military 
interventions. Respondent does not see that technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements, would merit 
for a PSO.  However, a single nation may take action, but this cannot be regarded as a PSO. 
 
1. Failed Governance: 
 
The greedy spoiler type is likely to be significant. However the situation is likely to complex, and there would 
be substantial need for local demand, that no one group or spoiler is raises above others. But overall the 
circumstances dictate, and as the level of violence is low; it would not convince the international community 
that a crisis-management operation is necessary.  
 
“Would this mean that it is more of a peacekeeping character?” Yes: for example the case of South Sudan, 
which may turn out to be a newly independent failed state, the crisis-management operation is more of 
monitoring and verification type activities. The UNDPKO has a “low key” approach where the mission is 
present and visible at a community and village level. The actions are in support of the govenernance and not 
coercive. 
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Preconditions 
  
(1) Although it is not necessary to involve absolutely every single party to a conflict in a peace process; 
some kind of political process must be in place, even if it involves greedy spoilers.  
(2) The fundamental preconditions that apply are: (1) a mandate (e.g. resolution) from the UN Security 
Council; (2) sufficient support through comprehensive considerations from the international 
community; and (3) the practical resources.  
(3) There should also be an initial understanding on who contributes to the practical resources (e.g. 
troop contributing nations) before a UN Security Council resolution is passed. 
 
Implications 
 
(1) An important implication arises from the passage of time since the beginning of an operation. Unless 
substantial progress is apparent, a review of the mandate will surely take place especially if the 
situation turns more hostile. An operating environment can quickly change. 
 
Future perspectives 
 
It is difficult to comment on perspectives. If one looks at past or recent failed governance situations: they are all 
individual cases, and thus it is hard to identify any trends.  However the threshold for the international 
community to intervene is lower on a conceptual level, but not necessarily in practice. It is likely that these 
interventions are not going to decrease, but rather increase. The operations are not solely military operations; 
rather they must comprehensive operations which include the political, civilian crisis management, policing and 
military elements. An operation must have quick impact projects to demonstrate quick progress alongside long-
term development programs. In these failed governance situations the effects may spread world wide and are 
thus severe. Progress may take time, but hopefully the international community has learnt that developing failed 
governances towards self-sustainability is important. 
Hypothesis 1 accepted as plausible. Reservations: see above.352 
2. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict: 
                                            
352
 Researcher’s comments: DEDUCTION: Level of hostility is an important precondition in considering any intervention 
and the mode of operating. To note; this is actually in contradiction with what Doyle and Sambanis PB triangle suggests, 
but level of hostility has impact on the international community’s commitment. But this tricky: if high hostility then public 
opinion might call for intervention but practical resources matters do not allow for it – it is a “catch 22”.  DEDUCTION: 
Time has an important impact once a mission is launched. 
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This is slightly difficult as there is not direct causality between the existnece of a total spoiler and high level of 
hostility .If there is a total spoiler then surely peace enforcement is used (e.g. Libya). But unless level of 
hostility is not high there will not be a chapter 7 mission. 
 
Preconditions 
 
(1) The responsibility to protect approach is a vital precondition. 
(2) Urgency may require the UNSCR to pass resolutions quickly. 
(3) The UNSCR must be resolute especially if the threat is high. 
(4) A strong peace negotiation process is a prerequisite, otherwise will be extremely difficult. 
 
Implications 
 
(1) Without a strong peace negotiation process the military component will evolve into being a party to the 
conflict. 
(2) Without a peace process there will not be a positive outcome exit strategy. 
 
Future perspectives 
 
The demand for an inclusive international process will remain as a precondition in these cases also in the future. 
There are no solely military solutions to these risks even in the future. The described risk condition requires 
long-lasting and serious-minded commitment from the international community. 
 
 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 accepted with reservations presented above. 
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3. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces 
 
The scenario itself is acceptable. However it is difficult to identify military actions conducted by the 
international communtity for this scenario. This is because conflict arises from economical interests. This does 
not disclude invidual states or coalitions that may take military action. Piracy may be the exception, where the 
EU or NATO would intervene, but intervention would require more prerequisites.  
 
Preconditions 
 
(1) It is a concrete precondition that the vulnerability is also experienced as a problem at the local – regional 
level. A mission cannot appear from “nowhere”. 
 
Implications 
 
(1) The timeframe; for how long can it go on for?  
 
 
Hypothesis 4: the scenario is accepted, but collective military action is not likely. However, individual 
states or coalitions may take action to protect their economical interests. 
 
4. Uncontrolled migration 
 
Respondent does not see uncontrolled migration as a scenario that would merit for military means in a crisis 
management operation, but rather frontier guard (i.e. border control) type instruments. 
 
 
Preconditions 
 
(1) The security situation should be extremely severe for it to necessitate military means.  
(2) Military means may be needed to secure delivery of aid (e.g. EU operation in Chad). The humanitarian 
aid agencies are extremely careful about their integrity. 
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Implications 
 
(1) Wide support from the citizens of participating nations is likely.  
(2) Not a particularly risky operation, thus getting a mandate should not be difficult to obtain. 
 
Future perspectives 
 
Management of this risk condition will be needed in the future and wider means to manage will be called for. 
 
5. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories 
 
Regarding hypothesis and dscription, if the dispute has high impact on states, then military means may be 
employed even in (pre-emptive/preventive) actions. Firstly, the challenge is finding a balance between the 
international negotiations (demands) and international law. If the dispute is highly violent then the threshold for 
international intervention is high, and very much dependent on how critical the resources are. In this scenario 
the distinctions between the spoilers are not pertinent to the actions taken. 
 
Preconditions 
 
(1) The scale of the conflict must be large enough.  
(2) The effects should not be limited to the local area only, but should have effects beyond the immediate 
are on a regional or even global level.  
(3) Alternatively the disputes should have long lasting effects on international trade. 
 
Hypothesis 7 and 8 accepted with above consderations. 
 
6. Proliferation of WMD/WME 
 
The scenario seems very plausible. The evaluation comprises of the risks (scope and type) as well as the overall 
setting. Hard to imagine anything beyond a setting, where one actor is in unlegitimate possession of 
WMD/WME. Anything with more actors or more complicated is hard to portray. 
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(1) Actions taken must be precise and short duration. The exception is the safeguarding of WMD/WME 
facilities, which may be a long term undertaking. 
(2) Preconditions are dependent on the spoiler type (e.g. state actor or non-state actor). If the spoiler is a 
small non-state actor, then it is likely that actions international community would be taken quickly. This 
would not be the case if the spoiler is a state actor. Actions against North Korea or Iran are very far 
away. This is due to the grave escalation prospects. 
 
Implications 
 
(1) If there is a substantial amount of WMD/WME involved, or the use of military force is very likely, then 
the planning must be conducted so that success is assured. Success must be very sure, because the 
political risks are so great. Although the physical effects of a failure may be limited to local – regional 
level, the political effects will have a much larger impact.353 
 
Future perspectives 
 
 A positive feature is that regardless of the outcome, this type of risk condition is not likely to require long term 
commitment for the military capabilities. 
 
7. Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes 
 
Hypothesis is accepted, but does not see the linkage between this risk condition and the applicability of spoiler 
theory. The risk condition is not man-made. 
 
Preconditions 
 
(1) This risk condition is not linked to the security situation. For example NATO’s relief operation after the 
earthquake in Pakistan had no security implications. 
 
                                            
353
 ”Jos merkittävä määrä WMD, jos sotilaallinen voimankäyttö on todennäköistä po. suunnitteltu niin että varmasti 
onnistuu. Onnistumisen pitää olla erittäin varmaa, koska poliittinen riski on niin suuri. Vaikka epäonnistumisen fyysiset 
vaikutukset olisivat paikallisia, niin poliittiset vaikutukset olisivat laajalle leviäviä.” 
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Implications 
  
(1) Cynically thinking, the resources would be engaged some time. Evaluation would take into account what 
else is going on, as well as internal and foreign policy considerations.  
 
Future perspectives 
 
Coordination by the international community is vital. The coordination issues relate to the will to be seen 
nationally, interoperability and command structures. 
 
Hypothesis 10 is accepted. 
 
8. Transnational criminal movements 
 
Slightly problematic – how do these movements fit into the grand threat scenarios? There are the type of actors 
that are not compromised with. There will be no negotiations with criminal movements – but rather efforts to 
prevent and limit criminal actions alongside other policing measures. 
 
Preconditions 
 
(1) If in support of police forces, the key preconditions arise from the capability evaluation of the police 
component. If their capabilities are not sufficient, then military capabilities may be used in support. 
(2) Does not necessarily require an international commitment. Can be utilised within a single state or be 
bilateral cooperation between neighbours. Military capabilities used as a last resort. 
 
Implications 
  
(1) Must be clearly defined also with respect to the timeframe, otherwise may drift into a violent spiral. 
 
LTSG (N) MIKKO LAAKKONEN, DIPLOMA THESIS, APPENDIX 6 32(44) 
Future perspectives  
 
Respondent does not see an increase in the trend employing military capabilities.However; international police 
cooperation is likely to continue increasing. 
 
Hypothesis 11 not accepted. See remarks on 1st round of delphi-questions. 
 
9. Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties 
 
Hypothesis 12 not accepted. Hard to visualize – only through many hypotheses. The linkage to the spoiler type 
is especially difficult. If the case is about a total spoiler, may be then it would easier to visualize. 
 
10. Extremism of marginalised groups 
 
Hypothesis accepted - the hypothesis is plausible. The point of view has an impact as well as the level of 
violence, which should be high for intervention to be conducted. 
 
Preconditions 
 
(1) The quality of the extremist group has an impact. If the situation builds up international support for 
intervening, then intervention may happen quickly. Otherwise intervention does not occur quickly. 
(2) Also the military might of the country in question has an impact.  
(3) The prospect of a quick relative change is always to be considered.  
(4) If the rise of an extremist group is about to oust otherwise difficult actors, then this may mean that the 
international community only follows the developments. 
 
Implications 
 
(1) The political evaluation and considerations must take into account the possible raimifications against the 
states participating in the intervention. 
(2) If external intervention is conducted, but there is support for the spoiler from external parties or states, 
then the process is likely to become more difficult. 
(3) Must be prepared for a long-term approach. 
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Future perspectives 
 
Is not an advocate of the idea that the Islamists’ pose a threat. Therefore does not foresee that military 
capabilities would be involved in these situations. 
 
Hypothesis 13 accepted - the hypothesis is plausible. 
 
11. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes 
 
Preconditions 
 
(1) Even if parties to dispute have not requested external parties to intervene, they should allow it and not 
actively resist it. 
(2) A mandate is necessary, not necessarily a UNSC resolution, but legitimacy for the intervention is a 
precondition. Mandate should have a peace enforcement dimension (e.g. UN Charter chapter VII type 
mission). 
 
Implications 
 
(1) The first priority is an effective political process, which requires unity on the issue from the international 
community. The use of military capabilities is a supporting measure. 
 
Future perspectives 
 
The end state is best achieved if the problem is managed before any military action has taken place. 
 
Hypothesis 14 accepted. The hypothesis is plausible and portrays a classic approach. 
Hypothesis 15 accepted with reservations. The hypothesis is plausible and portrays a classic approach. 
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12. Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements 
 
There was no need to cover this risk condition, as respondent does not view it as a case for PSO. 
 
13. Interstate rivalry  
 
This is a classic case and the hypothesis appears logical. One question that comes to the fore is the amount of 
parties to a rivalry. Initially one would think there are only two, but in this case there can be numerous. 
However, some of these parties may not be as important as others. Some considerations: does the military 
action actually relate to the spoiler in this scenario, or is it simple to conduct peace enforcement in this case? 
 
Preconditions 
 
(1) Some regional “African” conflicts would require mediation processes led by regional organisations (e.g. 
ECOWAS, AU). 
(2) If the dispute is small scale and limited, then it does not necessarily require a UN Security Council 
mandate. However, some type of international structure should be in support of the process. 
 
Implications 
  
(1) After a decision to commit to a PSO, the speed at which forces deploy is a concern for all. 
(2) There must be a linkage to a realistic negotiation proces and plausible exit strategies 
(3) Currently the will to commit to PSOs is relatively low. There is a desire to limit commitments to short 
term only. This is evident in the current discussions happening within the EU. The big scale operations 
have gone on for long periods, and implementing exit strategies is difficult. The political will is waning 
alongside the strict financial limitations. 
 
Future perspectives 
Unfortunately this hypothesis is valid, although trends portray that these cases would be on the decrease. 
Especially these cases are likely to appear intertwined with different regional and ethnic dimensions. The 
applicability of peace enforcement is related to the level, intensity and scope of violence. If violence can be 
“capsulated” or if it has wider ramifications, that has an impact. 
Hypothesis 17 accepted. 
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INTERVIEW RESPONSES – RESPONDENT 6 
 
1. Failed Governance 
 
Somalia is an example of a failed state. However, the ‘criminal’ elements of a failed state may form part of the 
future organized governance structure. As an example is that some elements of Somalia’s president Farole’s 
government have links to piracy – similar challenges are related to president Karzai’s government. A peace 
process would not prevail if these elements were excluded on the grounds of suspicion of illegitimate activities. 
In Afganistan the international actors aid and support Karzai’s government, but do not fully accept it. Referring 
to Somalia and USA’s perspective on Islamists: Islamists are viewed as terrorists because they have 
substantiated links to Al-Qaida. Respondent’s perspective is that Al-Qaida influences only in a limited manner 
the overall Islamists’ network – thus control is very regional.354 
 
Respondent does not agree with distinction of total spoilers. As an example is Hamas. Hamas does not accept 
Israel as a state, but based on discussion with other negotiators and diplomats Respondent believes that Hamas 
would accept a ceasefire that lasts for decades (i.e. 100 – 150 years). In this case Hamas would not need to back 
down on its fundamental demand of not accepting Israel – but would accept the ceasefire.355 
 
In general, respondent sees that by categorically excluding Islamists from negotiations the Western states are 
committing a grave mistake. This exclusion is founded on Western states own perception only. As an example 
is Khalil Ibrahim of the JEM (Justice and Equality Movement, Darfur – Sudan). Khalil Ibrahim is political 
Islamist. In Abudja 2005-2006, Respondent was astonished that the EU, USA and AU representatives 
undermined the negotation position of Khalil Ibrahim, and also undermined the fighting power of his followers. 
Neither the World Bank nor EU high representative were willing to meet Khalil Ibrahim. However this faction 
proved to be one of the most influential factions in the coming years. According to Respondent the similar 
situation is present in Afganistan with the Taliban, in Somalia, in Sudan with the JEM and in Gaza with the 
Hamas. In general this means that the intervening international actors have taken sides with one or more of the 
actors – and this actually implies that the intervening international actors are actually a part of any such crisis. 
Thus they are unable to get all the relevant actors into a negotiation process.356 
                                            
354
 Researcher’s comment: May need to involve total spoilers in peace process, which is consistent with Stedman’s theory. 
355
 Researcher’s comment: DEDUCTION: Useful to explore various time perspectives in current conflict settings. Maybe 
an uneasy ceasefire is better than ongoing violent conflict? 
356
 Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITION: a prerequisite for remaining impartial will necessiate the involment of all 
relevant parties and factions. 
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Using the recent history of Sudan and Darfur as an example, respondent made the point that the military does 
not favour military solutions; the civilian counterparts were calling for military solutions.  The military 
counterparts strongly favour a peace process.357 
 
The responsibility to protect civilians will have an emphasis in the future. If there is a prospect of a great 
number of civilian casualties or large refugee movements, then intervention is more likely. 
 
The extent of the planned effort must be manageable. (i.e. ends to means) 
 
On the prospect of becoming a part of a crisis; in order to avoid this, the action should have “one time only” 
character and the action should have a “decisive impact” on the developments. As examples are: (1) the NATO 
bombing actions in Kosovo and (2) the liberation of Kuwait in accordance to the UN Charter, which calls for 
the protection of any member state that becomes the object of military action.358 
 
Hypothesis partly accepted. Reservations: decisive actions could be necessary in support of political 
peace process whilst all relevant actors should be involved.  
Respondent sees the possibility of using “one time only” and “decisive impact” actions in support of a peace 
process. Overall a mandate authorizes an operation, whilst specific actions must remain within the mandate’s 
provided authority. Respondent has reservations on the identification of spoilers as total spoilers – there will be 
a need to negotiate and involve all relevant actors.359 
2. Interstate rivalry 
 
Respondent used the invasion and liberation of Kuwait as an example. Kuwait was a sovereign state, and its 
government in exile requested for assistance. The intervention was authorised by the UN Security Council 
                                            
357
 Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITION: A feasible political process remains crucial in any crisis management 
undertaking, with the military capabilities supporting that effort. 
358
 Researcher’s comment: Avoiding becoming a part of crisis and sustaining impartiality calls for that case by case 
decisions and actions to have decisive impact on the course of events.Overall, this (i.e. decisive) supports utility of peace 
enforcement. 
359 Researcher’s comment: EMPHASIS: Peace process. PRECONDITION: The responsibility to protect civilians will have 
an emphasis in the future. If there is a prospect of a great number of civilian casualties or large refugee movements, then 
intervention is more likely. DEDUCTIONS: (1) To initiate a process, have to accept that it will not be “perfect” textbook 
solution. One will have to accommodate parties and factions, which from developed states’ point of view are not fully 
legitimate. (2) Influence of terrorist networks very regional. (NB. same point as respondent 7 provided!) (3) Will have to 
negotiate with ‘terrorists’! Will have to negotiate with those whose perception of the world one does not agree with. (4) 
What is the impact of time? Must appreciate that the influence of any factions is likely to evolve and develop over time (ref: 
case Hamas). 
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Resolution. However despite this example, in the future there is limited possibility for intervention in interstate 
rivalries. Some kind of ‘focused operations’ may be possible; but operations involving large scale military 
capabilities are not likely to be plausible.  
 
3. OTHER COMMENTS 
 
Broadly on the UN and NATO relationship and differences 
 
On negotiation cultures: In Afganistan the situation seems to be that is the ‘final moment’ to initiate 
negotiations with the Taliban – else it may up in a situation as was in South Vietnam, where the last elements 
supporting external forces had to be rescued. The challenge is that: negotiations with the Taliban seem to cross 
the boundary of acceptable patriotism in the USA – and are therefore not accepted. Meanwhile there is a fear 
that President Karzai’s regime’s loyality for the intervening coalition is eroding.360 
 
Regarding preconditions in the future: there must be a mandate for actions taken. These mandates must be 
evermore clear. The UN Security Council is the authorizing body and provides the mandates. NATO provides 
the military capabilities, and continues to collaborate with other regional organisations (e.g. AU, Arab League) 
for support and coordination of efforts.361 
 
Pertaining to Afganistan and on the ISAF – UN relationship; the civilian development efforts are the key to 
success, and with early ventures a lot of ‘good will’ would have been gained – this did not materialize as the 
UN Security Council was divided on the matter early on. Whilst conducting military crisis management one has 
to consider what effects are caused by the distruction of infrastructure and removal of competent people from 
their posts. Here respondent used the water management systems rebuild in Iraq as an example. Continuing on 
examples occurred in Iraq; the late SRSG to Iraq, Sérgio Vieira de Mello, was accordingly outraged by the 
bypassing of the UN in Iraq.362 
 
Regarding the international system 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
360
 Researcher’s comment: Timing of negotations and appreciation of changed circumstances are highlighted. 
361
 Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITION: A UN Security Council mandate is a prerequisite for actions COMMENT: 
importance of a USNSCR seems to remain in the future, despite alternative views – UNSC remains as custodian of 
international law. 
362
 Researcher’s comment: IMPLICATION: A military component should not start leading the overall crisis management 
operation, but should provide a safe and secure environment for others to operate in. 
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Regarding the international system; Respondent emphasises that the UN sets the rules of play, and ‘news on the 
death of the UN are strongly exagerated”. Respondent sees that the UN concept will remain in the next decade. 
UN provides the mandate for actions, it is the forum of interaction and discussion, whilst all new emerging 
powers remain involved in the UN system. Respondent does not see the structural reform of the UN succeeding 
(e.g the permanent 5 will not change). Any reform should be sector and UN sub-organisation specific and the 
approach from down to top. 
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INTERVIEW RESPONSES – RESPONDENT 7 
 
1. Failed Governance 
 
The level of hostility is challenging in this case: it may appear as low, but even small interventions may spark 
high levels of hostility – thus the potential for hostility is also a factor. Also challenging is distinguishing 
different spoilers – but agree that greedy spoilers. Overall it may seem that interventions are tempting and more 
plausible than they actually are. 
 
Hypothesis 1 is accepted. Reservations: potential for escalation.363 
 
2. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict 
 
This scenario has resemblance of Libya (situation as of spring 2011), which is not a peace support operation 
scenario, but a scenario of war fighting. An intervention is always a political decision – and all political and 
diplomatic means should be exhausted before military action. However this scenario merits for a PSO, as was 
the case in Afganistan where initially the problems with the taliban were known, but the potential for spillover 
rose to the forefront of concerns. Overall this approach where interventions would be conducted is a 
(hyväntahtoinen), and not likely to appear in the real world. The challenge is that: crisis management, peace 
operations or peace support operations have not been explicitly defined. 
 
Hypothesis 2 accepted. Reservations: war fighting scenario. 
Hypothesis 3 accepted. Rreservations: hostility is likely to be high.364 
 
                                            
363
 Researcher’s comments: Idea that greedy spoilers exists is accepted. IMPLICATION: interventions may change the 
level of hostility; if this is the appreciation, then seeking compliance is important; if escalation not likely, then intervention 
impact may be assessed from current setting. PRECONDITION: the level of hostility that is visible is not a single factor, as 
alongside that the potential for escalation of hostility needs to be considered. IMPLICATION: the potential for escalation 
has an impact on force generation and military mode of operations. 
364
 Researcher’s comments: PRECONDITIONS: Must distinguish between PSO and warfighting. Make reference and 
differentiate pre-emption / preventive (ref. Doyle). Intervention is always a political decision, on which potential spillover 
effects has an influence. What is the impact of the overall future scenario?R ECOMMENDATIONS (reference to UN and 
NATO strategies): phasing of effort, clear aims and end states, comprehensive and collective efforts, etc. 
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3. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces  
 
If one accepts the theoretical approach, then this is a good foundation for launching a peace support operation. 
The precondition is that there is no conflict of interest with a powerful regional or local actor. The precondition 
is that the local or regional authority has the same (similar/parallel) interest as any intervening force. 
Intervention is not plausible in a chaotic (sekasortoinen) situation. The current situation of Somalian piracy 
reflects this as well as the situation in Egypt (spring 2011), where it was an overall interest to maintain the Suez 
canal operable. 
 
Hypothesis 4 accepted. Reservations: also limited spoilers would exist.365 
 
 
4. Uncontrolled migration  
 
Not a good or plausible scenario for military crisis management: more a question of humanitarian aid efforts 
and policing. The protection of aid efforts with military means is accepted. The hostility towards states at areas 
of arrival is not a precondition but an implication of the effects of migration (deteriorating living conditions) 
 
Hypothesis 5 accepted. 
Hypothesis 6 accepted.366 
 
5. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories  
 
Setting is problematic, as a limited number of areas where such disputes may arise. The Arctic area does not 
provided such scenario as disputes have been and are likely to be settled through political means. Alongside this 
the demands of China at South China Sea have been countered by political and diplomatic means: i.e. states 
emphasing their strong ties with the US. In contrast areas that are resource-rich but habited may cause conflicts; 
as is the case in the Great Lakes area in Africa. These potential conflicts would be the school examples of 
robust intervention, where the responsibility to protect would be the main incentive. 
 
Hypothesis 7 accepted. Reservations: if happens in habited areas. 
                                            
365
 Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITION: A PSO may be launched if no unacceptable conflict of interest with a strong 
local or regional actor. PRECONDITION: Interventions not likely into chaotic and unclear situations. 
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Hypothesis 8 accepted. Reservations: more likely in habited areas.367 
 
6. Proliferation of WMD/WME  
 
This issue involves also other WMD than only nuclear weapons. Several preconditions must exist in order to 
intervene. Firstly, the country that is about to gain WMD/WME capability must be new and an emerging one – 
not a country that has already established that capability (e.g. Pakistan). Gaining legitimacy for such an 
intervention should be possible (e.g. 2nd Iraq war). Another precondition is that a political process must be 
executed before any military action. It is plausible that against relatively weak actors preventive interventions 
are conducted. 
 
Hypothesis 9 accepted. Reservations: must be against a relatively weak actor with an emerging WMD 
capability.368 
 
7. Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes 
 
Clear without a doubt. 
Hypothesis 10 accepted 
 
8. Transnational criminal movements 
 
Examples can be seen in Mexico, Central America and even Russia. The precondition is that the local capacity 
to resist intervention is low, but other factors need also be considered. For example the Mexican government 
resists international intervention to support its campaigns against the drug cartels – Mexico is one of the states 
that emphasise sovereignty. Emphasis of state sovereignty varies from country to country and from region to 
region, but in certain areas the participants of an intervention force are a very crucial factor. As Afganistan 
shows; fighting criminality (drug crime) and attempting nation building simultaneously is extremely 
                                                                                                                                                                 
366
 Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITION: Gravitates towards humanitarian aid, and thus not suitable for evaluating 
peace enforcement measures. Protection of humanitarian aid efforts (i.e. peacekeeping measures) accepted. 
IMPLICATION: Level of hostility is an implication not a “given”.  
367
 Researcher’s comment: Conflicts not considered likely in uninhabited areas, but in habited areas there is potential for 
conflicts. Intervention in such cases would be justified and legitimacy gained by the “responsibility to protect” 
framework.IMPLICATION: Likely to be settled through political means. However in certain areas the responsibility to 
protect incentive will be sufficient to intervene. 
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challenging. However, USA conducts joint campaigns with Columbia targeting drug crime there (Plan 
Colombia). The challenge is that drug crime instigates many other forms of activity (e.g. law enforcement and 
corruption). In Columbia there is funtioning government albeit its legitimacy may have been questioned. The 
Plan Colombia has slightly increased its legitimacy, and the government is more or less approaching democratic 
standards. However fighting crime (e.g. drug crime) in one country has the effect of moving crime to another 
deprived area. Therefore this is a serious threat for e.g. Mexico, small Central American states, Caribbean states 
and West African states. 
 
Hypothesis 11 accepted. Reservations: authorizers and participants of an intervening force must consider 
follow on effects.369 
 
9. Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties 
 
The threshold for intervening with incentive of “responsibility to protect” is high, and is likely to even higher in 
the future as authoritarian regimes gain more influence within the international system. The threat must be a 
direct threat to the physical security of a population. Current situation North Africa in general and Libya in 
particular serve as a case studies. Only when the physical security of citizens was clearly threatened was there 
enough incentives for the UNSC to pass a resolution and nation states to act accordingly.  
 
Hypothesis 12 not accepted.370 
 
10. Extremism of marginalised groups  
 
It is important to note that the impact of extremism of marginalised groups is often local or at most regional. 
Furthermore it is religion oriented. Thus they cannot be considered as total. However groups like Al-Qaida can 
be considered as total. In contrast Hizbollah and Hamas can be considered as greedy spoilers, as they work as 
                                                                                                                                                                 
368
 Researcher’s comment: DEDUCTION: as respondent refers only to emerging capabilities – thus the actions would be 
preventive (i.e. against potential threats), but this would raise the concerns about the legality and legitimacy of such 
actions as the threat is not imminent? 
369
 Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITIONS: respect of state sovereignty may be unsurpassable. A functioning 
government in the area provides a far better starting point for combating transnational crime, than attempting to do both 
crime prevention and nation building simultaneously. IMPLICATIONS: The correct (i.e. acceptable) participants of an 
intervention force is crucial. One must consider follow on effects of successful operations towards other states; will 
success somewhere merely move the problem elsewhere. RECOMMENDATION: politically acceptable and impartial 
intervening forces 
370
 Researcher’s comment: In many instances power politics of great powers overrides concerns about responsibility to 
protect.  PRECONDITION: A threat must be a direct threat to the physical security of a population. 
LTSG (N) MIKKO LAAKKONEN, DIPLOMA THESIS, APPENDIX 6 43(44) 
proxies for Iran and Syria at times, but limited spoilers in their aims regarding their own area. Hizbollah has 
been flexible – which supports the greedy spoiler theory; whilst Hamas has functioned tactically – which also 
supports the greedy spoiler theory, but it has been total towards Israel. The question this raises is: From whose 
point of view is a group considered a total spoiler? Al-Qaida arrived to the scene as a new phenomenon, not 
respecting boundaries. For example and in contrast a Palestinian suicide bomber may attack in Israel, but is not 
likely to attack in Spain. 
 
Hypothesis 13 accepted. Supporting case is Afganistan. 
 
11. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes 
 
More often the case is protection of an achieved peace process, not a case of intervening and using peace 
enforcement means. Border disputes have occurred and will occur in the future. It will not be possible to 
identify legitimate or illegitimate demands. It is likely that external military capabilities are only used once 
parties are committed to a peace process in order to safeguard such a process. 
 
Hypothesis 14 accepted when referring to responsbility to protect civilians. Reservations: legitimate and 
illegitimate demands difficult to identify. 
Hypothesis 15 accepted with reservations - see above.371 
 
 
12. Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements  
 
Peace enforcement against cybercrime would be most suitable and even subject to plausible development 
measures. 
 
Hypothesis 16 accepted 
 
                                            
371
  Researcher’s comments: Peacekeeping has its place (protect peace process) traditional peacekeeping; not likely that 
interventions to impose peace. PRECONDITION: protecting peace not imposing it. IMPLICATION: peacekeeping 
measures called for. 
LTSG (N) MIKKO LAAKKONEN, DIPLOMA THESIS, APPENDIX 6 44(44) 
13. Interstate rivalry  
 
Preconditions are that intervention in most cases will require a UNSC resolution; a common understanding that 
intervention would be successful in stopping the rivalry by the fact that rival parties are relatively weak or the 
level of rivalry is low. The intervening force must also be able to overwhelm one or both parties simultaneously. 
 
Hypothesis 17 accepted. Reservations: see above preconditions. 
 
 
14. OTHER COMMENTS 
 
Contemporary military crisis management operations (i.e. peace support operations) have been developed on the 
basis of lessons learned in the wars of former Yugoslavia. Maybe the lessons learnt from Afganistan are only 
starting to be incorporated? Libya was a surprise – the undeciveness of the US is typical, as it follows the 
pattern that occurred in Bosnia. The UNSC voting by Germany on Libya might even be an accident, but surely 
is a mystery. 
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Iterative round of delphi-questions for diploma thesis: 
“Military crisis management in the next decade (2020-2030)” 
 
INTRODUCTION AND INSTRUCTIONS 
 
The 3rd round of delphi-questions is an integral part of the delphi-research method. The aim of the 3rd round of 
delphi-questions is to consolidate the findings of the 2nd round.  
 
The responses to the 2nd round are in the following draft. The draft is exhaustive, but to make the task more 
manageable I have highlighted the text parts that merit specific attention: 
- a unique finding provided by a panelist = purple highlight  (5 parts within the text) 
- a contradiction amongst the delphi-panel = yellow highlight (11 parts within the text) 
- a finding that is not robust or researcher’s elaboration = turqoise (9 parts within the text) 
 
The contradictions are the primary focus at this stage. I request that you provide your comments to the 
highlighted parts in at least the following format: 
- strongly agree 
- agree 
- disagree 
- strongly disagree 
If possible, please provide short argumentation especially in the cases were you disagree.  
 
I appreciate your earlies possible responses. Responses received by 26th of July 2011 will be incorporated. 
 
With many thanks and kind regards, 
 
Mikko Laakkonen 
Student officer, General Staff Officer Course 55, National Defence University, Finland 
+358-40-5808611, mikko.laakkonen@mil.fi 
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Testing the Hypotheses: 2nd Round of Delphi-questions 
 
-- 
 
5.4.1 Failed Governance 
 
Preconditions. Cognizance of what is good governance versus what is failed governance is a fundamental 
precondition for anyone planning, participating or conducting a peace support operation.372 -- 
 
A fundamental precondition is that defining spoilers is founded on the selected point of view. One must 
appreciate that spoilers are defined from the peace process’ point of view (i.e. parties of a peace process and 
their external interlocutors). --  
 
5.4.2 Potential Spill-over of Ethnic, Religious or Ideological conflict  
 
-- 
One may argue that this is an “illogical” type of conflict as versus a “logical” type of conflict. As an example, a 
logical type of conflict may have its root cause in economy. It is argued that illogical type of conflict has root 
causes in ethnicity, religion or ideology. Based on this point of view it is important to highlight ideological 
reconciliation.   
-- 
 
5.4.3 Vulnerability of Strategic Chokepoints and Infrastructures in Ungoverned Spaces373  
 
--. 
 
-- The vulnerability of strategic chokepoints is a more grand interstate level conflict scenario. -- 
                                            
372
 This point is supported by the argumentation available in United Kingdom Ministry of Defence: Global Strategic Trends 
- Out to 2040, Strategic Trends Programme, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), 4th edition, 2010, pp. 
10-14,17. 
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The delfi-panel provided conflicting views related to acceptance. It is argued that the political will to intervene 
is paramount, whilst the local acceptance is not considered. This suggests that the priorities of preconditions 
change in this scenario. The conflicting view is that vulnerability should also be experienced as a problem at 
the local and regional level. A mission cannot appear from nowhere. It is also argued, that there should not be a 
conflict of interest with a powerful local or regional actor. Local or regional actors should have similar or 
parallel interest as any intervening force. Furthermore, it is argued that intervention is not plausible in a chaotic 
situation.  
 
-- 
 
The panel has different views on what is truly strategic, as was elaborated earlier. In relation to this the panel 
provides a view that international community as a whole would not be likely to intervene. Rather an 
intervention would be conducted by individual states or coalitions with a strategic interest in the matter. 
 
5.4.4 Uncontrolled Migration 
 
-- 
 
5.4.5 Potential Disputes over Previously Uninhabited and Resource-rich Territories  
 
Preconditions. These disputes are more likely to occur intrastate. They are not likely in uninhabited areas374. --- 
. The hypotheses are accepted with reservations, but the acceptance is not robust375. Firstly, it is pointed out 
that actually all three types of spoilers (i.e. limited, greedy or total) may appear as the significant spoiler. 
Secondly, it is highlighted that this scenario is likely to happen in habited areas rather than in uninhabited areas. 
 
5.4.6 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction or Weapons of Mass Effect376  
                                                                                                                                                                 
373
 The definition of ungoverned space was elaborated during the interviews. The respondents provided their responses 
within a background where ungoverned was extended to geographical space in general. 
374
 Researcher’s comment: The risk condition’s definition ”uninhabited” may be there because of political considerations 
and potential political ramifications. As it is a NATO public document it could purposefully avoid pointing out inter- or 
intrastate disputes; in order not to escalate such disputes. 
375
 Two panelists accept and two panelists accept partly, whilst three panelists did not provide responses. 
376
 Henceforth WMD/WME. 
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Preconditions. --. Overall nothing should be left for chance in the planning for countering this risk condition. 
However, it is argued that the military preconditions are less generic - there is more “free hand” in this case. --  
 
As a counter-argument it is stated that matching a crisis management strategy to this scenario is extremely 
difficult, and therefore it should not be explored further377. --. The hypothesis gains acceptance amongst the 
panel, although the finding is not robust378. The reservations are encompassed in the preconditions. 
 
5.4.7 Consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes 
 
-- 
 
5.4.8 Transnational criminal movements 
 
-- However fighting crime in one country has the effect of moving crime to another deprived area. policing 
measures. Therefore criminal elements cannot be defined as greedy spoilers, and the hypothesis is not accepted 
in this form. 
 
5.4.9 Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties  
-- 
 
5.4.10 Extremism of marginalised groups  
 
Preconditions. Extremism of marginalised groups is a risk condition is always present in a crisis management 
scenario. In these scenarios there are are multiple actors present, of which some are likely to be marginalised and 
become extremist. However, the impact of extremist marginalised groups is often local or at the most regional.  
-- -- 
 
One implication is physical segregation, which is against instinct of panelist. But one may establish zones of 
separation, as has been explored in the Darfur Peace Process. -- 
                                            
377
 This refers to responses by respondent no. 4. 
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5.4.11 Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes  
 
-- 
 
5.4.12 Technological exploitation by criminal or rogue elements 
 
-- 
 
Hypothesis. Hypothesis no. 16 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition greedy spoilers exist, and this justifies 
for peace enforcement measures. This hypothesis received lucid support alongside views which do not accept it. 
The opposing views built the argumentation on the foundation that military ways and means or peace support 
operations do not have a role in countering this risk condition. Quite intentionally the hypothesis does not 
describe the ways and means how such peace enforcement could be conducted. It is plausible that the military 
means could be intelligence gathering and logistical support, but importantly the military could also kinetically 
target criminal or rogue elements that actually exploit technology with malicious intentions.  
 
-- 
 
5.4.13 Interstate rivalry 
 
--. It is stated that the intervening force should be able to overwhelm one or both parties simultaneously. This 
relates to the number of parties involved. Initially one would think there are only two, but in this case there can 
be numerous parties that affect the situation. However, some of these parties may not be as important as others.  
 
-- 
 
Hypothesis. Hypothesis no. 17 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition greedy spoilers exist, and this justifies 
for peace enforcement measures. The hypothesis received support; although its acceptance is subject to 
preconditions. One reservation is that this hypothesis applies to an interstate conflict with regional character, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
378
 Three panelist accept the hypothesis, whilst three do not provide adequate response and one does not see the risk 
condition relevant for crisis management operations. 
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and especially to a conflict between neighbour states. Alongside two undecided respondents, one respondent 
does not accept the hypothesis. This opposing view is founded on the basis that as one must have the consent of 
the rivalries, thus a peace enforcement mode is not possible. 
 
One may argue that this opposing view does not fully appreciate the definition of impartiality,. The definition 
pertains to the consent of the main parties of a conflict. If there are other parties involved or proxy forces that 
have become uncontrollable; peace enforcement may be a necessity in resolving an interstate rivalry. If either of 
the main parties behaves as a greedy spoiler, defining peace enforcement becomes difficult. One may argue that 
even in such cases peace enforcement may be relevant, for at least limited periods of time, provided that the 
actions conducted are consistent with the mandate. This elaboration supports the earlier notion that spoilers are 
defined from the peace processes point of view. 
 
Future Perspectives 
 
-- 
. However, the threshold for the international community to intervene is lower on a conceptual level, but not 
necessarily in practice. -- 
 
--. Some of these considerations pertain to the responsibility to protect. For example, challenging considerations 
are: how to protect, when to protect and what are the interests of a limited number of people versus an entire 
nation’s interests. In generic terms, the needs of the periphery must be factored in plans and actions, whilst 
appreciating that migration will exist in the future. 
 
Disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories are likely to occur. However, these disputes 
are likely not to be so severe that they necessarily lead to armed conflict. It is propable that agreements are 
reached through political negotiations and mediation. Technology -- 
 
Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes are more likely to happen intrastate. -- 
 
On a more generic note pertaining to the use of military power; one should explore the possibility of using “one 
time only” and “decisive impact” actions in support of a peace process. -- 
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Rely on Consent or Enforce Compliance 
--. 
 
Posture of peace 
support operation 
Associated risk condition Primary reason for 
PSO’s posture 
Assessment of 
propability 
peace enforcement failed governance greedy spoiler highly certain 
peace enforcement potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, 
ideological conflict 
total spoiler highly certain 
peace enforcement vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and 
infrastructures in ungoverned spaces 
greedy spoiler highly certain 
peace enforcement extremism of marginalised groups total spoiler highly certain 
peace enforcement territorial and extra-territorial border disputes greedy spoiler highly certain 
peace enforcement interstate rivalry greedy spoiler propable 
peace enforcement technological exploitation by criminal or rogue 
elements 
greedy spoiler propable 
peace enforcement potential disputes over previously uninhabited 
and resource-rich territories 
greedy spoiler possible 
peace enforcement proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
or effect 
greedy and total spoilers possible 
peace enforcement transnational criminal movements support police operations possible 
peacekeeping potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, 
ideological conflict 
high hostility highly certain 
peacekeeping uncontrolled migration protection of aid efforts highly certain 
peacekeeping consequences from environmental 
catastrophes or changes 
protection of aid efforts highly certain 
peacekeeping territorial and extra-territorial border disputes limited spoiler highly certain 
peacekeeping potential disputes over previously uninhabited 
and resource-rich territories 
limited spoiler possible 
  
Table: Illustration of key research findings 
 
 
 
 
 
